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When they realize it's not your first rodeo

HOTD

MINDFIXTV NEWS REPORT: FOR THE FIRST TIME: Long-Sought 9/11 Records Released to the Public 25 Years After the Attacks Twenty-five years after September 11, Americans are getting access to a major collection of long-sought government records that the public has never before been able to examine in this form. The Public Interest Declassification Board announced today that after nearly two decades of advocacy, a collection of records relating to 9/11 has been declassified and made available to the public for the first time. This does not mean all 9/11 records were secret until today. Many have been public for years. What is new is this particular collection of previously unavailable material. There are two major parts to today's story. The National Archives has released an approximately 7,000-word internal 9/11 Commission summary of President's Daily Brief intelligence, along with previously classified Commission interview memoranda involving Condoleezza Rice, Samuel Berger, Richard Clarke, Michael Scheuer and former CIA Director George Tenet. Those National Archives records carry a declassification date of September 8, 2026, and were made public today. Separately, CIA Director John Ratcliffe announced today that he declassified 71 President's Daily Brief products related to 9/11, totaling more than 100 pages of CIA analysis, much of it publicly available for the first time. And when you start reading what was being reported in the years before September 11, one subject jumps off the page almost immediately. Aircraft. The 9/11 Commission's President's Daily Brief, or PDB, Review Team examined 353 intelligence articles from 1998 through September 20, 2001 involving al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan and related terrorism issues. It identified a core group of 24 articles that specifically discussed possible terrorist attacks inside the United States and/or al-Qaeda's possible use of aircraft. Then you get to September 10, 1998. That PDB said there was no conclusive information about bin Laden's future attack plans, but reported that he had recently said his preferred option was to strike the United States on its own soil, in Washington. Then comes the line that will immediately get people's attention. A walk-in source claimed that the same group responsible for the African embassy bombings might fly an explosive-packed airplane into an American city. The source matters. This was a walk-in, not a confirmed intelligence asset, and the same PDB warned that people walking into U.S. facilities overseas offering information could themselves be casing those facilities. So the intelligence came with uncertainty attached to it. But the warning was recorded on September 10, 1998, three years and one day before 9/11. Less than three months later came another striking report, and the full document itself is now public. The December 4, 1998 PDB was titled "Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks." It said reporting suggested bin Laden and his allies were preparing for attacks in the United States, including an aircraft hijacking intended to obtain the release of Shaykh Omar Abdel-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef and Muhammad Sadiq Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya saying that as of late October the group had completed planning for an operation inside the United States on behalf of bin Laden, but that the operation was on hold. The brief then reported that Gama'at leader Islambuli, in late September, was planning to hijack a U.S. airliner within the next couple of weeks to free Abdel-Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what the document described as possibly a different source. That same source said late the previous month that bin Laden might implement plans to hijack a U.S. aircraft before Ramadan began on December 20, and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport. The document said some members of the bin Laden network had received hijack training. It also stated, in the same breath, that no group directly tied to bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization had ever carried out an aircraft hijacking. It noted that bin Laden could be weighing other kinds of operations against U.S. aircraft, citing reporting that the Gama'at had obtained SA-7 missiles in October and intended to move them from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, failing that, a U.S. military or civilian aircraft. The memorandum was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center. Then comes August 6, 2001. This one matters because the newly released Commission summary gives us more context around the famous PDB titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US." The document explicitly warned that intelligence officials had been unable to corroborate some of the more sensational earlier threat reporting, including a 1998 report that bin Laden wanted to hijack an American aircraft to force the release of the Blind Sheikh and other imprisoned extremists. That caveat was set in boldface in the original. And then the document essentially says, nevertheless, the FBI was seeing something. The PDB reported patterns of suspicious activity inside the United States consistent with preparations for hijackings or other attacks. It mentioned recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York. It said the FBI was conducting approximately 70 full-field investigations across the country that it considered bin Laden-related. And the CIA and FBI were investigating a call to the U.S. Embassy in the UAE claiming that a group of bin Laden supporters was already inside the United States planning attacks with explosives. So the picture was not a neat intelligence trail pointing directly toward what happened on September 11. It was a mixture of warnings, questionable sources, uncorroborated reports, active investigations and pieces of information spread across different agencies. But now add what senior officials later told the 9/11 Commission behind closed doors. Richard Clarke, who served as the top counterterrorism official at the National Security Council under both the Clinton and Bush administrations, told investigators that the idea of using an aircraft as a missile was very much on his mind years before 9/11. He specifically discussed the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, where officials were concerned that an aircraft could be flown into the stadium during the opening ceremonies. The government ultimately assembled an improvised defense system involving Patriot radar, an AWACS aircraft, chase aircraft and other measures designed to identify and respond to an incoming plane. That makes another portion of the newly public testimony particularly important. Condoleezza Rice told the Commission that she had misspoken during a May 2002 press conference when she said nobody could have imagined terrorists using airplanes as missiles. Rice said she should have said that she personally had not imagined it, because she later learned that earlier reports involving that tactic existed. Commission general counsel Dan Marcus then pointed something out to her. Italian authorities had been concerned enough about terrorists potentially using aircraft as missiles that they closed the airspace over Genoa during the 2001 G8 summit and deployed air-defense batteries. Rice responded that she did not know why no one had made what she called the "leap of imagination." She also said she did not know why the various elements had not been pulled together. Her testimony provides important context about the summer of 2001 as well. She told the Commission that most of the threat reporting at that time pointed overseas. But she said President Bush was concerned about where else attacks could occur, and that she and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card asked Clarke about bringing domestic agencies into the alert. According to Rice, general warnings then went out inside the United States, including an FAA circular specifically citing concern about hijackings. Rice also addressed the August 6 PDB directly. She told the Commission it mentioned the contact with the U.S. Embassy in the UAE about someone wanting to use explosives inside the United States. In her assessment, that seemed to be a crank call, and she said there was nothing to act on domestically. That brings us to another major part of these records. Iran. The 9/11 Commission's PDB summary contains an entire section titled "Iran and Iraq." The report says both countries occasionally appeared in intelligence concerning possible state support for bin Laden, but that the PDB gave more attention to Iran. A January 8, 1998 intelligence report summarized in the document said many sources indicated that bin Laden and Iran's Revolutionary Guards, the IRGC, had worked together since 1992 in training and smuggling weapons for Islamic extremists. The report also described intelligence linking Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC to training for bin Laden's followers. Several sources indicated that bin Laden had initiated contacts with high-ranking Iranian government officials and that those conversations intensified in 1997. But again, there were caveats. One report claimed that Iran, Sudan and bin Laden had agreed to work together in late 1991. The intelligence community said that claim could not be corroborated, although analysts considered it consistent with the beginning of IRGC cooperation with Sudan around that time. By the summer of 1999, the summary says there was evidence of fresh contacts between the IRGC and bin Laden, including reporting about proposed cooperation involving Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and bin Laden. The CIA was wary about whether that account was true. Then, in December 2000, another PDB raised the possibility of joint action involving Hezbollah, Iran and bin Laden. Again, the document says intelligence officials had reservations about the accuracy of those reports. That material obviously takes on additional significance today because the United States and Iran are currently engaged in an active military conflict. But the closed-door interviews reveal something else that I think people need to see. Senior American officials did not all interpret the Iran and al-Qaeda intelligence the same way. And nowhere is that clearer than in their discussions of the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Khobar Towers was a separate terrorist attack five years before 9/11. But the interviews matter here because they reveal how senior U.S. intelligence and national security officials were evaluating Iran, Hezbollah and possible al-Qaeda connections during the same broader period. Richard Clarke told the Commission that he believed Iran's Quds Force, directed by senior levels of the Iranian government, was responsible for Khobar. But when it came to bin Laden's possible involvement, Clarke said he never received a definitive answer from the intelligence community. He said U.S. officials knew that al-Qaeda personnel regularly transited Iran and that al-Qaeda was in contact with the IRGC, and he raised the possibility that al-Qaeda operatives may have provided logistical support to those behind the attack. Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's bin Laden unit, saw things differently. Scheuer recalled intelligence making the case that Khobar might have been a joint operation involving al-Qaeda and Iranian entities. He said he believed the theory that Iran alone organized the attack was a "fantasy." He thought it was possible that al-Qaeda and Iran or Hezbollah cooperated on training and travel arrangements. But this is where the full context matters. Scheuer was also intensely skeptical that bin Laden would have depended on another organization to carry out an operation. He told the Commission that bin Laden did not want to be involved with state sponsors, particularly Iran, which Scheuer considered incompetent. Former CIA Director George Tenet gave investigators yet another version. Tenet cited the IRGC working with Saudi Hezbollah as having been behind the Khobar Towers attack. He said he could not remember exactly when that conclusion had been reached, but recalled that bin Laden received a congratulatory message in Sudan after the bombing. When Commission investigators asked Tenet why the United States had not retaliated against Iran after Khobar, his first answer was straightforward. He did not remember and said he would need to check the record. Tenet then added that deciding what to do about Iran was an enormously difficult problem. He described Iran as a far different military target than Afghanistan and discussed Hezbollah's ability to retaliate around the world. Then there is former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. Berger told the Commission that he believed Khobar had links to the Iranian government, although he was never sure how high inside the Iranian regime those links went. He said the Clinton administration had evidence pointing toward Iranian involvement, but he distinguished that from having a definitive intelligence judgment. Berger also said Saudi authorities refused to give American investigators access to suspects because they feared that U.S. investigators would uncover evidence of Iranian government involvement, leading America to attack Iran and Iran to retaliate against Saudi Arabia. But Berger then added another significant piece. He said CIA Director Tenet never had clear evidence establishing responsibility for Khobar and did not share Richard Clarke's degree of certainty about Iranian involvement. Berger also said he himself was unaware of information connecting the Khobar attack to al-Qaeda or bin Laden. There is one more Iran document in this release that deserves attention, and it is dated five weeks before the attacks. On August 2, 2001, responding to a specific request from a senior administration official, the PDB carried an article titled "Intelligence cases against Iran and UBL in the Khobar Towers bombing." According to the Commission's summary, that reporting pointed toward Iranian support rather than toward bin Laden. It said the intelligence confirmed Saudi Hezbollah involvement with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It said Iranian officials sponsored training and probably had foreknowledge of the attack, encouraged it and privately claimed credit. It said reporting from one foreign service directly implicated Supreme Leader Khamenei. The same article then laid out the other side. It noted that a few reports suggested a possible role for bin Laden, pointing to explosives smuggled into Saudi Arabia in 1994 and 1995, including a later report that explosives sent from Sudan to Yemen were used in the attack, and an unconfirmed source claiming bin Laden took credit. It also noted that two terrorists implicated in the USS Cole bombing professed ties to the Khobar bombers. That disagreement may be one of the most important things to understand about all of these documents. They do not present a clean story in which every intelligence official knew the same things and reached the same conclusions. They show intelligence being collected in fragments. Some sources were considered reliable and others questionable. Some reports were corroborated and others never were. Senior officials disagreed with each other. Some were more certain than others. And sometimes the intelligence community itself was unwilling to go as far as individual policymakers were willing to go. That does not make the newly released material less significant. It makes it more important to read carefully. The CIA itself says the products released today trace analysts' evolving understanding of al-Qaeda and their attempts to warn about bin Laden's attack plotting despite what the agency describes as sparse, vague and imperfect information. And yet, looking backward 25 years later, the pieces now sitting in front of the public are striking. There were reports of bin Laden wanting to strike the United States on its own soil. There was a walk-in warning about an explosive-packed airplane being flown into an American city. There was reporting about a hijacking plot and operatives evading security during a trial run at a New York airport. There were reports that some members of bin Laden's network had received hijacking training. There were FBI investigations across the country and reports of suspicious activity consistent with preparations for hijackings or other attacks. There were senior counterterrorism officials who had already contemplated airplanes being used as missiles years before September 11. And there were years of intelligence reports examining contacts and possible cooperation between bin Laden's network, Iran's Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah, while officials simultaneously argued over what those connections actually meant. Sandy Berger gave the Commission a warning that belongs in this conversation. He cautioned investigators against viewing the world before September 11 entirely through what we learned afterward. He said history is seen through a rearview mirror, but "history is lived through a foggy windshield." That's fair. But today we have more of that rearview mirror than the American public had yesterday. I am not going to tell you what conclusion you should reach. Read the dates. Look at what intelligence officials were reporting. Look at what senior government officials later told the 9/11 Commission privately. Look at where they agreed. Look at where they contradicted one another. Then come to your own conclusions. And this may still not be the end of the story. The Public Interest Declassification Board said today that while this release represents meaningful progress, important questions surrounding 9/11 remain and additional records of public interest still warrant review and possible declassification. Twenty-five years later, another part of the record has finally been opened. ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES: National Archives, 9/11 Commission PDB Review Team Report: [archives.gov/files/declassif…](archives.gov/files/declassif…) National Archives, Newly Declassified 9/11 Commission Memoranda for the Record: [archives.gov/declassificatio…](archives.gov/declassificatio…) CIA, President's Daily Briefs Released for the 25th Anniversary of 9/11: [cia.gov/stories/story/cia-re…](cia.gov/stories/story/cia-re…) CIA, 71 Declassified President's Daily Brief Products: [cia.gov/stories/story/cia-re…](cia.gov/stories/story/cia-re…) Public Interest Declassification Board / National Archives, Long-Sought 9/11 Records Now Declassified and Available to the Public: [transforming-classification.…](transforming-classification.…) #September11 #911Files #Declassified #CIA #NationalArchives #MindfixTV

The first car to park on the trailer wins , I’ve never been so invested in a sport like this

Another another 9/11 video I found

I'm going through old footage of 9/11, and this one really shows what it was like for people who weren't even in the immediate vicinity of the towers. Absolutely insane

Family guy postpartum depression joke🔞

Unc went to Thailand and met a gorgeous girl there!

Right under our noses the Russians have developed a more advanced version of @powerslap ✋🍑👀

''Rumania'': Por este deporte de cachetear culos que se hace más famoso cada año

There was one more person who unintentionally captured the moment the 9/11 attacks began. Pavel Hlava was filming the Twin Towers from a distance when American Airlines Flight 11 struck the North Tower. He did not even realize he had captured the impact until he reviewed the tape later. He kept filming, and minutes later also recorded Flight 175 striking the South Tower, with the roar of the plane clearly audible as it approached. By pure chance, Hlava captured both attacks on the same tape. His footage of the first impact is far less circulated than Jules Naudet’s, but it may be the only other known video of the moment the first plane hit the World Trade Center.

You know how every few years you’ll see footage that you’ve never seen before on 9/11 and wonder how you’ve never seen it before Well that’s exactly what this is for me Chris York is on a family vacation and most of his footage is on the rooftop of Liberty Court a few blocks away from the World Trade Center In it, you see clear footage of the twin towers about a week before the September 11th attacks. Beautiful day, manhattan looks great. Then there’s a long delay in his camera roll. When it resumes (1 minute mark) the north tower is struck. You can see the earliest first responders at the base of wtc1 - including battalion chief’s Joseph pfiefer While Chris is filming, the South tower is struck, and he recalled later that he could physical feel the blast and the heat of the explosion. In my opinion this is rare footage and perspective 500 feet above the streets and 500 feet below the strikes. Never forget what took place 25 years ago today. Love and respect to those involved, those affected, and our great heroes who saved so many lives. Good bless America and its people.

A gentlemen who was at his desk within the world financial center heard a loud explosion and went out to the west side highway to see what was going on. Mid-interview, the south tower is hit

The jumpers started at 8:46. Networks had the tape. They hid Americans choosing the air over the fire. Then they spent 25 years treating the word Islam like a crime. The footage was “too graphic.” The truth was forbidden. This day is stamped in my heart forever...