I appeared on Sky News UK this weekend to discuss the Duma elections and Ukraine's strikes The main takeaways: - The Duma elections are largely performative and aimed at showing that Russia is still a "sovereign democracy" rather than an autocracy. The exclusion of Yabloko means only pro-war parties join, a fact spotlit by Communist Party standard-bearer Gennady Zyuganov - They do have regime stability significance though: military veterans coming forward create a new layer of ultranationalists in the Duma. CPRF votes either show ultranationalist dissent or passive dissent more generally as there are no opposition options. United Russia dominates but region-wide support is watched as more regional backing means greater loyalty to Putin - Ukraine's strikes on Moscow build on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum strikes and energy refinery attacks. They take the war to the Russian people but have a limited impact on Putin's calculus. Economic recessionary conditions and manpower losses exceeding recruitment don't seem to change tack yet. - Russia and its proxies will do a what-aboutism: we hold elections even under attack, Ukraine does not. The reality is the diaspora and physical security concerns make Ukrainian elections orders of magnitude more risky than what Russia just held

Somaliland is getting more attention and is pushing for US recognition Here are some points to consider: 1) Somaliland-U.S. Cooperation has growing foundations- AFRICOM engagements with Hargeisa and Berbera suggest that Somaliland's relative stability in a violent Red Sea region is a strategic asset. There is military training and cooperation between the U.S. and Somaliland, and a recent State Department report highlighted "positive, constructive" relations with the Somailand authorities. This momentum engaged Somaliland's President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi to visit Washington DC and advance the recognition push. 2) Recognition from the U.S. is unlikely in the near-term- Somaliland is offering a military facility deal, lithium/coltan access and Berbera port use as compelling carrots for US officials to consider. They can reach members of Congress and diplomats via a representative office in Virginia. Nonetheless, the US remains committed to the One Somalia policy, and wants to thread the needle between Saudi Arabia/Egypt which align with Somalia, and the UAE and Ethiopia which have closer ties with Somaliland. 3) Somaliland's recognition case would benefit greatly from African support and this is hard- African institutional opinions have evolved on the Somaliland question and in ways that do not favor it. A 2005 AU fact-finding mission showed that Somaliland had a unique, justifiable sovereignty case that would not lead to a cascade of separatism Africa. The AU has moved way from stance and generally aligns with Somalia's unity. Israel's unilateral recognition of Somaliland has not helped its case in Africa. 4) Somaliland can further its cause without formal recognition- This middle ground is the most plausible scenario: leveraging its resources, location and stability to broaden trade agreements, consular offices, attract FDI and strengthen aerial connectivity beyond Ethiopia/the UAE logistical nodes. De facto recognition is a smoother path than formal recognition, and serves many of the same purposes.

I was in Saudi Arabia this week and my firm Pangea Geopolitical Risk is closely monitoring the Yemen developments Some key points to consider 1) This is more than a Saudi-Houthi conflict, Yemen is a deepened state of hot civil war: the Houthis are gaining ground at the expense of Saudi-aligned government forces and the south Yemeni movement is taking steps to reconstitute and warning that the December 2025 attacks on them worsened security. 100,000 Yemenis are displaced in the latest fighting and the 2022 truce is over. Saudi airstrikes are unlikely to be as sustained as they were after 2015 but will continue as will Houthi cross-border attacks. Riyadh has been targeted by the Houthis for the first time since 2017-18 and the King Khalid Airport incident is a symbolic throwback to those times. 2) Pakistan will continue threading the needle on intervention: Pakistan has vowed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and is rhetorically giving the Mecca Agreement teeth. This means more air defence cover training and the utilization of the thousands of Pakistani security trained forces in Saudi Arabia for collective defence. It does not likely mean Pakistani jets striking Houthi targets or Pakistani boots on the ground. Pakistan's 2015 non-intervention logic partially holds and its backchannel role with Iran is not fully extinguished. 3) Confidence in US Leadership will be shaken further: Trump's first term in 2019 witnessed two successive events that shook confidence in the US within GCC countries: the passive abandonment of the Kurds in Turkey's Syria Operation Peace Spring offensive and the non-response to Abqaiq attack. Trump's refusal to assist Saudi Arabia in this crisis will compound those concerns. Europe-GCC cooperation will grow, as trust in Russia and China as backchannels has been strained by their Iran ties, but does it have substance? EDGE in UAE is making major European plays and both the GCC/Europe are modernizing at the same time. 4) Egypt is the country to watch- Egypt's parlous macroeconomic situation has been further affected by the latest escalations, it sees the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait as economically integrated. Calls for an Arab solution to the Red Sea security crisis are intensifying and Sisi's meeting with MBS is likely to fuel greater Egypt-Saudi Arabia security cooperation. Egypt is happy to continue contributing to maritime security in the Red Sea. The trauma of the 1960s and capacity constraints impede frontal involvement in Yemen. Egyptian officials see military intervention in Yemen as a trap. Possibility of formal Mecca Agreement inclusion grows modestly from last month but not a certainty.

A UNSC consensus here is hard China has joined the non interference camp in most African conflicts and since 2023, Russia has gone from a two track to pro Burhan policy US secondary sanctions are likely to be the enforcer rather than UN action

The SAF's use of chemical weapons has been revealed in this new expose from the New York Times Yet another harrowing chapter in Sudan's 3.5 year long civil war A conflict that gets so little international attention nytimes.com/2026/09/05/world…

Sudan’s army chief Burhan is framing himself as a unity figure who can stabilise a war torn country The real story is darker Chemical weapons use, US sanctions and the weaponisation of food and international aid make him unfit to lead

🇺🇦 Who holds the cards now? As Ukraine Independence Day approaches on August 24th, there are rumours a US delegation is headed to Kyiv to renew peace talks. Learn more about the history of the conflict with our Ukraine reading list, now all titles 40% off in our summer sale. ➡️tinyurl.com/3huby346 @warmatters @SMonaghanPhD

I agree. Escalating tensions between Israel and Türkiye do not necessarily presage a confrontation Something to keep in mind when considering the broader impacts of the Mecca Agreement

Interesting layout of the UAE development model

Exactly IMEC and Middle Corridor have many dimensions, it’s not a clear cut zero sum dynamic between them

So far only Bahrain and Qatar have welcomed the Mecca Agreement. A staggered and cagey response from GCC countries