I was going through Raymond Realty’s latest presentation and thought this is worth simplifying for anyone new to real estate. The key thing to understand is POCM Percentage of Completion Method. Raymond doesn’t book the entire sale of a flat as revenue when it is booked. Revenue gets recognized gradually as construction progresses. This is why real estate earnings can look very uneven. A project can have hundreds of crores of bookings but contribute very little to revenue initially. Now comes the important part. There is a minimum construction threshold that needs to be crossed before revenue recognition starts. Under the traditional POCM framework, this is generally around 25% of construction and development costs. In simple terms, once the basic structure of the building has progressed enough foundation work is done and construction starts moving towards the building coming above ground the project can cross this threshold. After that, revenue is recognized based on how much of the project has actually been completed. For example: If ₹500 Cr worth of flats have been sold and the project has reached 25% completion, roughly ₹125 Cr of the sold revenue can be recognized, subject to the applicable accounting calculations. If the project later reaches 50% completion, roughly ₹250 Cr of the sold revenue could be recognized. So the important thing is: Bookings tell you how much has been sold. Construction progress tells you how much of those sales can actually show up as revenue. This is why the next few quarters at Raymond Realty are interesting. RRL has already sold ~₹12,300 Cr across its active projects but has recognized only ~₹8,378 Cr. That leaves around ₹3,922 Cr of sold inventory yet to be recognized as revenue. Now look at where the projects are. Wadala has already clocked ~₹807 Cr of bookings and is moving from excavation towards the stage where the foundation and lower structure are completed and the building starts coming above ground. Sion is also moving towards this stage. Once these large projects cross the required construction threshold, a meaningful chunk of the sales already sitting in the backlog can start flowing into the P&L. The potential catch up from Wadala & Sion alone could be ₹160 Cr+ of revenue as they cross this stage. Then there is another ₹15,700 Cr of launched but unsold inventory. This is where the second leg gets interesting. As these projects progress further and more floors are constructed, Raymond can sell the remaining inventory. A flat sold at a later stage of construction can mean faster collections because the buyer has to pay for construction milestones that have already been completed. And because the project has already crossed the required threshold, revenue from these new sales can also start getting recognized based on the progress of construction. So you have a potential flywheel: Construction progresses → existing sold backlog gets recognized → more inventory gets sold → faster collections → more revenue gets recognized. And behind all this sits a ₹52,000 Cr development pipeline. This is why I don’t look at Raymond Realty’s current quarterly P&L in isolation. I look at: How much is sold + how far construction has progressed + how much sold backlog is yet to be recognized + how much inventory remains to be sold. Because in real estate, the earnings can sometimes be sitting right there. You just have to understand how far the building has progressed before those earnings can show up in the P&L.

Margins should Expand from here for PNG as they will Expand more into North and Central India.

Meta was quite cheap back then. I still remember investors and analysts absolutely hating Zuck because of the massive burn at Meta Labs. Somewhere, I had confidence that sooner or later, if it didn’t work, he would pull the plug. So I simply valued Meta based on Facebook and Instagram. Turned out to be pretty rewarding. I see everyone going crazy for US stocks these days. Always remember one thing: Big returns are rarely made when everyone is screaming BUY.

One thing I have learned from my own experience is how rerating and derating cycles work. I am not an expert at playing cycles, but let me share what happened with KPI Green. I bought KPI around Nov Dec 2022. The market cap was around ₹1,500 1,700 Cr and the business was already on track for roughly ₹100 Cr+ PAT. So you were roughly paying 15 17x forward earnings for a business growing very fast. At that point, KPI had: 232+ MW capacity 1,350+ acres land bank 805+ MW evacuation capacity 128+ MW orders The growth runway was huge and the market was still relatively early in discovering the story. Then came the rerating. FY23 PAT came at ~₹110 Cr. FY24 PAT jumped to ~₹162 Cr. But the market cap expanded far faster. By Apr 2024, the market cap was around ₹11,000 Cr and the stock was trading at roughly 65 70x earnings. So the market was no longer valuing KPI on what it was earning. It was valuing years of future growth. I booked around 70 80% of my gains after making roughly 5 6X. The business was still growing. That was not the reason to sell. The reason was valuation. In 2022 the question was: How big can this business become? In 2024 the question had become: How much of that future growth is already priced in? I kept a small position for momentum and added again later in 2026. But eventually the business and the entire theme went through a derating. And that is the biggest lesson for me. Multibagger returns usually come from 3 things working together: Low starting valuation Long growth runway Earnings growth + rerating But the same thing works in reverse. When growth becomes consensus, valuations become stretched and the market starts demanding more from every quarter, the risk reward starts changing. A great business can still be a poor investment at the wrong valuation. For me, the goal is not to sell just because a stock has gone up. It is to recognise when the rerating has already happened and the next phase of returns depends almost entirely on earnings catching up with the valuation. Rerating gives you the turbo. Earnings growth drives the journey. Derating can take away a big part of the return.

Seeing other jwellery stocks run i feel P N Gadgil is just waiting for a trigger.

Good price action after Equity raise and Business update H1 results should be positive would be interesting to attend the con call.

These estimates may sound a little aggressive but I think they are achievable. Even at 18% ROE these valuations look like a steal. At just 0.8x book value, there is a good margin of safety to absorb a blip or some miss in these estimates. Added more on this fall. Let's see how it plays out.

Valuations are comfortable could be a good turnaround play keep it on your radar.

I listened to interviews of MFI CEOs from Muthoot Microfin, Satin and Fusion from about a month ago. One thing stood out. None of them were seeing any meaningful disruption on the ground due to El Niño or geopolitical tensions. In fact, the commentary was around improving collections, normalising credit costs and accelerating growth. Muthoot Microfin: Credit cost expected at 2.25–2.5% vs 9.4% last year. ROA target of 4–4.5% in 18 months. Satin: Raised AUM growth guidance to 20–25%. GNPA down to 2.2%, NNPA below 1%. Fusion: Credit cost guided at 2.1–2.2%, 99.8% collection efficiency and 4% exit ROA target. The MFI cycle seems to be moving from survival → recovery → growth. Now the key question is how much of this recovery is already priced in.

Trump k mood swings ko roko koi 🥲 US, Iran Discuss Phased Deal To Reopen Hormuz And End US Blockade - RTRS Sources

People often ask me why I usually avoid very hot themes which are already in mature stages or late momentum stages, even when the next few quarters of earnings growth can still be very good. The investing style I follow is simple. I usually avoid companies trading at triple digit PE when the story is already mature. At that stage, the risk reward equation gets skewed for me. I don't want to chase the final 40-50% in a stock at the cost of getting stuck for years. I am not very agile when it comes to cutting positions and honestly, that is not my style. There are plenty of examples in the market where stock prices peaked before the earnings story actually broke. Tata Elxsi is a good example. The stock was trading around 100x FY22 earnings. FY22 revenue still grew 35% and PAT grew 49%, but the valuation started derating and PE fell to around 49x in FY23. KPIT peaked around ₹1,929 in July 2024. The subsequent Q1 FY25 results still showed 25% revenue growth and 52% PAT growth. Dixon touched around ₹19,150 in December 2024. The next quarter still delivered roughly 117% revenue growth and 124% PAT growth. The point is not that these businesses became bad. The point is that when a story is priced for perfection, earnings can remain very strong and the stock can still struggle because valuation starts doing the heavy lifting. This is why I would rather find a good business in an earlier stage of the cycle than reach late to a story everyone already knows. I have rarely seen big money being made by reaching very late to the party. There will always be exceptions. Everyone has their own style. This is just how I prefer to play the game.

Balaji Amines finally commissions its upgraded Acetonitrile plant. Capacity now stands at 1,440 TPM or ~17,280 TPA The interesting part starts now. Can Balaji ramp up utilisation and deliver healthy realisations + EBITDA/tonne?

MFIs are now trading at interesting trailing valuations: Satin Creditcare: ~0.8x P/B Muthoot Microfin: ~1.1x Arman Financial: ~2.2x Most can deliver 15 to 20% ROE as asset quality normalises. At these valuations, this fall is creating a decent risk reward setup.

₹90,000–1,00,000 Cr. That's the approximate annual commission pool sitting inside India's insurance distribution ecosystem. IRDAI's proposed reforms could take out ₹35,000–45,000 Cr from this pool. And the market reaction makes sense for some players. PB Fintech crashed ~30% today. Policybazaar's economics are directly linked to the commission it earns on policies sold. Now look at the proposed cuts: Term insurance: ~51% → 25% Health first year: >30% → 15–20% Motor TP: 22% → 0–2.5% Credit linked insurance: up to 42% → 2–2.5% For distributors, this is a massive hit to revenue per policy. And PB Fintech has another problem. Its customer acquisition and call centre costs don't fall 50% just because commissions do. So the market's reaction to PB Fintech makes sense. But I think the selloff in insurance companies is much harder to justify to the same extent. Because insurers are on the other side of this transaction. What is a cost for Policybazaar is potentially a saving for the insurer. If ₹35,000–45,000 Cr of distribution economics is removed, a meaningful portion of that value has to accrue somewhere. Some can go to policyholders through lower pricing. Some can improve insurer margins. And some can simply be competed away through lower premiums. There will definitely be a near-term growth hit as distributors lose incentives to aggressively push policies. But structurally, insurers should benefit from a lower cost of acquisition. That's why I see a clear asymmetry here: PB Fintech = direct structural hit to unit economics. Insurers = near-term growth pain, but potentially better long-term economics. The market has treated both as if they are the same side of the transaction. I don't think they are. The ₹35,000–45,000 Cr doesn't disappear. It gets redistributed.

Microfinance and SFBs are looking quite attractive.

30% gone in a day 🤯

Sometimes you just need to be a little patient.

Either Trump will end this war soon or something big will break in the economy 😬

When I first bought Yatharth Hospitals, the narrative was completely different. People would say management is shady. Why did the IT department freeze their funds? If nothing was wrong, why would that happen? Many refused to believe the numbers, despite Yatharth being one of the fastest growing hospital players in NCR with an aggressive expansion plan. Now a PE firm has bought a stake, and suddenly the same people who questioned everything are no longer asking why Tyagi ji’s wife sold her stake or raising the same management concerns. Raymond Realty has a similar story. You can give 100 reasons why Raymond Group companies deserve low multiples. Raymond Ltd already had a dream run on the aerospace narrative. And even in Raymond Realty, people continue to question the management despite the massive growth in presales and the huge GDV opportunity sitting in front of them. That’s how markets work. In the short term, it is often about narratives. Eventually, when the numbers keep showing up quarter after quarter, the narrative starts changing. The interesting part is that this is where huge alpha can be created. Identify the business early, understand the numbers, and most importantly, have the conviction to stick through the volatility while the narrative is still against you.

Good consolidation Q2 Business update could act as a trigger ?