Remember what Machiavelli said about mercenaries in "The Prince": They can't be trusted to be there when you really need them.
The U.S. government pays Blackwater (now rebranded Academi) contractors roughly $1,200 per day per operative, compared to approximately $180 per day for a U.S. Army soldier with equivalent field skills. Politicians cite this as proof that privatization fails. The market is clearing information that the military bureaucracy buries.
Private military contractors operate under genuine profit-and-loss discipline. Erik Prince built Blackwater by delivering specialized capability, rapid deployment, and zero pension liability to clients. If his teams performed badly in Fallujah or Kabul, contracts dried up. That accountability structure does not exist inside the Pentagon, where generals preside over catastrophic failures and collect full retirement packages.
The premium price tells you something important: the market is clearing information that the military bureaucracy buries. When the State Department paid Blackwater $1.2 billion between 2004 and 2009 to protect diplomats in Iraq, it was purchasing specific expertise, speed, and contractual liability that the Army's chain of command structurally cannot provide. You get what you pay for, and Congress mostly gets armies optimized for procurement politics rather than combat effectiveness.
The real scandal is that the government monopolizes violence, crowds out genuine private security competition through regulatory barriers, then acts surprised when the one vendor who slips through charges accordingly. Monopoly always produces high prices and low accountability. The contractor market is not too free. It is not free enough.
Blackwater's premium reflects genuine scarcity. The Pentagon's bloated baseline reflects what happens when no one faces a profit-and-loss statement.