Validator economics are fairly explicit, but there’s an important caveat in the docs: these are governance and deployment defaults, not numbers applications should blindly hardcode.
The current defaults include:
• 42,000 GEN minimum self-stake
• 42 GEN minimum delegation
• 1,000 active-validator cap
• α = 0.6 for self-stake weight
• β = 0.5 for the weight exponent
• 7-epoch unbonding period
The reward structure is split across different pools rather than applying one percentage to everything.
For the v0.6 time-unit fee pool, the split is 85% to validator/staking distribution, 10% to the Intelligent Contract developer, and 5% to the DeepThought DAO treasury.
That 10% / 5% allocation applies to the time-unit work pool. Storage, receipt, and message-fee buckets sit outside it. Developer fees only accrue when the contract is linked to a Developer NFT; otherwise that reserved amount is refunded.
Inflation follows another route: 75% goes to stake pools, 15% to validator owners for operations, 10% to developers, and 0% to the treasury by default.
Pool rewards follow selection weight and are then divided between owners and delegators according to stake. The share-accounting mechanism means rewards can effectively compound by increasing the GEN represented by each share.
Inflation begins at a bootstrap rate and gradually moves toward a floor.
The negative incentives are layered too: reduced rewards, selection bans, quarantine during investigation, slashing for specified faults, and forfeited appeal bonds.
One distinction is worth keeping: losing a vote isn’t itself misconduct.
The penalty system is aimed at defined faults, not simply at being wrong.
That seems to be the economic premise: make timely, honest participation financially sustainable while making genuinely faulty behavior expensive.