As a human being, the kindest thing you can do to your brain is to not think.

it has been a little bit more than three years since i first started writing on smoothbrains.net. i would like to pause blogging for now! here is a retrospective to cap things off: smoothbrains.net/posts/2025-…
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windy country road, going a bit quick, isuzu 4x4 with a big snorkel in the oncoming passing lane crosses the center line and would have clipped the front corner of my van if i had not leisurely brought us 250 mm to the left 500 ms before the projected moment of impact, i get a *download* of the next 1000 ms – rainbow trajectories spray horizontally into phase space, i mentally salute the ones that didn't make it, and then on we go does anybody else get these?
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see also
Replying to @algekalipso
i get the low-key, sober version of this all the time when riding my bike through traffic, feels like extremely briefly my attention slips down the temporal crevice in which i get obliterated by a ford ranger
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actually, after i got sick to death of it, i am thinking about binding again. gotta go backwards to go forwards if we wish to take a group theoretic approach to understanding qualia (i.e., the qualia space inhabited by a given qualia is closely related to the symmetry group inhabited by the state space of the underlying physical structure; add to this that said pair of structures should also not violate locality/causality), should we also explore a group theoretic approach to binding? what might that resemble? perhaps "binding" would then be something as simple as a qualia space whose parts can't be transformed independently for example, if a visual field involves spatial motions E(2) and colour transformations U: - E(2) ⋉ U^X: each qualia pixel's colour can be transformed independently; experience is unchanged, because no pixel's colour is related to any other's - E(2) × U: changing one qualia pixel's colour alone does change the experience, because the relations between that pixel and all the others shift; only a transformation applied to every pixel at once leaves experience unchanged cc: @KanizsaBoundary @jessi_cata
Replying to @cube_flipper
the only way i can think this might happen is as described here (in reference to the notion of modelling qualia spaces in terms of their symmetry groups, as people like @kanair, @maxhodak_, @jessi_cata have explored)
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(please note that i do not think the literal actual symmetry group of the visual field is E(2), and claude just picked U as a placeholder variable for whatever group works for colour transformations)
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cc: @kanair @oizumim @NaoTsuchiya idk if anything here is original or not
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people with psychic dogs who know when their owners are coming home 🤝 people who thought permutation city sounded reasonable
Replying to @cube_flipper
by this measure, demonstrating the viability of computational functionalism is pretty much equivalent to demonstrating the reality of woo-woo nonlocal parapsychological phenomena. ironic that the rationalists are stereotypically computational functionalists
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recently i have been watching what a friend can achieve with affordable access to formal verification methods (using astra/fable). where before if you wanted to *prove* that some software had some property or another – maybe you want to prove it is secure in some way – this effectively required hiring expensive consultants from INRIA or somewhere. now you can just pay for the tokens for example, while i was driving around yesterday i was thinking about how the USA cannot allow itself to import Build Your Dreams cars, presumably because nobody can guarantee that the car's firmware won't be remotely disabled by China in the event of a war. this is the sort of thing cheap formal verification solves at the front of my mind is @johnsonmxe's post, "We need ownable neurotech" opentheory.net/2022/05/we-ne… > An underappreciated aspect of neurotech is we lack a strong “ownable computing” model, particularly for implanted systems. cc: @maxhodak_ @viemccoy
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cc also: @mattparlmer i suspect you'd find this interesting too
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cc also: @ArthurB @breitwoman i have to assume the tezos scene is aware of this already?
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Cube Flipper retweeted
key quote from the recent @robinhanson post on consciousness: > My second key observation is that all of our known fundamental descriptions of how the universe constrains physical systems are quite local and simple, even if they result in complicated physical worlds. That includes all proposed interaction and boundary condition rules. This strongly suggests that whatever rule describes which experience systems really feel versus not is also simple and local. overcomingbias.com/p/no-new-…
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key quote from the recent @robinhanson post on consciousness: > My second key observation is that all of our known fundamental descriptions of how the universe constrains physical systems are quite local and simple, even if they result in complicated physical worlds. That includes all proposed interaction and boundary condition rules. This strongly suggests that whatever rule describes which experience systems really feel versus not is also simple and local. overcomingbias.com/p/no-new-…
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well, CF overreaches well past Lorentz and even diffeomorphism invariance, as it is commonly presented one of its core claims appears to be that consciousness is invariant even with regards to broken spatiotemporal continuity. which is really quite out there
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by this measure, demonstrating the viability of computational functionalism is pretty much equivalent to demonstrating the reality of woo-woo nonlocal parapsychological phenomena. ironic that the rationalists are stereotypically computational functionalists
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holy fucking poast lmfao. a+ qualiatech futurism
human text, get your human text right here, guaranteed written by a real flesh-and-blood human qchu.substack.com/p/goonworl…
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Cube Flipper retweeted
Why Hybrid in "Hybrid Mind Uploading" As far as we know, consciousness has only ever shown up as an ongoing physical process in living tissue (unless you're willing to make some huge leaps about the nature of reality). That's where I'll start, and I'll try to assume as little as possible beyond it. It's also why I'm so fussy about the "hybrid" in the name. By hybrid mind uploading, I mean any route on which a living brain and an engineered substrate co-run and gradually integrate, until part of the person's phenomenal experience (maybe, eventually, all of it) is realised by the engineered substrate. That substrate can be biological, biohybrid, biomimetic or fully non-biological. Nothing gets scanned out along the way and re-instantiated somewhere else as its own free-standing "thing", disconnected from the brain that we're trying to "upload"/preserve. Whether an engineered substrate can realise a mind is the hypothesis under test, not an axiom to build into the definition. The "uploading" part only tells you where you might end up => all the interesting questions live in the "hybrid". Philosophically, I'm going for maximum conservatism: whatever survival is, it can't be anything more abstract than the process itself, running on without interruption. Want to put it somewhere more abstract (a pattern, a program, a file of weights, etc.)? Fine, but then that extra step is yours to justify, and with someone's life hanging on it, you'd better have a pretty good argument! "But an upload might be conscious. It might even be you" => sure, and we might all be living in a simulation, and the rest of you might be furniture in my dream. You can hang any story you like on a bare "might", however wild, so the most it can do is make you careful. The real worry about classical uploading (scan, store, simulate via software) is much more down to earth. Run a description of your functional organisation again somewhere else: does that actually continue your exact process, or does it just kick off a new one (or nothing at all)? For it to continue yours, there'd have to be some second thing (a soul, software, meta-reality => take your pick) that can be peeled off the process and set down somewhere else. Nobody has managed to show that there is such a thing. Classical mind uploading simply takes it for granted, and in doing so buys into a fairly Platonic picture of minds, one where they can exist apart from the biophysical reality that's carried every single one of them so far. And should that picture turn out to be wrong, we'd end up building an enormous graveyard of p-zombies (or, at best, of "strangers" with our memories). Don't forget: done at scale, classical mind uploading might even be the Great Filter! So, start with the biology and build upwards from there (slower, probably harder, but a lot less likely to kill anyone) :-) PS: The video is the idea at the cell scale: a neuron, a scaffold growing around it (i.e., hybrid state), and the de novo "neuron" (doing the same physics as the original neuron) that's left once the scaffold has taken over.
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