Some further thoughts on the new round of peace negotiations with Putin over Ukraine.
Moscow is offering the United States not "peace in exchange for business," but rather "business in exchange for war." The Kremlin is offering Washington major Russian-American deals, access to energy resources, the Arctic, critical minerals, infrastructure and investment projects. The main objective is to buy American consent to the normalization of the war Russia is waging against Ukraine.
Kirill Dmitriev is effectively selling Washington precisely this model of future relations. The head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Putin’s special envoy has been systematically working through the channels of Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, whose value lies exactly in their direct access to Trump’s inner circle. Following the meeting with Putin on September 5, the Kremlin once again separately reported that major Russian-American projects had been discussed in detail.
At the same time, Moscow is offering an entire package of economic "normalization." It includes Arctic oil and gas, LNG, heavy oil, lithium, copper, nickel, platinum, rare earth metals, nuclear energy, infrastructure and aviation. Long-term purchases of American aircraft have been discussed, which would require the lifting of aviation sanctions, as well as compensation for American companies for losses incurred after leaving Russia.
Energy and the Arctic are the central components of the proposal because this is where Russian and American interests could potentially be linked for decades. Russia needs technology, capital and sanctions relief to develop difficult oil and gas fields and LNG projects. American companies are being offered access to resources. For the Kremlin, the main benefit would come when American companies invest billions of their own dollars in these projects. After that, imposing new sanctions on Russia would also mean losses for American businesses.
Sakhalin-1 demonstrates how Moscow is trying to create such mutual interests in practice. On August 15, 2025, the day of the Trump-Putin summit in Anchorage, Putin signed Decree No. 559, which opened a legal pathway for the return of foreign investors. For Exxon, this concerns its former 30% stake and approximately $4.6 billion written off after the company left Russia. Exxon has publicly denied plans to return, but talks continued: Reuters reported on a non-binding framework agreement between Exxon and Rosneft, while the Wall Street Journal reported contacts between Neil Chapman and Igor Sechin, and Darren Woods discussed the issue with Trump. Putin has meanwhile extended the deadline for transactions involving the stake until January 1, 2027. Moscow is effectively offering Exxon the opportunity to recover billions in lost value in exchange for restoring an economic relationship with Russia.
Gentry Beach and Novatek show that such a model can be put into practice. According to The New York Times, the Dallas-based investor, who has ties to the Trump family, signed an LNG agreement with Novatek after the Anchorage summit. Beach himself said that the project had been discussed “at the highest levels” in Moscow and Washington. This is already a concrete American private-sector interest for which improved relations with Russia have financial value.
Moscow is using critical minerals to exploit American dependence on China. Putin has offered American companies access to Russian deposits of lithium, nickel, platinum and rare earth metals. But in February 2025, he explicitly included the so-called “new territories” - the Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia - in the proposal. This makes the Russian offer particularly revealing: American businesses are effectively being offered an economic interest in resources located in territories seized by Russia as a result of the war.
The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant illustrates even more clearly how business can become an instrument for normalizing the consequences of the war. Bloomberg reported on options involving American participation in or control over the plant, with the electricity it generates potentially being divided between the parties. In other words, a Ukrainian facility seized by Russia is no longer being discussed solely as an issue of occupation, but also as the subject of a potential economic agreement.
Even the proposals concerning aluminum follow the same model - access to the Russian market in exchange for the lifting of restrictions. In February 2025, Putin proposed returning approximately 2 million tonnes of Russian aluminum per year to the US market.
Separately, he proposed an approximately $15 billion project in Russia’s Krasnoyarsk Krai involving a hydroelectric power plant and new aluminum production.
There are also more extravagant proposals designed to sell Trump the image of a grand historic deal. In October 2025, Dmitriev proposed a “Putin-Trump tunnel” beneath the Bering Strait: 112 km long, costing approximately $8 billion and taking up to eight years to build, potentially with the involvement of Elon Musk’s Boring Company. The economic feasibility of such an estimate is questionable. But the political product is obvious: a major project, Trump’s name and a symbol of a new US-Russia partnership.
The same function is served by the $14 trillion figure Dmitriev uses to describe the potential of economic cooperation. It emerged after Zelenskyy said on February 6, 2026, that Ukrainian intelligence had obtained documents concerning a so-called “Dmitriev package” worth approximately $12 trillion. Following The Economist’s publication, Dmitriev called the $12 trillion figure “fake news,” but immediately raised the estimate to more than $14 trillion and claimed that American businesses had already lost more than $300 billion because of sanctions. There is no documentary evidence confirming the realism of this figure. For now, it is a populist argument aimed at an American audience: confrontation with Russia costs you money, while cooperation could bring in far more.
And American capital is already responding to the opportunities, although so far largely outside Russia itself. On January 29, 2026, Lukoil announced a deal with Carlyle to sell LUKOIL International GmbH, which holds international assets with a book value of approximately $22 billion. The deal is subject to OFAC approval. Reuters also reported competing bids from Chevron and Quantum Capital, as well as interest from Exxon and ADNOC. In other words, when Russian assets become available and the Treasury allows a transaction to proceed, major American businesses immediately show interest.
On the other hand, the Carlyle example currently demonstrates the willingness of American capital to buy Russian assets, rather than the willingness to invest in Russia. Lukoil is selling its foreign assets precisely because of sanctions pressure. This is effectively a consequence of pressure on Russia, rather than evidence of successful normalization. For the Kremlin, the next step is much more important: to ensure that American money flows not into the purchase of assets from Russia, but into new projects inside Russia itself.
OFAC demonstrated another vulnerability in the sanctions system in 2026: American interests can outweigh the desire to maintain pressure on Russia. In March, General Licenses 133 and 134 were issued, followed later by 134B and 134C, allowing transactions involving certain shipments of Russian oil, including cargoes belonging to Rosneft, Lukoil and sanctioned tankers. The reason was the US-Israeli war against Iran, problems surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the threat of an oil shortage. Dmitriev did not cause this. But Moscow saw the lesson clearly: if Russian oil is needed by the US to solve another problem, sanctions can become secondary.
The main obstacle to the Russian model currently lies in Congress. On August 7, the Senate voted 86-11 in favor of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which provides for increased pressure on Russia’s energy sector, financial system, shadow fleet and major buyers of Russian energy. A companion bill introduced by McCaul and Hoyer has already been submitted to the House of Representatives. The 86-11 vote shows that, outside the president’s inner circle, the idea of a rapid return to business as usual with Russia does not yet have political consensus.
Moscow is therefore not currently working with the entire American system, but with its most receptive elements.
Opposing this are a significant part of Congress and the security establishment. The Treasury Department is taking a more situational approach: sanctions can be eased when broader American interests require it.
Why does Moscow need economic cooperation with the US if China and Chinese capital are available next door? China already buys Russian resources, but it cannot lift American sanctions, return Russia to the dollar-based financial system, or weaken the transatlantic sanctions regime. American investment offers the Kremlin much more: capital and technology, political legitimacy, less dependence on China, and potentially an American lobbying constituency interested in maintaining stable relations with Russia.
Moscow already has some initial results, but they remain contradictory.
There is Beach-Novatek, the negotiations surrounding Sakhalin-1, Carlyle and Lukoil’s international assets, interest from Chevron and Quantum, and a series of OFAC exemptions. But Carlyle is benefiting from a sanctions-driven asset sale, Exxon is seeking to recover its own losses, and OFAC eased restrictions because of an energy crisis. This is still not the systemic normalization that the Kremlin wants.
Moscow’s real success will begin when American businesses start investing new money directly into Russia and become interested in protecting those investments from future sanctions. An even more significant threshold will be reached if American capital becomes willing to enter projects connected to occupied Ukrainian territories and assets seized during the war.
The struggle is therefore no longer about whether individual US-Russia deals are possible - they are. The question is whether the Kremlin can turn these deals into a system in which American domestic interests emerge that would favor accepting Russia’s aggressive policy on the European continent.
Lavrov’s article, сalled International Cooperation in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities, was published ahead of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok and is essentially an appeal to potential investors and partners. It is worth remembering, however, that as of April 2026, the financial and economic model for the Northern Sea Route itself was still not ready. Moscow is selling promises, not real prospects.
Lavrov proudly points to the arrival of a Chinese vessel operated by New New Shipping Line in Murmansk on August 19, carrying approximately 500 containers of automotive components.
Russians are presenting a single voyage as a landmark event. But the dry figures tell a different story: in 2025, the Murmansk Commercial Sea Port handled 30.4% less cargo than in 2024. Total freight traffic along the Northern Sea Route amounted to 37.02 million tonnes in 2025, declining for the second consecutive year. This is despite Putin having set a target of 80 million tonnes as early as 2024.
It is also worth noting that New New Shipping Line, whose vessel was given such a ceremonial welcome in Murmansk, is well known in Europe. It operates the Newnew Polar Bear, which left Ust-Luga in the autumn of 2023 and, according to Finnish and Estonian investigators, damaged the Balticconnector gas pipeline and two telecommunications cables by dragging its anchor along the seabed. Beijing acknowledged the vessel’s responsibility, attributing the incident to a storm, but investigators in both countries do not consider the Chinese internal report to be official evidence.
In June 2026, Rosatom and New New Shipping Line announced the creation of a joint venture to build container ships. At the same time, Rosatom granted permits to seven Chinese vessels operated by Sea Legend, which is launching the first regular container service to Europe. The route runs from Ningbo to Felixstowe, followed by Rotterdam, Wilhelmshaven and Gdynia.
But let’s look at the scale of this partnership, which is frankly unimpressive. Sea Legend’s vessels carry between 1,400 and 4,900 containers, while the largest container ships operating on the Asia-Northern Europe route carry 18,000-24,000. One Arctic voyage per week adds less than half a percent to the weekly volume of cargo transported on this route. The entire program - eight voyages during the summer navigation season - accounts for less than one-tenth of one percent of the annual volume. This is not a redistribution of global logistics, but a niche seasonal service.
At the same time, China is pursuing its own Arctic agenda, one that has nothing to do with Russia. In the summer of 2026, the U.S. Coast Guard escorted the Chinese icebreaker Xue Long as it sailed through the U.S. exclusive economic zone in the Bering Sea as part of China’s 16th Arctic expedition.
India is the only partner after China to have something concrete to show for its involvement. In December 2025, agreements were signed on training Indian seafarers for polar waters and cooperation in shipping. The ratified RELOS agreement gives Indian vessels access to Russian Arctic ports and icebreaker escorts - but the first Indian vessel will only make the voyage next year. South Korea is preparing its own demonstration voyage and presenting it as a greener alternative to the Chinese service, meaning it is competing for the same niche. Brazil, Indonesia and Belarus appear in the text merely as names.
Lavrov accuses NATO of excessive militarization and of creating threats, while conveniently remaining silent about Russia’s own role in militarizing the Arctic.
Today, Russia has the largest nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet among the Arctic states and claims even greater ambitions. However, the delivery of the Chukotka icebreaker has been postponed until 2027, Leningrad is expected in 2028, and Stalingrad in 2030. Rosatom acknowledges that 12-14 nuclear icebreakers will be needed by 2030, while the fleet will remain at around ten. The permitted operating period has been increased to 270 days a year, reducing the time available for maintenance. Because of the high costs, icebreaker escort tariffs have become uncompetitive, and Rosatom is proposing to introduce a separate levy on shippers starting in 2028. British sanctions in 2025 halted the towing of a floating dock, forcing the Arktika icebreaker to travel from Murmansk to St. Petersburg for scheduled maintenance.
Russia’s Arctic performance is strongest where Putin has no problem spending money: nuclear infrastructure.
According to U.S. intelligence assessments, around two-thirds of Russia’s maritime second-strike capability is based in the Arctic, particularly on the Kola Peninsula. The official rationale is to protect submarine patrol areas while gradually expanding the zone of control toward Svalbard and the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. This is complemented by refurbished airfields on Novaya Zemlya, Alexandra Land and Kotelny Island, S-400 and S-300 systems on Novaya Zemlya, and a testing range maintained at a high level of readiness.
Drones have now been added to the traditional military capabilities. Russia is developing two main areas. The first is unmanned underwater systems: Poseidon, whose carriers are identified as the Belgorod and Khabarovsk, with the Russian Navy’s commander-in-chief confirming in July 2026 that the carrier had already entered service. The second is infrastructure for seabed operations. The Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research includes a dedicated hydrographer/diver unit, a brigade of special-purpose submarines, vessels carrying deep-sea systems, and a seabed surveillance network covering the area from Murmansk to Franz Josef Land. Its stated tasks explicitly include installing equipment to intercept underwater communications and damage subsea infrastructure.
But Russia’s northern ports are also vulnerable to Ukrainian drones, although less so than those on the Black Sea. Following Ukrainian strikes on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, at least 40% of Russia’s oil export capacity was knocked out, and Murmansk quickly became a major hub for crude oil exports. Last year, drones launched from a truck struck the Olenya airfield near Murmansk.
In short, Lavrov’s article promotes a narrative in which Russia is creating new opportunities for international cooperation in the Arctic while the West is merely getting in the way. The real picture is different. Freight traffic is declining, icebreakers are years behind schedule, tariffs are uncompetitive, the container service accounts for only tiny fractions of the market, while China is simultaneously expanding its own presence near Alaska. The Arctic matters to Moscow not as a trade route, but as a place where its nuclear fleet is based, where it can project military power with confidence, and where exports can be redirected away from areas vulnerable to attack.