You can’t get hyperinflation in the reserve currency because the demand isn’t coming from your own economy, it’s coming from everyone else’s. Roughly 58% of global FX reserves sit in dollars, per IMF COFER data. Trade between Brazil and Indonesia gets invoiced in dollars. Foreign borrowers owe something like $13 trillion in dollar debt they have to service no matter what the Fed does at home. That’s a demand floor no other currency has. Look at what happened after 2008. The Fed’s balance sheet went from $900 billion to $4.5 trillion, then to nearly $9 trillion in 2020. In Argentina or Zimbabwe, that kind of expansion chases a fixed domestic goods basket and spirals into a wage-price loop. Here it got absorbed into global demand for dollar assets, mainly Treasuries, because there’s nowhere else deep enough to park that capital. The euro can’t absorb it. The yuan can’t, not with capital controls still in place. Weimar Germany is the counter-case that proves the point. The Reichsmark had no external demand cushion, so every mark printed chased the same shrinking basket of goods at home. That’s the actual mechanism behind hyperinflation. Reserve status breaks it before it starts.