The ANC Created the Political Giant It Later Tried to Bury: The Consequences of a Failed Political Calculation
The political class, heavily influenced by the lobbying and counsel of certain political and economic elites, convinced itself that pushing the old man into the political wilderness after 2018, throwing him under the bus and conveniently constructing him as the villain, was a price worth paying. Their calculation was that Jacob Zuma would eventually become politically irrelevant, disappear into the sunset and cease to occupy any meaningful space in the body politic of South Africa.
Even more so after his arrest in 2021, the assumption appeared to be that the chapter had finally been closed. But much of this thinking was premised on personal feelings, political egos and a profound misreading of political history, rather than tangible evidence, sound political analysis or a carefully considered strategy.
The assumption that former President Jacob Zuma was nothing without the institutional machinery of the ANC, and that removing him from the organisation would automatically erase his political relevance, was fundamentally flawed.
What those making these calculations seemingly failed to appreciate was the very political history that produced Zuma in the first place.
One cannot tell the story of Jacob Zuma's political evolution without acknowledging the ANC forebears who shaped, mentored and politically tutored him. Leaders such as the late Presidents Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, alongside senior cadres like Govan Mbeki, Walter Sisulu, Moses Mabhida, Stephen Dlamini, Harry Gwala and John Kgwana Nkadimeng, among others, formed part of the political environment that moulded his trajectory within the movement.
It was through the movement's own political processes, strategic considerations and internal arrangements that Zuma was elevated into positions of considerable influence. His unusual concentration of leadership responsibilities, including his roles as ANC National Chairperson and ANC KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Chairperson respectively, speaks to the particular political calculations of that period.
These arrangements were not merely administrative appointments. They were part of a broader political strategy to consolidate the ANC's organisational presence and political dominance in KwaZulu-Natal, particularly against the influence of Inkatha. They also unfolded against the backdrop of growing internal and regional tensions, including the resistance associated with Munt'omdala, the Lion of the Midlands, Harry Gwala, whose uncompromising political approach and reluctance to negotiate with the IFP were viewed with concern by sections of the party's senior leadership.
The point I am making is that the ANC did not simply accommodate Jacob Zuma; it actively participated in creating the political personality that he eventually became.
Yes, these were tactical decisions informed by the political circumstances of the time. But political decisions have consequences beyond the immediate objectives for which they are taken. In building JZ's political stature, the ANC inadvertently helped create a personality whose political influence would eventually extend beyond the organisational boundaries of the very movement that nurtured him.
And therein lies the irony.
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