On Argentina. I have been asked my views. I am no expert on Argentina, but here they are. (A very nice exercise in open economy macro…)
Exchange rate-based stabilization typically leads to an overvalued exchange rate for some time (even if the underlying cause of inflation, the money-financed deficit, is taken care of). Inflation comes down, but not as fast as the nominal exchange rate is allowed to depreciate. Over time, the overvaluation may slowly go away, and this is indeed happening in Argentina.
But as overvaluation lasts, and interest rates remain high, the risk that voters lose patience becomes higher. Or other shocks can come in play, a corruption scandal making the government less popular.
And the anticipation that voters will reject the government and the program will come to an end, leads people (domestic or foreign) to anticipate a larger depreciation, and try to move out of pesos into dollars which leads to a run on reserves. This is particularly the case when the economy is already partly dollarized, and people can easily shift from pesos to dollars. I think this is what we see in Argentina.
Can lending by the US (or the IMF) solve the issue? Some say it is just a band aid. It is more complex than that. If the Milei program cannot succeed anyway, then it is indeed just money poured down the drain. If, instead, if the Milei program is slowly working, the new funds increase reserves and allow the government to continue without a crisis, leading in turn to more support for Milei in the next election, and allowing the adjustment to continue, it may not. This is the relevant discussion.
For more informed opinions, follow
@Monica_debolle and
@IvanWerning (whom I thank for very useful discussions. opinion still only mine)