Dafuq Rube Goldberg policy are we cooking up now?
Dude. There’s an elephant in the room nobody dares mention.
The US runs massive trade deficits because wypipos can’t do mafs. It’s easier to sell down assets to buy manufactured goods.
Wypipos aren’t jess a little behind. We’re talking multiple standard deviations… orders of magnitude of mafs deficiency. There jess aren’t enough technically competent Americans to make anything.
Sorry. I don’t make the rules.
Everything else… from exchange rates to subsidies to industrial policy are either rounding errors or a policy expression of wypipos can’t do mafs (or chinx can do mafs).
The low hanging fruit isn’t your Rube Goldberg exchange rate policy nobody can understand… it’s to get your kids to do their mafs homework.
The fundamental flaw of Plaza 1.0 was that it was a one time revaluation, where countries agreed to push the currency to a certain level and then let it go.
But a one time revaluation can be offset with any number of counteracting policies, anything that implicitly taxes consumers and subsidizes producers. This is exactly what Japan did in response to Plaza 1.0 (explanation at the end).
The currency moved once, and then the policy distortions that led to the need for Plaza went right back to work. And the same result will happen again if we design it as a one time revaluation.
A durable solution requires that the currency be continually determined by the trade account, and not the capital account.
Under a one time revaluation, a country can enact policies to offset the revaluation so that the trade account resists rebalancing. But under a system where the currency is continuously determined by the trade account, those offsets are self defeating, because the persisting surplus keeps forcing the currency up. The adjustment doesn’t stop until the surplus closes.
Whatever we call the next currency agreement, it should not be based on setting a predetermined level. Instead we must institute a mechanism that ensures currency values are continuously driven by the trade account and not the capital account. That will allow currencies to fulfill the role Keynes and others at Bretton Woods envisioned: a regime that reacts to the trade account so that trade naturally rebalances and persistent imbalances cannot exist.
*While currency changes matter, they’re not the only factor driving external balances.
Despite the massive yen appreciation, Japan’s current account surplus actually expanded post-Plaza. Germany’s, in contrast, declined meaningfully in response to the Deutsche Mark appreciation.
The reason is that Japan set off a credit surge at negative real interest rates. This transferred wealth from net savers (households), to net borrowers (Japanese corporates), which counteracted the change in the value of the currency. It reduced the household share of GDP by more than the currency appreciation raised it. So the savings rate actually went up, not down, and their current account surplus went up, not down.