General Bradley in his Biography about his time at the Army War College: "One group was assigned to study Hitler, then rising to power in Germany. In its presentation, the group told us Hitler could be discounted because he was mentally unstable"
Kissinger in Diplomacy: "The Western democracies' initial reaction to Hitler's ascendancy was to accelerate their commitment to disarmament. Germany's government was now headed by a chancellor who had proclaimed his intention to overthrow the Versailles settlement, to rearm, and then to engage in a policy of expansion. Even so, the democracies saw no need for taking special precautions. If anything, Hitler's accession to power strengthened Great Britain's determination to pursue disarmament. Some British diplomats even thought that Hitler represented a better hope for peace than the less stable governments which had preceded him. "[Hitler's] signature would bind all Germany like no other German's in all her past," British Ambassador Phipps wrote exuberantly to the Foreign Office. A British guarantee for France was unnecessary, according to Ramsay MacDonald, because, if Germany broke a disarmament agreement, "the strength of world opposition to her cannot be exaggerated." France, of course, was not reassured by such soothing pronouncements. Its chief problem still remained how to find security if Germany rearmed and Great Britain refused a guarantee. If world public opinion were really all that decisive in dealing with violators, why should Great Britain be so reluctant to give a guarantee? Because "public opinion in England would not support it," replied Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secre-tary, thus making explicit France's nightmare that Great Britain could not be relied on to defend what it would not guarantee. But why would the British public not support a guarantee? Because it did not consider such an attack likely, replied Stanley Baldwin, head of the Conservative Party and in all but name leader of the British government."
Literally Joseph Goebbels in 1940: "Up to now we have succeeded in leaving the enemy in the dark concerning Germany's real goals, just as before 1932 our domestic foes never saw where we were going or that our oath of legality was just a trick.... They could have suppressed us. They could have arrested a couple of us in 1925 and that would have been that, the end. No, they let us through the danger zone. That's exactly how it was in foreign policy too.... In 1933 a French premier ought to have said (and if I had been the French premier I would have said it): "The new Reich Chan-cellor is the man who wrote Mein Kampf, which says this and that. This man cannot be tolerated in our vicinity. Either he disappears or we march!" But they didn't do it. They left us alone and let us slip through the risky zone, and we were able to sail around all dangerous reefs. And when we were done, and well armed, better than they, then they started the war!"