Today marks six months since the expiry of the 2010 New START Treaty, and no dialogue whatsoever regarding a better one.
The current lack of any progress in the field of strategic arms reduction is probably not the biggest problem in terms of ensuring Russia’s military security, but by the 2030s it could become a serious challenge.
By that time, new nuclear delivery systems and new warheads will begin to appear in the US arsenal. It is likely that, by that time, decisions may also be taken to increase the total number of next-gen B-21 ‘Raider’ heavy bombers to be procured, as well as to equip the next-gen ‘Sentinel’ ICBM with MIRV and other fancy payloads.
It would be interesting to observe all this activity through on-site inspections, rather than relying solely on national technical means. Possible limitations might allow Russian resources to be redirected towards strengthening its general-purpose forces.
At the same juncture, it cannot be ruled out that issues relating to the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of France and the UK may also move into the practical realm.
Overall, Russia (as well as China) has greater capacity to participate in the unfolding nuclear arms race compared with other nuclear powers; however, the experience of the previous Cold War showed that there are no winners in such a race – everyone loses.
Against a backdrop of general deterioration in international security, it cannot be ruled out that ‘defeat’ in this race (just as much as any attempt to prevent such a defeat by force) could now prove catastrophic not only for the participants in the arms race, but for humanity as a whole.