🇱🇻 Latvia’s State Border Guard says newly installed surveillance infrastructure along the country’s eastern border has been deliberately sabotaged. Cables have been cut, distribution cabinets damaged and surveillance equipment targeted in what Border Guard chief Guntis Pujāts describes as “not random vandalism” but targeted action intended to disrupt border monitoring and delay deployment. Latvian authorities describe the wider activity along the Russian and Belarusian borders as aggressor-state-supported provocations. No individual perpetrators have publicly been identified.

🇷🇺🇱🇹 Could this itself be hybrid warfare? This morning, Russian state news agency RIA Novosti published a remarkable column discussing a potential Russian attack on Lithuania - including the possible use of nuclear-armed missiles. A few hours later, the article was deleted. RIA then issued an unusually explicit statement saying the piece did not reflect its editorial policy or the state policy of the Russian Federation. We don't know why the article was approved and published in the first place, and there is currently no evidence proving this was a coordinated information operation. But consider the effect: A nuclear threat against a NATO member is injected into the information space through a Russian state outlet, spreads internationally, and is then officially disowned. Deliberate signalling, an editorial failure - or something in between? Whatever the explanation, this is exactly the kind of ambiguity that makes the information domain such an important part of modern hybrid warfare.