The Trump-Xi summit should be viewed not as a one-off but rather as another diplomatic spike in a long year:
1. The state visit was the second of four U.S.-China summit opportunities in 2026. And even more than last time, this one was more sizzle than steak.
2. Heavy on the pageantry, there were more military flyovers than substantive agreements. The two sides extended the trade truce, but only by two months, reduced tariffs on $30B in goods, and announced an AI dialogue.
3. For China, the visit was a major opportunity to show the world - and the Chinese people - that Xi and Trump are two superpower leaders, and that the Chinese leader is now recognized as such. Hence the U.S. literally rolling out the red carpet, top CEOs joining him in Washington, the President greeting his plane, etc.
4. There was naturally wall-to-wall coverage in the Chinese press. The summit served Beijing’s narrative of an inexorably rising China.
5. The U.S. got two pandas, which is something, I suppose. It seems to have gotten nothing on Taiwan, the South China Sea, gray zone activity, Iran, Russia-Ukraine, AI distillation, human rights, or other grievances.
6. Instead, stability was the watchword. Both sides emphasized commonalities and abstract goals rather than the reality of strategic competition or the very real divergence in outlook.
7. Xi even invoked history to remind Americans that they once teamed with China to fight Japanese militarism. Perhaps, he suggested, we’re seeing echoes of that era today.
8. That perturbed some Japanese experts. Perhaps, if Xi repeats often enough that the U.S. and China were once united against Japan, Americans could be convinced to do it again? No chance. The Chinese and Japanese governments were very different back then, to put it mildly.
9. No one today confuses the two or believes that Japan, rather China, represents America’s great long run strategic challenge. Even Trump, despite his affection for Xi and his 1980s mindset on Japan, says the U.S. needs to beat China on AI.
10. It’s good to keep up bilateral communications, given the power of both sides and the stakes in the U.S.-China relationship. Rather than simply look ahead to the next opportunities in Shenzhen and Miami, however, Washington should focus on everything that happens in between the meetings.
11. That means returning to vigorous competition, strengthening the U.S. position in all ways, working closely with American allies and partners, and constraining key Chinese capabilities. We have a long way to go in reassuming a strategic mindset.