I look for cheap, ignored and unpopular stocks, ideally trading below BV or Net-nets, like Walter Schloss & young Warren Buffett did | Not investment advice
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I bought $GME today.
Yes, that $GME. The 2021 meme stock.
But this isn't 2021.
GameStop isn't just a video game store anymore.
Nearly half of its sales now come from collectibles.
This idea is from @leevalueroach of The Value Road. All credit to him.
Go check out his 34-slide deck.
At the deck's $22 price, $GME has a market cap of $11.1B:
· $4.7B of cash
· $4.7B of eBay stock (a 9.8% stake)
· 4,710 Bitcoin (~$0.3B)
· Minus $2.8B of convertible notes at 0%
That's ~$13.70 a share of net financial assets.
So what are you actually paying for the stores?
$11.1B market cap minus $6.9B of net financial assets leaves ~$4.2B, or ~$8.30 a share, for the entire operating business.
And this business has quietly changed since 2021.
Collectibles went from 6% of sales to 45%, driven mostly by Pokémon cards.
Gross margin jumped from 29% to 44% in twelve months.
Q2 operating income was a record, on revenue that fell 19%.
The part most people miss is the trade-in counter. GameStop buys hundreds of millions of dollars of cards and games from customers every year, about two-thirds paid in store credit.
That credit comes back as sales at full margin.
Management guides to "in excess of $650M" of EBITDA. The first half alone was $340M, and Q4 holds the holiday.
That $4.2B for the operating business, measured as EV/EBITDA:
· ~6.4x on management's guide
· ~4.7x on The Value Road's ~$885M estimate
· ~6.5x even in their own 2027 hangover scenario
Ryan Cohen, CEO and Chairman, takes no salary, no bonus, no options, and has never sold a share.
He bought $20.4M on September 10.
Then today, another 1,150,680 shares at $22.94, about $26.4M, in the open market. He now owns 40.5M shares, ~8% of the company and roughly 20% of his net worth.
The risks are real, though:
· The Value Road's own model assumes a post-anniversary hangover in 2027, with EBITDA falling to ~$646M.
· The Pokémon Company controls allocation.
· The grading program depends entirely on PSA, which has paused its cheaper tiers.
· Most of that $13.70 floor isn't cash. $9.38 of it is the eBay stake, which moves with eBay's share price.
· The biggest risk is capital allocation. The hostile bid for eBay, as structured, would need ~$22B of new debt and would spend the balance sheet that protects the downside.
Long $GME
Not financial advice.
GameStop $GME is one of the most misunderstood companies in the entire market. Wall Street has left the company for dead. Every sell side firm has dropped coverage and zero hedge funds will own this because of the former meme stock hair.
Now the stock trades dirt cheap with $5 billion of cash, $5 billion of ebay stock (10% of the entire company), $300 million of bitcoin and $2.8 billion of zero percent convertible debt.
You are buying the core business for $4.1 billion. The core business that has completely transformed itself into a highly cash generative card store.
Management has turned around the entire company and it is not a dying retailer anymore. It is a cash generative cash machine flipping Pokemon, Magic The Gathering and One Piece cards. Cards are one of the hottest markets in the entire world right now and Wall Street is asleep at the wheel.
Unit economics are stunning. There are 1,600 stores in the U.S. $1.9 million sales per store. 45% gross margins at the store level. Four wall EBITDA per store of $580k. This is a four wall margin of 30.6%. There is very little capex and inventory is mostly financed by vendors and there is a float business with the trade-ins with in-store credit zero percent debt.
Management is guiding to $650 million of EBITDA for the full year. They are sandbagging the number HARD. I am pulling data from ebay and GemRate and total Pokemon sales in August were up 30% m/m. The highest monthly sales ever recorded.
In addition, the 30th anniversary for Pokemon occurred on September 16th. It was the biggest coordinated Pokemon event in history. I went to a dozen of GameStop's and local card shops and they were all sold out. Lines out the door. The phone ringing off the hook. Wall Street is completely unaware that GameStop is flipping cards in size and has transformed their business model.
Finally, Q4 is the company's biggest quarter and there are more events for the 30th anniversary landing in the quarter. For the full year, I am modeling in excess of $850 million of EBITDA, $200 million ahead of management's sandbagged guide.
Management likely knows this. Ryan Cohen bought $20 million in the open market, and other C-Suite executives followed along with numerous buys, just days ago. And then the company announced they will be reopening stores, for the first time in many years. The payback on reopens should be less than a year.
I see the company trading at 4.7x EV/EBITDA, and over 90% of that EBITDA should convert into free cash flow, or a 20% free cash flow yield on the enterprise value. Wall Street is completely missing the story and asleep at the wheel with drool running down their big fat bellies.
There will likely be push back on the ebay acquisition, but I encourage everyone to actually dig into the deal. It could be transformative and there are many synergies that Wall Street idiots are missing. Wall Street suits have no idea how the card market has been gamified and turned into a lottery ticket system that has become extremely addicting on apps like Whatnot. In addition, Ryan Cohen is an All Star capital allocator and operator, an extremely rare combination, and a platform like eBay is right up his wheel house.
I built a website below that has a 34-deck slide, highlighting the thesis. Have fun and check out my analysis and website. I am long $GME and find the thesis asymmetric.
deepfuckingvalue.com
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One of my main positions.
Class B shares offer it with a discount.
A great deal IMO.
Value investing is about buying good businesses when they’re going through a difficult period. Grifols is in one of those moments right now. That’s when opportunities can appear, and as investors, we have to decide whether to take them or let them pass.
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A Hong Kong business sitting on more cash than its entire market cap.
Credit to @sammutgabi of Bilbel Capital for this one.
$1161.HK Water Oasis Group Limited.
· HK$844M market cap
· HK$917M of cash
· Zero bank debt
· Dividend yield ~6%
The cash alone exceeds the entire company.
This is a Hong Kong beauty and medical aesthetics group, listed since 2002.
55 centres under Oasis Beauty, Oasis Medical, Glycel, phMedic+ and the new InMedic brand.
Services are 93% of revenue and nearly all of the profit. That services profit has compounded at 14.9% a year since 2002.
H1 2026: revenue up 4.8% to HK$515.8M, net profit up 27.6% to HK$70.8M, gross margin 93.4%. Capex of HK$2.9M. Interim dividend raised 43%.
The objection you'll see first: HK$752M of that cash is a liability, treatments customers paid for but haven't received yet.
Here's why that's an edge, not a problem.
Customers buy treatment packages upfront for a discount.
The money is non-refundable.
Water Oasis owes them sessions, not cash, and delivering a session costs almost nothing extra at a 93% gross margin, because the clinic and staff are already paid for.
Meanwhile new customers keep prepaying. Their money covers the cost of treating the earlier ones. So the balance never actually gets drawn down, it just rolls forward.
It has grown from HK$220M in 2010 to HK$750M today, dipping only when Covid shut the clinics.
That's interest-free, permanent financing that funds itself.
Why the brand holds: you can't judge a facial treatment before buying it, so you pick on trust. Every good result deepens it and makes switching feel riskier.
Management has said outright they're ready to buy them. Precedent: Millistrong in 2021, roughly HK$29M net for a business earning HK$7-12M a year. A 25-40% annual return.
Capital allocation: 90% of all profits paid out as dividends since 2002, plus 11.5% of shares bought back. Further buybacks are capped by the 25% minimum float, so it's dividends and acquisitions from here.
Visit Gabriel's article for a deeper analysis.
A business that grew 15% a year for 24 years, while paying out 90% of profits as dividends.
Yet today, it trades below net cash and under 6× earnings.
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$0327.HK Pax Global Technology Ltd is the largest position in my portfolio.
Although it is up 26% from its lows, I still think it's very undervalued.
At this price:
· Market cap: ~HK$4,311M
· Cash and equivalents: HK$3,907M
· Short-term deposits: HK$172M
· No debt
· P/E: 4.2x on annualised H1 earnings
· P/B: 0.50x
· P/NCAV: 0.59x
The market keeps ignoring it.
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@HolyFinance I know you have some investments in HK, do you have an opinion on this one?
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I have been followed by X accounts and value investors whom I've been following, listening to, and admiring for many years.
The internet is truly powerful.
Taking action is all it takes.
And this is just starting.
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In March 2025 I wrote up a tiny French casino operator at €1.73/share, trading at 4.4x EV/EBIT with a 26% FCF yield.
Last week, it received an offer to be bought out at €6.19 per share.
$SFCA $SFCA.PA Société Française de Casinos.
It owns four casinos in French tourist towns plus hotels, restaurants and spas.
· €8.8M market cap when I wrote it up.
· Net cash on the balance sheet.
· Free cash flow matching reported profits, year after year.
The whole thesis was almost boring: a steady, profitable, well-run business, ignored because it was too small and too illiquid for anyone to bother with.
On August 27, Merkur Spielbanken signed a promise to acquire 95% of Casigrangi, the holding company that owns 81.21% of SFC.
The implied price: €6.19 per SFC share.
The premiums tell you how badly the market was pricing this:
· 157.9% over the previous close
· 145.2% over the 60-day VWAP
· 195.9% over the 240-day VWAP
The stock now trades at €5.90, a small discount to the offer price.
I am selling it here at €5.90.
That works out to +241% from my €1.73 write-up price.
More than a 3-bagger.
Another example that cheap, ignored and cash-generative businesses don't stay ignored forever.
Value always finds its way.
Follow for more.
Link to the original thesis below.
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Net cash alone is worth more than this entire company.
$0113.HK Dickson Concepts (International) trades at HK$6.01/share but net cash per share is HK$7.80.
· Market cap HK$2.32B
· Net cash HK$3.01B
· Dividend yield ~5-9%
· P/E ~9x
Negative Enterprise Value for a business that is actually profitable.
How is that possible?
Because Hong Kong stocks are being largely ignored.
Dickson is a Hong Kong luxury retail group founded in 1980 by Sir Dickson Poon, now run by his son Pearson Poon.
55 stores across Hong Kong, China and Taiwan under Harvey Nichols, Dickson Watch & Jewellery, S.T. Dupont, Rolex, Bulgari and Hublot, plus a separately managed securities portfolio.
FY2026 (year to March): revenue up 3.5% to HK$1.99B, net profit up 25.7% to HK$248.9M.
Hong Kong sales were flat, Taiwan fell 5.9% on weak sentiment and tariff swings. China up 34.2%.
Total dividend jumped to HK55 cents (from HK10 cents), including a special payout for the group's 45th anniversary: a ~9.2% yield at the current price.
In July 2025, the controlling Poon family (60.5% owner) tried to take the company private, but minority shareholders rejected it as too cheap.
At today's price it is still trading below the value of its own cash.
On my watchlist. No position. Not investment advice.
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"Royal Pop" Collection sold this year like an iPhone launch.
The company behind it trades below book value.
$UHR $UHR.SW The Swatch Group AG
· CHF 184.75/share
· CHF 9.6B market cap
· 0.82x book
· CHF 1.1B net liquidity
· 87% equity ratio
· Almost no debt
H1 2026 profit looked weak: net income of just CHF 16M, operating margin down to 1.7%.
But that wasn't the business breaking, it was a choice.
Instead of cutting staff or slowing factories during a soft patch, management kept everything running at full capacity, accepting lower margins in the short term.
Then, on May 16, Swatch launched Royal Pop, a pocket watch made in collaboration with Audemars Piguet.
Demand was so overwhelming that stores in New York, London, Barcelona and Dubai had to shut down or call police to manage the crowds.
The launch generated over 25 billion social media views and reignited demand for Swatch's earlier collabs (MoonSwatch with Omega, Fifty Fathoms with Blancpain).
RBC Capital Markets estimates Royal Pop alone could generate over CHF 1 billion in sales.
The result: sales up 13.1% at constant currency in May-June, continuing into July, with the core Watches & Jewelry margin nearly doubling to 15%.
Worth flagging that Royal Pop is strong but likely temporary lift, not a fix for Swatch's deeper questions and future.
No position. NFA.
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Mr Market is offering you a deal today.
You pay $2.27 per share and you receive $3.04 of cash.
You're being paid to own the business.
Wait, what?
Deal?
$PEW GrabAGun operates as an e-commerce retailer of firearms, ammunition and related accessories. And it's trading below net cash.
So what's the catch?
Two, actually.
First: growth is coming from price, not demand. H1 2026 revenue was up 10% and gross profit up 31%, but almost entirely because average firearm prices rose 12%. Unit volumes actually fell 3-4% on firearms and 13-18% on accessories.
They're charging more for fewer sales.
Second: costs ballooned. The company posted a $3.6M net loss, driven almost entirely by G&A expenses jumping 231% YoY — the price of suddenly being a public company (compensation, stock-based comp, professional fees, director fees). That new cost structure ate the entire gross profit gain and then some.
On the positive side, there's some optionality worth watching:
PEW Logistics, launched in January 2026, lets other firearm manufacturers plug into GrabAGun's compliance and fulfillment infrastructure for a fee, instead of building it themselves. Three manufacturers have signed on so far: KelTec, Derya Arms, and Backwoods Suppressors. It's still tiny, but it's a higher-margin, recurring-revenue business layered on top of the core retailer — essentially a free option at this valuation.
So the cash discount is real.
Whether that catches up with the balance sheet, or resolves itself, is the actual bet here.
I'm just buying it cheap and waiting for a shift in market expectations.
My margin of safety is the cash.
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A Hong Kong authorized retailer for Rolex, Patek Philippe, Cartier and other top brands, priced like it is going bankrupt.
$0887.HK Emperor Watch & Jewellery
Founded in 1942 and publicly listed since 2008; 17+ years of audited financial history and Over HKD 1 billion paid out to shareholders in dividends since the IPO.
The numbers:
· HKD 0.30/share
· HKD 2.18B market cap
· HKD 1.4B of net cash
· P/TBV 0.37x
· P/E 4x
· Zero bank debt
· Dividend yield ~5%
1H2026 net profit jumped 64% to HKD 318M, gross margin up to 33%.
Mainland China is the growth engine, 16 stores today, 20 more planned in 2026.
Emperor Group itself holds 60.6%, so free float is limited.
A profitable, dividend-paying retailer with real brand relationships and a long public track record, ignored by the market because it trades in Hong Kong.
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It is essential to be mentally flexible and sell when your thesis is proven wrong.
$ADVN $ADVN.SW I have sold my Adval Tech shares.
I bought a net-net.
Cheap on assets, net cash, a strong balance sheet. Four years of losses, but protected while it fixed itself.
But the protection is gone.
Net cash: CHF 12.2m to CHF 0.8m in six months.
Gross debt: CHF 3.1m to CHF 7.0m.
Free cash flow: +2.2m to -11.5m.
NCAV per share: CHF 65.02 to CHF 54.64.
Five months ago, management called the company "solidly financed".
The half-year report now lists securing financing for growth as a board priority.
My read is more debt, against trailing EBITDA of about CHF 2.1m, with gross debt already near 3.4x that.
I wrote it up at CHF 41 in October 2025. It trades at CHF 44 today.
The price rose 7% while NCAV fell 16%.
At CHF 44, that's 0.81x NCAV and 0.34x tangible book.
Still technically a net-net, but with a thinner margin of safety and a management team planning to take on debt.
On operations:
H1 2025 — EBITDA 0.8
H2 2025 — EBITDA 2.3
H1 2026 — EBITDA -0.2
Management expects H2 2026 to improve on H1, but still a full-year loss, with the transformation in full effect only from H2 2027.
No need to hold when there are better opportunities in the market.
Some businesses lose money for four years in a row and the market throws them out below the tangible value of their assets.
That is the moment to buy them.
$ADVN Adval Tech Holding AG is an example at CHF 45.20.
A century-old Swiss industrial group trading at a third of book value.
Market cap: CHF 33M
EV: CHF 21M
Total equity: CHF 99M
P/TBook: 0.32x
P/NCAV: 0.7x
Founded in 1924, 8 production plants across Switzerland, Germany, Hungary, China, Malaysia, Mexico, and Brazil, 1,100 employees, and CHF 155M of trailing revenue at a 44% gross margin. Metal and plastic components for automotive and medtech, with the medtech side quietly building a bigger share of the mix. Almost no financial debt.
The last four years have been ugly. Automotive volumes down, Swiss franc strength eating margins, plant restructuring absorbing charges.
Meanwhile the "Forward Strategy" is consolidating sites in Hungary, closing Muri, and cleaning operations.
You're paying 32 cents on the franc for the equity of a 102-year-old Swiss manufacturer while the turnaround is already visible in the numbers.
I am long Adval Tech
NFA
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Update on $GIS
Based on H1 2026 results, revenue grew 21% YoY to €6.3M in H1 2026.
The real driver: US wholesale, which jumped from €322K to €1.15M, more than tripling.
Overall, wholesale now makes up 59% of sales (up from 23% a year ago), while retail's share fell from 32% to 16%.
Geographically, the US now represents 20% of sales, up from just 8% a year ago, the fastest-growing market in the group by far.
Special Sales (bespoke, high-margin pieces) also grew 55%, to €1.26M.
So this isn't a company walking away from wholesale, as I stated in my previous post.
It's leaning into it, specifically in the US, where demand for this tier of jewelry is expanding fastest.
Retail boutiques (St. Moritz, Portofino, Galata) actually pulled back this half.
Worth watching whether the US wholesale momentum holds through H2.
Would you buy a business generating €1M of free cash flow for under €6M?
That's $GIS Gismondi 1754 right now
A 270-year-old Genoa jewelry house making some of the highest tier of luxury pieces on the market.
Here's what went wrong: for years, Gismondi sold its products through multi-brand jewelry stores, at thin margins.
Exclusive jewelry, distributed like a commodity.
Sales and margins fell hard through 2024 and 2025 as a result.
Here's what's changing: the company is walking away from wholesale and building out its own boutiques and franchises instead.
And it's working, St. Moritz sales nearly doubled.
The Prague franchise is booming.
Q4 2025 revenue jumped 32% YoY, even as full-year revenue finished down 12% (dragged by the wholesale exit earlier in the year).
The result of that pivot, in a transition year: ~€1M of EBITDA, ~€1M of EBIT, ~€1M of free cash flow.
Against a market cap under €6M.
Debt is shrinking too, down 21% in 2025, net debt now €4.5M.
The Gismondi family owns 60%.
Expansion targets: luxury ski destinations, select US and Central European cities, and Tokyo.
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Would you buy a business generating €1M of free cash flow for under €6M?
That's $GIS Gismondi 1754 right now
A 270-year-old Genoa jewelry house making some of the highest tier of luxury pieces on the market.
Here's what went wrong: for years, Gismondi sold its products through multi-brand jewelry stores, at thin margins.
Exclusive jewelry, distributed like a commodity.
Sales and margins fell hard through 2024 and 2025 as a result.
Here's what's changing: the company is walking away from wholesale and building out its own boutiques and franchises instead.
And it's working, St. Moritz sales nearly doubled.
The Prague franchise is booming.
Q4 2025 revenue jumped 32% YoY, even as full-year revenue finished down 12% (dragged by the wholesale exit earlier in the year).
The result of that pivot, in a transition year: ~€1M of EBITDA, ~€1M of EBIT, ~€1M of free cash flow.
Against a market cap under €6M.
Debt is shrinking too, down 21% in 2025, net debt now €4.5M.
The Gismondi family owns 60%.
Expansion targets: luxury ski destinations, select US and Central European cities, and Tokyo.
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