PM and writer of Undervalued and undercovered. smallcaptreasures.substack.c…
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¿Cuál es el problema real de la vivienda en España? ¿Se soluciona con regulación? Antes de manifestarse tres días seguidos, gastemos una hora mirando los datos.
La demanda se concentra donde hay trabajo y servicios. Entre 2021 y 2025 se crearon muchos más hogares que viviendas: un déficit de unas 750.000 según el Banco de España, la mitad en solo 6 provincias. En 2025 se crearon unos 240.000 hogares y se terminaron unas 92.000 viviendas.
¿Y las casas vacías? Casi la mitad están en pueblos pequeños, sin empleo ni servicios.
¿Especuladores? El 92% del alquiler es de particulares, y los propietarios con más de 10 viviendas tienen el 4,3% del parque. No hay concentración para hablar de cárteles o monopolios.
Entonces, ¿por qué no se construye más?
Permisos: una licencia tarda de media 12 meses, cuando la ley recomienda 3, y el planeamiento urbanístico puede tardar años.
Suelo: el suelo urbano está en su precio más alto en 14 años.
Mano de obra: la construcción pasó del 12% del empleo durante el boom a en torno al 6,5%.
El elefante en la habitación, la red eléctrica: el 88% de los nudos de distribución tiene menos de 1 MW disponible, y según los promotores en 2025 solo se atendió el 12% de las solicitudes de conexión. Ampliarla en grandes desarrollos lleva entre 5 y 8 años. Hay promociones terminadas que no se pueden entregar porque no tienen luz.
No se puede proteger el suelo rústico, blindar los barrios de viviendas unifamiliares, limitar la densidad, sumar cientos de miles de hogares al año y además esperar precios asequibles. Algo cede, y cede el precio.
Tampoco es algo solo español: las ciudades con buena calidad de vida atraen demanda global, y sin oferta los precios suben.
¿Control del alquiler? En Cataluña, según Esade, bajaron sobre todo las rentas caras, subieron las baratas y cayeron los contratos. ¿Vivienda social? Es necesaria, pero choca con los mismos muros: suelo, licencias, obreros y red eléctrica.
¿Qué político pone esto en el centro del debate? No suelo hablar de estos temas y me ha costado apenas una hora recopilar estos datos. Pongan un poco de esfuerzo. Fuentes en comentarios.
📺TV en DIRECTO | Gritos de "Gobierno progresista, hipócrita y rentista" en la manifestación en protesta por la crisis de la vivienda social.elpais.com/u4sdl
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Déficit de viviendas y hogares vs. viviendas terminadas (Banco de España, Informe Anual 2025): idealista.com/news/inmobilia…
Viviendas vacías y precio del suelo: cope.es/programas/la-lintern…
Propiedad del alquiler y empleo en construcción (Banco de España, Informe Anual 2023): bde.es/f/webbe/GAP/Secciones…
Grandes tenedores (datos del Catastro): og-at.org/novedad/espana-tie…
Licencias (EY/Asprima): idealista.com/news/node/7827…
Capacidad de la red eléctrica (BBVA Research): infobae.com/espana/2026/08/2…
Plazo de ampliación de la red (BBVA Research): esdiario.com/economia/260827…
Solicitudes de conexión: idealista.com/news/inmobilia…
Promociones terminadas sin luz y planes parciales antiguos: eleconomista.es/vivienda-inm…
Control del alquiler en Cataluña (Esade): esade.edu/ecpol/en/publicati…
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4x the average free cash flow of the next two years, and the company owns real estate worth more than its entire enterprise value.
That is Kohl's ($KSS). Net debt is now down to roughly one year of free cash flow, so the balance sheet work is essentially done. I think the next step is to become a share cannibal.
The buyback has started small. I think the big one lands once they call the 2030 notes in 2027.
This is where the street is wrong. Consensus models the stabilisation of the business. It does not model EPS compounding from a company this cheap retiring its own shares year after year.
Credit analysts are already warning about too much cash might go to shareholders after 2027. I like it when credit sees the thesis before equity does.
27.5% of the float is short.
Full write-up on Undervalued and Undercovered (link in the comments)
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I want to know your most bearish takes on $MIAX.
It seems quite attractive at current levels, and after following it for a while, there seem to be very strong arguments for the bull case:
10–11x EV/EBITDA if we exclude the losses from their futures venture.
It's growing faster than its competitors and taking share from them.
A free option on the futures business making money (even though I'm not confident in it, as that hasn't been the case for a while), plus the Rothera stake, which gives us some exposure to the prediction-markets story for free.
The main question is whether perpetual futures are a real threat to options volumes. Maybe they take some retail share? Likely small; it doesn't seem like a major concern, just bad momentum.
Please destroy my thesis.
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Ashtead Technology $AT.L, one of our higher conviction offshore names, has a bid on the table at 615p.
Fourth approach from the same buyer. The board rejected the first two outright.
A fourth attempt is not a compliment to the price. And 615p still looks light.
This is the gap we keep writing about. The market prices the large offshore names on the future and the small ones on the present, and when it gets wide enough a private buyer turns up and takes one off the board. Ashtead is one of several names in our offshore basket. And I think others like $enh.ol or $gms are wonderful opportunities in the long run.
I've written extensively around this asymetry you can currently exploit in the markets in undervalued and undercovered.
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Latest article on the topic:
smallcaptreasures.substack.c…
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Extremely cheap assets, buy and hold them
@HugoNavarroPer2 and I discussed Greek ports as attractive investments. $PPA has risen 20% over 6 months YTD.
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Good piece, and I do not really disagree with the 12 to 18 month call. A soft patch is a reasonable base case.
The market is underwriting BORR as if current premium jackup rates hold at 120k or better. SED Energy ($ENH.OL) is priced as if premium fixtures top out in the 90s (I think Sed reflects more current reality).
Longer term I stay long because Asian demand should keep building and there is catch-up demand from the Middle East once the conflict ends. At these oil prices that drives shallow water spending, plus all the maintenance that still has to be done.
On deepwater I am with you, and that is part of why I like the SED and Ventura merger. It gives you both cycles in one company, with the balance sheet to be a buyer in the last M&A window rather than the one retendering at the bottom or selling assets.
For anyone interested, I wrote about this asymmetry in more depth. Link in the comments.
Our long form analysis of the JU market and $BORR is available for free on our platform; nortilus.com/free-research
Please enjoy some contrarian research on the name, if you are super bullish JUs there is no other alternative but we prefer deepwater stocks such as $RIG and $COSH for now.
While difficult to estimate with any real accuracy, we struggle to see a strong JU market over the next 12–18 months, and the broader analyst community increasingly seems to be coming around to the same view.
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I have been bullish on offshore for almost a year. The thesis got better. My stocks did not.
So I went back and worked out what actually happened. The liquid names trading on the future re-rated up. The names pricing current reality got cheaper. The gap is wider than when I started, and I think closing it is worth a lot.
Ten names on one screen this week:
Transocean 8.6x. Borr 8.2x. Noble 7.5x. Seadrill 6.7x. Tidewater 6.7x.
Ashtead 5.1x. Gulf Marine 4.7x. Constellation 4.6x. SED Energy 3.9x. Ventura 3.0x.
Nothing trades in between.
It is not a quality gap. Noble's Courage steps to $309,500 a day to December 2030. Constellation's Alpha Star is above $310,000 to December 2030. Same basin, same customer, same month, same rate. One trades at 7.5x, the other at 4.6x.
The sharpest version is in jackups. Borr's 2026 book is already covered at $134k a day, and at 6x EV/EBITDA the market needs $138k. A 3% improvement. SED's four tender barges are contracted at $107k, and at the same 6x the market is asking for $72.5k. A 32% fall. The two rate series have tracked each other since 2008. Both of those cannot be true.
Meanwhile the majors keep saying the same thing. Transocean's commercial head on Southeast Asia: "it really is blowing up in terms of contracting." Their CEO expects deepwater utilisation to approach 100% by the end of 2027. Equinor just took three harsh-environment semis for seven years, with a base day rate expected to exceed $400k.
And you get paid to wait. Two of the cheap names already pay double-digit yields and a third starts in 2027. Of the five expensive ones, only Noble pays a dividend at all.
I own three of the cheap ones. Full deep dive, the day-rate models and the management calls, on Undervalued and Undercovered.
Expensive: $RIG $NE $SDRL $TDW $BORR
Cheap: $VTURA.OL $ENH.OL $COSH.OL $GMS.L $AT.L
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Eolus Vind (STO: EOLU-B) trades at 5x earnings, below tangible book, and by 2028 it should hold more cash per share than the whole company costs today.
That is the floor.
For free you get one of the last listed pure-play renewable developers, one that came through the downturn intact, standing in front of a step change in power demand.
So why is it here? 2025 was ugly, a SEK 356m loss with SEK 240m of impairments, and despite paying a dividend in all but one of the last 15 years there was nothing that year and nothing in 2026 either.
That is not the board going cold on capital returns. It is one clause in a bond they issued last year, larger than they needed. The impairment tripped it, dividends and buybacks are gated identically, and it runs until the first call date in May 2027.
The option you are not paying for: 14.8 GW of pipeline, and it is not just wind. Solar and batteries are 8 GW of it, with another 6 GW of onshore wind, which is exactly what a grid full of intermittent generation needs. Behind it a team that has been executing for decades across very different market environments for renewables.
And the demand side has changed underneath that pipeline. Amazon has just signed PPAs on four Swedish wind farms, three of them developed by Eolus alone, and now holds contracts across almost 1 GW of Swedish wind. The US is obviously a huge market and Eolus has substantial solar and battery exposure there, where a single milestone payment on a project sold in 2022 is worth roughly 20% of the current market cap.
That pipeline was assembled when nobody was competing for Nordic power. That is no longer the market, and the scarce thing now is not land or turbines, it is a grid connection. Roughly 20 GW of new generation and 25 GW of new consumption are sitting in the Swedish queue against a national peak load of 25 GW. The late-stage projects here already have theirs secured.
The two closest listed comparables, OX2 and Arise, were both taken private at 43% and 56% premiums. The real comps got bought. Eolus is what is left.
We don't need the sector to boom, we don't need a takeover, we don't need great execution. We need projects already named and dated to convert, and one bond refinanced on schedule.
Full deep dive on Undervalued and Undercovered (link in the comments):
$EOLU-B
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If you are long $BORR , $RIG or $NE, this merger is worth ten minutes of your time. $VTURA + $ENH.ol
It gives you exposure to both the jackup and the deepwater cycle, with a +20% dividend yield at current day rates. We don't need the offshore cycle to go well for this to work.
13 offshore units, USD 1.3bn of contracted backlog, 4x EV/EBITDA against 7-8x for the US-listed peers, and a NYSE dual-listing process starting at closing.
Full write-up with both models and the scenario grids, with @AyusoValue , for free on Undervalued and Undercovered (link in the comments).
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Hugo Navarro retweeted
Great read below on $ENH $VTRA offshore companies combining. Its one of my top 5 holdings. Super cheap and very high (sustainable imo) mid double digit yield. Merger announced yesterday, and will soon get a US listing too. US dividend crowd is going to love this one imo...
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Two of the cheapest names in offshore announced they are merging, and on the combined company's own numbers you are paid 19% to 36% of the share price every year to hold it. $vtura and $enh.ol
One side could not refinance a 10% bond maturing April 2027, so it could not distribute a cent no matter how much cash it generated. The other was simply too small and too illiquid for most of the people who would want to own it. Both go away at closing, and the new board has committed to start a NYSE dual-listing process.
What you are left with: 13 offshore units across three verticals, USD 1.3bn of contracted backlog, around 1x leverage, at roughly 4x EV/EBITDA against 7-8x for the US-listed peers.
We ran the accretion per share across a full scenario grid, and the interesting part is that the deal is most accretive exactly where the acquirer does worst on its own. We don't need day rates to rise, we just need the discount for being small, levered and absent from New York to go away.
Full write-up with both models, the pro forma financials and the scenario grids, done with @AyusoValue in the comments, for free.
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SED Energy Holdings ($ENH.OL) and Ventura Offshore ($VTURA): the combination is the answer to almost every open question in both names
The all-share combination announced on 11 September 2026 solves multiple structural problems at once and is genuinely accretive to SED holders at current prices.
For Ventura, the deal removes the single biggest tail risk on the standalone thesis: the April 2027 bond maturity. The DNB USD 250M bridge plus extended RCF refinances Ventura's 10% ~USD 190M bond and terms out the debt with the flexibility to move to a non-amortizing structure. That is exactly the enabler Ventura management needed to deliver on the 100% payout dividend policy they wanted to start in 2027.
For SED, the deal removes the "small, illiquid, single-region tender rig story" that Fearnley and others used to justify a distressed multiple. Combined backlog of USD 1.3bn (vs SED standalone at ~USD 400m), a fleet spanning shallow-water tender rigs, deepwater semis and drillships, geographic diversification across SE Asia, Brazil and Africa, and a stated intent to move to a US dual-listing. Different company, different investor base, different multiple.
The deal is genuinely accretive for SED holders on the underlying numbers, not just on the strategic narrative, and it is accretive even at these depressed current prices. Using my base cases (SED ~USD 130-135M EBITDA at renewed rates with tender wins; Ventura with Catarina re-contracted at USD 250-300k/day generating ~USD 153-159M EBITDA), combined EBITDA reaches ~USD 283M in FY27 and more than USD 300M in FY28 assuming some rates improvements or some synergies.
The re-rating writes itself. Combined trades at roughly 3.8x 27e EV/EBITDA at deal-implied prices vs peer median of ~6-8x. The US dual-listing is the biggest single multiple-expansion catalyst. Moving from 4x to 6x EV/EBITDA is not aggressive, it just closes part of the Nordic-to-US discount. On 6x applied to FY28 combined EBITDA of ~USD 300M, equity value moves to ~USD 1.5-1.6bn, roughly 55-65% above current deal-implied pricing without any increase in the rates these vessels are hired at.
Synergies are modest but real. SG&A consolidation (one board, one audit, one IR function). The bigger prize is refinancing Ventura's 10% bond.
Because the acquisition is all-share, SED does not add cash leverage. Pro forma net debt is around USD 300-350M (mostly Ventura's), reasonable on combined EBITDA of ~USD 260-280M. That leaves capacity for further accretive M&A in offshore drilling and services if the market gives them an opportunity.
I will write a full update on the name in Undervalued and Undercovered over the weekend, with the pro forma financials, dividend model and US listing catalyst.
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