Meanwhile, Putin publicly stated in early June that Russia will improve and strengthen its air defense system to counter Ukrainian medium-range drones. They are redeploying air defense systems and radars to key logistics routes. This has already been happening in recent months, in addition to using alternative routes (which are longer and more vulnerable) or moving supply depots away from the front lines, which has reduced the effectiveness of their advances compared to last year. At the same time, countermeasures against drones such as the Hornet are being implemented, including more radars, drone interceptors, and advanced EW. However, these deployments require at least six months, so changes will not be visible until the end of the year. In addition, the Russian military has also begun attacking Ukrainian logistics routes with greater intensity, specifically the Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway. Unlike Ukraine, the Russians have been using low-cost FPV drones such as the Molniya and mother drones to attack trucks, fuel tanks, buses, armored vehicles, and engineering equipment since January. This has allowed them to create a “death zone” north of Pokrovsk, which significantly complicates the Russian army’s supply lines to Dobropillya and Andronivka, straining Ukrainian resources to hold the front there.

Lyman still has a small presence of Russian troops in the Masliakivka suburb but Nikolaevka was completely secured by Ukrainian Army after the elimination of Russian infiltrations in the last two & a half weeks. Yesterday I discussed the problem of the accumulation of Ukrainian local successes for the Russians (nitter.net/Suriyakmaps/status/210…), and this is now happening as these successes spread to both banks of the Donets River. It’s no longer just that the loss of Lyman is hindering the progress of the Russian operation to take Sloviansk; rather, the very momentum behind the Russian assault on the city from the east has vanished (though the same cannot yet be said of Kramatorsk, at least for now). 🇺🇦🇷🇺

I understand that Russia remains committed to prolonging the war of attrition at the cost of fewer casualties and even further territorial losses, but time continues to take its toll on troop morale and public support for the war. Losing the Lyman salient has not been particularly costly for Russia, as it ordered a swift withdrawal, and it is highly likely that the Ukrainian advance will be halted at Zherebets; the issue is the impact on the morale of troops who have seen almost a year’s work undone in a matter of weeks, without noticing any substantial change in the dynamics of the war. This is compounded by the lack of reinforcements on certain fronts, the failure to implement countermeasures, and the absence of intensified attacks on the Ukrainian rear. The disaster of 2022 will not be repeated, but neither do the advances of 2024–2025 seem likely to be, unless Moscow decides to take more radical measures to accelerate the deterioration of the Ukrainian armed forces – something that could be carried out now that the Russian parliamentary elections have concluded. Local setbacks are not a cause for concern at present, but their accumulation will eventually take its toll on Russian morale and, consequently, on the conduct of military operations, which could lead to a genuine stalemate on the front by 2027.🇷🇺🇺🇦

I understand that Russia remains committed to prolonging the war of attrition at the cost of fewer casualties and even further territorial losses, but time continues to take its toll on troop morale and public support for the war. Losing the Lyman salient has not been particularly costly for Russia, as it ordered a swift withdrawal, and it is highly likely that the Ukrainian advance will be halted at Zherebets; the issue is the impact on the morale of troops who have seen almost a year’s work undone in a matter of weeks, without noticing any substantial change in the dynamics of the war. This is compounded by the lack of reinforcements on certain fronts, the failure to implement countermeasures, and the absence of intensified attacks on the Ukrainian rear. The disaster of 2022 will not be repeated, but neither do the advances of 2024–2025 seem likely to be, unless Moscow decides to take more radical measures to accelerate the deterioration of the Ukrainian armed forces – something that could be carried out now that the Russian parliamentary elections have concluded. Local setbacks are not a cause for concern at present, but their accumulation will eventually take its toll on Russian morale and, consequently, on the conduct of military operations, which could lead to a genuine stalemate on the front by 2027.🇷🇺🇺🇦

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1662-1668: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Orikhiv front: During the last week, reinforcements of Ukrainian army have helped to halt the Russian advance in Novopavlivka and Orikhiv. However, this has not been enough to prevent Russian army from consolidating its gains in Novoandriivka and Mala Tokmachka, which both localities have been completely captured, while slight advances have been made in Preobrazhenka. Further east, Russian forces have managed to consolidate their positions in Chervona Krynytsya and Huliaipilske (completely taken too), pushing the front line beyond Ukraine’s first line of defense, entering Novoselivka, and reaching the outskirts of Yehorivka. Map: [ google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid… ]

عشرات المصوتين يتجمعون قبل فتح مراكز التصويت في العيون في الصحراء المغربية #مراسلو_سكاي #المغرب #الانتخابات_التشريعية_المغربية_2026

كذب ونفاق حكومة الجولاني سائق صهريج عراقي يفضحهم عن غير قصد حكومة الارهاب تبيع البنزين للدولة العراقية ومن مصفاة بانياس..

🔴 #URGENTE | Los bomberos de Ceuta hallan asentamientos de inmigrantes en túneles de cientos de metros bajo el campus universitario Los ceutíes llevaban semanas sospechando que había inmigrantes en los túneles porque "cada vez había más en los asentamientos de las playas" ✍️ Por @iranzugvergara 📲 Sigue leyendo: elespanol.com/reportajes/202…

Thomas van Cringe & Nathan Ruser ladyboy: wow, look how fancy he is with this modern style. How beautiful is the new Syria. 😱😱😱😍😍😍!!!

A principios de enero de 2026, dos residentes ceutíes de origen marroquí, Abdelasis Mohamed Ahmed y Abdeselam Abdelkader Mohamed, registraron oficialmente ante notario un partido político denominado "Justicia y Desarrollo". La formación duró apenas unos días antes de ser disuelta voluntariamente por sus propios promotores, quienes alegaron motivos personales y familiares para justificar esta rápida marcha atrás. La elección del nombre no puede considerarse accidental. El Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo marroquí, conocido por sus siglas PJD, es una formación islamista que gobernó Marruecos entre 2011 y 2021 y que mantiene raíces ideológicas en los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios. Su actual secretario general, Abdelilah Benkirán, exprimer ministro marroquí, realizó declaraciones públicas en las mismas fechas de enero de 2026 afirmando explícitamente que Ceuta y Melilla "son nuestras" y que "regresarán a la soberanía marroquí". Estas declaraciones fueron pronunciadas en un acto conmemorativo organizado precisamente por el Partido de la Justicia y el Desarrollo marroquí. La coincidencia temporal elimina cualquier posibilidad de casualidad nominal. La rápida disolución del partido tras apenas unos días no debe interpretarse como fracaso de la estrategia, sino como repliegue táctico ante una reacción política y mediática más intensa de lo anticipado. Las declaraciones públicas del eurodiputado de Vox Jorge Buxadé, quien denunció explícitamente las conexiones con el islamismo marroquí, generaron un coste reputacional que hizo inviable continuar con el proyecto en su forma actual. La justificación de "motivos familiares y personales" resulta inverosímil tratándose de un proyecto político que requiere registro notarial formal y que genera controversia nacional inmediata. El caso revela fallos estructurales graves del Estado español. Un notario permitió el registro de un partido con nombre idéntico al de una formación islamista extranjera cuyo líder reivindica activamente territorio español. El Ministerio del Interior tampoco activó ningún mecanismo de revisión o suspensión cautelar. La única respuesta efectiva provino de la presión política y mediática externa, no de las instituciones diseñadas para proteger la soberanía nacional. La legislación española carece de instrumentos preventivos que impidan el registro de formaciones políticas vinculadas con entidades extranjeras que cuestionan la integridad territorial del Estado. El episodio funciona como sondeo estratégico, como prueba de los límites del sistema español y de su capacidad de reacción. Su rápida disolución no constituye victoria sino evidencia de que la operación fue excesivamente burda en su simbolismo. La próxima iteración será necesariamente más sofisticada, utilizando nomenclaturas menos evidentes y discursos más ambiguos. La amenaza no ha desaparecido sino que ha aprendido que necesita máscaras más elaboradas para operar con mayor eficacia.