The overlooked $LQDA / $UTHR question may be whether the eventual end game is a broader PH-ILD royalty deal — potentially covering BOTH Yutrepia and L606 — rather than years of trying to keep Liquidia out of PH-ILD. Why could LQDA eventually have negotiating leverage despite losing at the district court? PH-ILD is a growing, underpenetrated market. Real-world data suggest a meaningful subset of treprostinil-naïve PH-ILD patients struggle to stay on Tyvaso DPI. If Yutrepia genuinely provides better tolerability/usability for those patients, it may be expanding the treated treprostinil market rather than simply taking share from Tyvaso. Removing PH-ILD from Yutrepia’s label does not mean Yutrepia use in PH-ILD disappears. If physicians see a real patient benefit, many already know the product and can prescribe it off-label. LQDA can be extremely disciplined about not promoting PH-ILD, but meaningful off-label utilization could still be difficult to suppress — and probably impossible to eliminate completely. That matters because a label win is not necessarily the same thing as an economic win. For UTHR, eliminating the Yutrepia PH-ILD label does not mean every Yutrepia patient becomes durable Tyvaso revenue. Some will switch to Tyvaso DPI or nebulized Tyvaso. But others may not tolerate DPI, may reject the nebulizer burden, or may simply discontinue prostacyclin. A royalty allows UTHR to monetize patients it might otherwise never retain. And Liquidia has another asset: L606. L606 is being developed as a sustained-release, twice-daily inhaled treprostinil formulation for PAH and PH-ILD. That matters strategically because UTHR does not currently have a marketed 1x- or 2x-daily inhaled treprostinil product of its own. (Liquidia Corporation) A broader settlement could therefore include a PH-ILD royalty on Yutrepia AND a royalty/license framework around future L606 PH-ILD sales. In effect, UTHR could gain economic participation in Liquidia’s next-generation, less-frequent-dosing product without having to build that product itself. TPIP makes that option more interesting. Insmed is developing TPIP as a once-daily inhaled prostanoid. If it succeeds, UTHR may eventually face a less-frequent-dosing competitor regardless of what happens to Yutrepia. So the strategic question becomes: Why spend years trying to suppress Liquidia’s PH-ILD franchise, only to face an outside once-daily competitor later, when UTHR could instead own a royalty stream on Yutrepia and potentially L606? UTHR has the stronger hand today. It won at the district court and has little reason to negotiate cheaply or immediately. Liquidia has said it plans to appeal, so UTHR can push its advantage while the legal process plays out. (Reuters) That means a deal may take time. But over the medium term, the incentives could shift if: • Yutrepia continues to see meaningful off-label PH-ILD use • LQDA stays disciplined on off-label promotion • physicians demonstrate a durable preference for Yutrepia in certain patients • Tyvaso DPI persistence remains an issue in treprostinil-naïve PH-ILD • L606 progresses as a twice-daily product • TPIP gets closer to market • and appellate risk remains At that point, the economically rational end game could be broader than a simple Yutrepia settlement: UTHR gets a royalty on Yutrepia PH-ILD. UTHR potentially gets economics on L606 PH-ILD. LQDA gets certainty and preserves its PH-ILD franchise. Doctors retain access to differentiated formulations. And UTHR gets exposure to the shift toward less-frequent inhaled dosing without needing to own the underlying products. The key question is not simply: “Can UTHR get PH-ILD removed from the Yutrepia label?” Answer yes; but rather, “Is UTHR better off spending years trying to eliminate Liquidia from PH-ILD — while TPIP advances — or turning Liquidia’s differentiated inhaled treprostinil franchise into a royalty-bearing asset?”