Trump: U.S. officials met with the Iranian delegation for three hours on Tuesday

پزشکیان ممکن است تلاش کند در نیویورک این تصویر را ارائه کند که در داخل نظام یک جریان عمل‌گرا وجود دارد که خواهان مذاکره و پایان جنگ است و در مقابل، جریان‌های تندرو مانع آن هستند. اما این روایت بلافاصله یک سؤال دیگر ایجاد می‌کند: اگر دولت کنترل تصمیمات امنیتی و نظامی را ندارد، آمریکا با چه کسی باید توافق کند و چه کسی اجرای آن توافق را تضمین خواهد کرد؟ بنابراین سفر نیویورک فقط آزمون جنگ_دیپلماسی ایران و آمریکا نیست؛ به نوعی آزمون اعتبار ساختار قدرت پس از علی خامنه‌ای هم هست. #IranWar‌

Pezeshkian may try to use his appearance at #UNGA to present the image that there is a pragmatic faction within the Iranian establishment that seeks negotiations and an end to the war, while hardliners are obstructing that path. But this narrative immediately raises another question: if the government doesn’t control security and military decision-making, who should the United States reach an agreement with, and who can guarantee that such an agreement will actually be implemented? Therefore, Pezeshkian’s appearance at UNGA is not only a test of the war-versus-diplomacy dynamic between Iran and the US; in a sense, it is also a test of the credibility of Iran’s power structure in the post-Ali Khamenei era. #IranWar‌

New alert issued by U.S. embassies across the Middle East warning of possible flight cancellations and airspace closures. Houthi forces target Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles. Heightened tension in Israel amid high holidays during ongoing conflict with Iran.

Today, I was invited to speak with members of the #Kurdish community in #Germany about developments in the #MiddleEast and the emerging regional dynamics. Standing beside a flag that represents Kurdish identity, solidarity, and the shared bond of Kurds across the world.

امروز به دعوت جمعی از کردهای شهروند آلمان، در نشستی درباره تحولات خاورمیانه و معادلات جدید منطقه شرکت کردم و به گفت‌وگو و تبادل نظر پرداختیم. در کنار پرچمی که نماد هویت، همبستگی و پیوند کردها در سراسر جهان است.

After October 7 disrupted the path toward Saudi–Israeli normalization, #Houthi attacks are creating new incentives for security cooperation between the two countries, including reported Israeli intelligence assistance to Saudi Arabia. This shows the paradox of Iran’s Houthi card: Tehran can use the Houthis to impose costs on the U.S. and other international and regional actors, disrupt energy flows, and widen the conflict. But in doing so, it may also push Saudi Arabia and Israel closer together on security. gaining tactical leverage while creating strategic costs for itself. #IranWar‌ #Yemen

In my interview with @VOAfarsi today, I argued that Tehran wants to return to negotiations. This can also be read between the lines of recent reporting by @nytimes. The narrative emerging from inside the system, that one hardline faction was responsible for the attacks that helped derail the MoU, while even IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi was reportedly unaware of the operation, can itself be understood as a message to Washington. In my view, the IRGC, which now holds decisive power within the system and was responsible for the attacks that contributed to the collapse of the MoU, is now trying to sell a different narrative: blame particular individuals for what went wrong, distance the broader leadership from the decision, and create a pathway back to the negotiating table with the US. #IranWar‌

Amnesty International’s new landmark 1000+page report exposes how the Iranian authorities committed crimes against humanity to crush the 2022 Woman Life Freedom uprising and identifies 87 officials who should be criminally investigated. Amnesty International is calling for urgent international criminal justice to end impunity for repeated mass protest killings in Iran.

⭕️ کوردستان در اعتصاب سراسری؛ تا الان اعتصاب سراسری در این شهر ها تایید شده: سقز کرماشان «کرمانشاه» مهاباد سنندج پیرانشهر دیواندره مریوان اشنویه بانه بوکان #ژن_ژیان_ئازادی #زن_زندگی_آزادی

Avustralya Parlamentosu’nda konuşan Kürt Akademisyen Şükriye Bradostî: "Jina Amini’nin katledilmesi sonrası Saqqez’de başlayan #JinJîyanAzadî Hareketi, İran’daki siyasi tartışmayı değiştirdi. Kürdistan değişimi bekleyen çevre bölge değil, değişimin başlayabileceği bir merkezdir.”

Today, in my remarks to the Australian Parliament marking the anniversary of #Jina Amini’s movement, I emphasized: To understand Iran’s future, we must first understand who #Iran is. #Kurdistan is not a peripheral region waiting for change to reach it. The uprising following Jina’s killing showed that it can be a center from which change begins. From Saqqez, #Jin_Jîyan_Azadî crossed communities and regions and reshaped the political conversation across Iran. Jina’s legacy reminds us that Kurds and other peoples are not simply victims of repression. They are political actors with the right to self-determination and a meaningful voice in shaping Iran’s political future. I also offered policy recommendations for the Australian government on how it can support a more inclusive approach, one that recognizes Iran’s diversity, engages directly with historically marginalized voices, and creates space for them in discussions about Iran’s future. At the same time, Australia should stand firmly against the Islamic Republic’s repression and transnational threats and hold those responsible for human-rights abuses accountable. #womenlifefreedom

دم رفقای کُرد ما گرم. کاش #فراخوان روز ۲۵ شهریور کردستان با کمک احزاب و سازمان‌های دیگر ایران به اعتصاب سراسری در تمام کشور تبدیل شود. #اعتصاب_کردستان #اعتصابات_سراسری

Kürt akademisyen Bradostî: İsrail, Kürtlerle ilişkilerinde Batı’nın hatalarını tekrarlamamalıdır Bradosti, Batılı güçlerin Kürtleri “güvenlik aracı” olarak gördüğünü belirterek, “Kürtler, savaş ve krizlerde hatırlandılar, kriz bitip diplomasi başlayınca unutuldular” dedi.

🔴 Kürt Akademisyen Şükriye Bradostî: Batı Kürtleri güvenlik aracı olarak gördü, İsrail aynı hatayı yapmamalı 🗞️ @rukenturhalli rupelnews.com/tr/kurt-akadem…

At a conference in London organized by the Jewish-Kurdish network, I joined a panel discussing the emerging strategic architecture of the Middle East. My argument was that the region has changed significantly since October 7 in at least three ways: local conflicts have become increasingly interconnected with regional security; the boundary between gray-zone competition and direct interstate confrontation has blurred; and, perhaps most importantly, states and non-state actors are reassessing old assumptions about alliances, deterrence, and security cooperation. For the Kurds, there is an important lesson from decades of engagement with Western powers: too often, they have been treated as security instruments, discovered during wars and crises, then forgotten when the crisis ends and diplomacy begins. There is another dimension that deserves greater attention. Kurdish society is one of the Middle East’s most religiously diverse communities. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but Kurds also belong to a wide range of other religious traditions, including Shi'a and Alevi, Yazidism, Christianity, and Judaism. Today, hundreds of thousands of Israelis trace their Kurdish Jewish heritage to Kurdistan, while families of Kurdish origin can also be found among Palestinians. This religious diversity within Kurdish society reflects a long history of different faiths and communities living alongside one another and is important when considering the role Kurds could play in a more pluralistic regional order. This is also relevant to discussions about Kurdish-Israeli relations. Despite widespread assumptions, there is no formal strategic alliance between Israel and the Kurds. But if Israel seeks to build a meaningful partnership with Kurdish actors in this changing regional order, it should not repeat the old Western approach. A durable partnership cannot be based on viewing the Kurds simply as useful partners during moments of regional confrontation. It must be built as a long-term relationship based on mutual interests, political recognition, and shared strategic goals. The Middle East’s strategic architecture is changing. The question is whether policies toward the Kurds will change with it.

In my @bbcpersian debate, I argued that the Islamic Republic’s biggest failure in this war has been its inability to rally Iranians around the flag. Unlike the Iran–Iraq War, this war has not consolidated the regime’s power. The evidence is its intensified executions, threats, and street repression. A lack of clear U.S. strategy does not mean Tehran is winning. #IranWar‌

بزرگ‌ترین شکست جمهوری اسلامی ایران در این جنگ، ناتوانی در جمع‌کردن مردم حول پرچم و ایجاد همبستگی ملی به نفع حکومت بوده است. برخلاف جنگ ایران و عراق، این جنگ برای ج.ا «نعمت» نبوده و نتوانسته شکاف میان جامعه و حکومت را کاهش دهد. عملکرد رژیم در این مدت نیز به‌وضوح گویای همین واقعیت است: از اعدام‌ها و تشدید زبان تهدید و ارعاب علیه مردم گرفته تا افزایش کنترل خیابان‌ها با اتکا به نیروها و حامیان اقلیت وفادار به حکومت. اگر جنگ توانسته بود جامعه را پشت رژیم تهران بسیج کند، حکومت امروز تا این اندازه به ابزار سرکوب، تهدید و کنترل امنیتی جامعه نیاز نداشت. #IranWar‌

Some exciting news! 🗞️ I’m pleased to share that I’m joining the Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution at @GeorgeMasonU as Affiliate Faculty. I look forward to engaging with faculty, fellow scholars, and students and contributing to the Carter School’s academic community.

INTERNATIONAL JEWISH–KURDISH CONFERENCE 2026 eventbrite.co.uk/e/6th-and-7…