Public Choice@_PublicChoice

Public Choice publishes scholarly research that applies economics to nonmarket social phenomena, such as politics, law, religion, conflict, and the family.

springer.com/journal/11127
Joined May 2023
Online first in Public Choice: “Cross-tier incumbency spillovers: evidence from India” by Ajay Saharan & Shraddha Yadav doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Cross-tier incumbency spillovers: evidence from India

Public Choice - We study cross-tier legislative incumbency spillovers in non-concurrent elections, a relatively understudied dimension of multi-level electoral politics in federal systems. Using a...

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Online first in Public Choice: “A model of criminal justice discretion” by Tom S. Clark doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

A model of criminal justice discretion

Public Choice - Criminal prosecutors wield tremendous power in the American legal system. However, their ability to direct prosecution against criminal suspects relies on coordination with the...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Review of Douglas W. Allen and Bryan Leonard. 2025. “Why the rush: an institutional economic analysis of homesteading and the settlement of the west”” by F. Andrew Hanssen doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Review of Douglas W. Allen and Bryan Leonard. 2025. “Why the rush: an institutional economic...

Public Choice -

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Online first in Public Choice: “Populism and academic freedom” by Rui Silva doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…
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Online first in Public Choice: “Beyond six versus twelve: Kian v. Florida and the design of the criminal jury” by Francesco Parisi doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Beyond six versus twelve: Kian v. Florida and the design of the criminal jury

Public Choice - Kian v. Florida asks whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require twelve-person juries in serious criminal cases. The case has revived a debate that began with Williams v....

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Online first in Public Choice: “Logrolling affects the relative performance of majority and unanimity rule” by Liza Charroin & Christoph Vanberg doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Logrolling affects the relative performance of majority and unanimity rule

Public Choice - We consider a committee facing binary decisions on a number of proposals. If members vote sincerely and payoffs are symmetrically distributed, we show analytically that simple...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Gary D. Libecap, Where’s Coase? The implications of economic property rights or rent-seeking in forming institutions” by Steven M. Smith doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…
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Online first in Public Choice: “Gubernatorial partisanship and housing outcomes: evidence from close elections” by Louis Philippe Beland & Tonghui Tian doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Gubernatorial partisanship and housing outcomes: evidence from close elections

Public Choice - This paper studies the impact of gubernatorial partisanship on housing outcomes, particularly housing permits, using a regression discontinuity design based on close U.S....

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Online first in Public Choice: “Law enforcement with rent dissipation” by Murat C. Mungan & J. Shahar Dillbary doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Law enforcement with rent dissipation

Public Choice - We consider a framework which brings together losses arising from rent-dissipation and the workhorse model of law enforcement. Governmental actors engage in a contest to share the...

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Online first in Public Choice: “A hangover like any other: the cost of ruling for populist parties” by Andreas Bergh & Anders Kärnä doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

A hangover like any other: the cost of ruling for populist parties

Public Choice - Populist parties have grown rapidly in popularity in many European countries and have increasingly become common in government coalitions. Because these parties often make expansive...

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Online first in Public Choice: “The political economy of exit protection” by Ali Palida doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

The political economy of exit protection

Public Choice - Existing theories explain how exit disciplines governments but generally treat citizens’ ability to relocate as an institutional primitive. This paper instead endogenizes exit...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Electoral cycles and consumption in India” by Ronit Mukherji & Sakshi Satija doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Electoral cycles and consumption in India

Public Choice - Using high-frequency household panel data from India covering 40 state assembly elections between 2014 and 2022, this paper examines how electoral cycles shape household...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Constitutional drafting processes and constitutional success” by Adam Chilton, Murat Mungan & Mila Versteeg doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Constitutional drafting processes and constitutional success

Public Choice - Several recent constitution-making processes have been celebrated for being participatory, inclusive, and representative. However, many of these processes also failed. We theorize...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Electoral incentives when the stakes are low: a case study from an economics department” by Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni & Diego Lubian doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Electoral incentives when the stakes are low: a case study from an economics department

Public Choice - Since the pioneering work of Lizzeri and Persico (2001), it has been well known that, in winner-take-all systems, office-motivated politicians may favor targeted redistribution over...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Dual regulation and the cost of electricity rents to households: evidence from Texas” by Seth J. Carter doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Dual regulation and the cost of electricity rents to households: evidence from Texas

Public Choice - Does overlapping regulation of municipal electric utilities facilitate rent extraction at the expense of residential consumers? I study a setting in which two non-coordinating...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Pension’s resource-time trade-off: the role of inequalities in the design of retirement schemes” by Renaud Bourlès & Santiago López-Cantor doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Pension’s resource-time trade-off: the role of inequalities in the design of retirement schemes

Public Choice - Public pension schemes serve as mechanisms for intertemporal income smoothing and within-cohort redistribution. This paper examines the influence of income and lifespan inequalities...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Money talks, moderation walks: the centripetal impact of campaign contributions in the U.S. house” by Andrew Christopher Pickering & Mehmet Akif Yardimci doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Money talks, moderation walks: the centripetal impact of campaign contributions in the U.S. house

Public Choice - Do campaign contributions polarize legislators or induce moderation? Theory allows for both possibilities, with effects likely varying by donor type. Using data on all contributions...

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Online first in Public Choice: “Partisan conflict and economic policy uncertainty: insights from a time-varying causality approach” by Nikolaos Antonakakis, Menbere Workie Tiruneh, David Gabauer, Samuel R. Schubert & Lemonia Papadopoulou-Kelidou doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

Partisan conflict and economic policy uncertainty: insights from a time-varying causality approach

Public Choice - How does partisan conflict (PC) relate to economic policy uncertainty (EPU)? When does uncertainty feed back into conflict, and how stable is that link? We examine these dynamics...

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Online first in Public Choice: “A rationale for political disengagement” by Johan A. Dornschneider-Elkink, Sarah Parlane & Thomas Sattler doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

A rationale for political disengagement

Public Choice - This paper analyzes how uncertainty about the policy consequences of electoral options influences both citizens’ engagement and electoral outcomes. We consider a spatial...

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Online first in Public Choice: “The efficiency paradox of majoritarian democracy” by Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi doi.org/10.1007/s11127-026-0…

The efficiency paradox of majoritarian democracy

Public Choice - Majoritarian democracy is widely regarded as the canonical procedure for converting heterogeneous individual preferences into collective decisions, yet its welfare properties are...

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