Paradoja de Richard Wollheim o paradoja de la democracia En las páginas de un ensayo publicado en 1962 dentro del volumen Philosophy, Politics and Society, el filósofo británico Richard Wollheim expuso una contradicción profunda en el corazón de las teorías democráticas. Nacido en 1923 y fallecido en 2003, Wollheim fue un pensador destacado en filosofía de la mente, emociones y estética, pero su contribución a la filosofía política reveló tensiones ineludibles en el acto de votar. Un ciudadano comprometido con la democracia puede preferir sinceramente que se apruebe la opción A, considerándola la mejor para la sociedad. Al mismo tiempo, como demócrata genuino, acepta que debe prevalecer la voluntad mayoritaria. Si la mayoría elige B, ese mismo votante debe respaldar la implementación de B, aunque siga creyendo que A era superior. Surge así una inconsistencia entre la preferencia individual y el compromiso colectivo con el procedimiento. La máquina democrática produce un resultado que el votante racional no desea del todo, pero que debe acatar por lealtad al sistema. Esta tensión, conocida como la paradoja de Wollheim, cuestiona la coherencia interna de la democracia cuando se le trata como un mecanismo infalible de revelación de la «voluntad popular». La paradoja no es un capricho abstracto. Ilustra cómo el votante se divide: desea un contenido específico y, simultáneamente, desea que gane quien obtenga más sufragios. No se trata de mera indecisión, sino de una fractura lógica entre juicio personal y deferencia al agregado. Wollheim no pretendía destruir la democracia, sino advertir sobre sus límites conceptuales. El «pueblo» como ente unificado con preferencias coherentes resulta una construcción ilusoria. Las mayorías emergen de agregaciones imperfectas, donde las preferencias individuales se diluyen y a menudo generan políticas que nadie defendería con plena convicción una vez aplicadas. Los impulsores de modelos democráticos participativos y mayoritarios han idealizado repetidamente la «voluntad de las masas» como fuente infalible de justicia social. Promueven mecanismos de consulta popular, referendos y movilizaciones colectivas bajo el supuesto de que la suma de votos revela una dirección sabia y armónica. Sin embargo, aplican esta paradoja de manera sistemática. Muchos ciudadanos respaldan en las urnas políticas de fuerte intervención redistributiva, regulaciones extensas o agendas identitarias invocando «solidaridad» y «progreso colectivo». Al mismo tiempo, en sus vidas privadas prefieren conservar más de sus ingresos, evitar la fragmentación social excesiva y mantener espacios de libertad individual lejos de la sobrecarga burocrática. Una vez implementadas las medidas, surgen deuda pública descontrolada, aumento de la delincuencia en ciertas urbes europeas, estancamiento económico en naciones con alta carga impositiva y polarización cultural que nadie parece haber pedido explícitamente en su totalidad. En Chile, durante procesos plebiscitarios recientes, amplios sectores votaron por propuestas que prometían mayor equidad y derechos ampliados, solo para lamentar después el detalle de textos que generaban incertidumbre jurídica y fuga de capitales. En Argentina, varios ciclos electorales han llevado a victorias de plataformas que luego implementan controles de precios y gasto público expansivo, produciendo inflación crónica que erosiona el poder adquisitivo de los mismos votantes que las apoyaron. En España, coaliciones que ganan con discursos de justicia social terminan aprobando normativas que complican la vivienda, elevan la precariedad laboral juvenil y tensionan la unidad territorial, mientras las encuestas posteriores revelan arrepentimiento parcial entre las bases moderadas. La paradoja opera porque el procedimiento democrático se eleva a valor supremo, por encima de los contenidos concretos. Los defensores de estas visiones tratan al «colectivo» como si poseyera una racionalidad propia, ignorando que las mayorías se forman a menudo por emociones momentáneas, información incompleta o incentivos de corto plazo. Cuando los efectos negativos aparecen, fuga de talento, desincentivo al esfuerzo productivo, burocracia asfixiante, responden con más democracia: nuevas consultas, mucha más regulación, mayor adoctrinamiento en instituciones educativas. La inconsistencia se resuelve no corrigiendo el rumbo, sino insistiendo en que el problema radica en que no se ha consultado lo suficiente o en que faltan mecanismos de «democracia aún más profunda». Richard Wollheim demostró que la democracia no genera automáticamente coherencia entre lo que cada uno quiere y lo que el conjunto impone. Pretender lo contrario conduce a sistemas donde las políticas se aprueban por agregación, pero se viven con frustración creciente. Las sociedades que cultivan libertad individual, límites claros al poder y mecanismos de corrección descentralizados logran una mejor armonía entre las preferencias personales y el orden colectivo. Ignorar la paradoja solo multiplica los desencuentros y erosiona la legitimidad del propio sistema.

The Long Road to cooperation and market integration across Africa: challenges and pathways open.substack.com/pub/jimdem…

Port-Louis now benefiting from disruptions related to Iran war and Houthis, but had been losing ground to competitors over last 13 years chatgpt.com/s/m_6a083f5a7cbc…. Needs hard infrastructure upgrade and soft infrastructure reform

Merci à Christophe Clavé pour cet éclairage sur l’appauvrissement de la langue et la ruine de la pensée 🙌 "La disparition progressive des temps (subjonctif, passé simple, imparfait, formes composées du futur, participe passé…) donne lieu à une pensée au présent, limitée à l’instant, incapable de projections dans le temps. La généralisation du tutoiement, la disparition des majuscules et de la ponctuation sont autant de coups mortels portés à la subtilité de l’expression. Supprimer le mot «mademoiselle» est non seulement renoncer à l’esthétique d’un mot, mais également promouvoir l’idée qu’entre une petite fille et une femme il n’y a rien. Moins de mots et moins de verbes conjugués c’est moins de capacités à exprimer les émotions et moins de possibilité d’élaborer une pensée. Des études ont montré qu’une partie de la violence dans la sphère publique et privée provient directement de l’incapacité à mettre des mots sur les émotions. Sans mot pour construire un raisonnement, la pensée complexe chère à Edgar Morin est entravée, rendue impossible. Plus le langage est pauvre, moins la pensée existe. L’histoire est riche d’exemples et les écrits sont nombreux de Georges Orwell dans « 1984 » à Ray Bradbury dans « Fahrenheit 451 » qui ont relaté comment les dictatures de toutes obédiences entravaient la pensée en réduisant et tordant le nombre et le sens des mots. Il n’y a pas de pensée critique sans pensée. Et il n’y a pas de pensée sans mots. Comment construire une pensée hypothético-déductive sans maîtrise du conditionnel ? Comment envisager l’avenir sans conjugaison au futur ? Comment appréhender une temporalité, une succession d’éléments dans le temps, qu’ils soient passés ou à venir, ainsi que leur durée relative, sans une langue qui fait la différence entre ce qui aurait pu être, ce qui a été, ce qui est, ce qui pourrait advenir, et ce qui sera après que ce qui pourrait advenir soit advenu ? Si un cri de ralliement devait se faire entendre aujourd’hui, ce serait celui, adressé aux parents et aux enseignants : faites parler, lire et écrire vos enfants, vos élèves, vos étudiants. Enseignez et pratiquez la langue dans ses formes les plus variées, même si elle semble compliquée, surtout si elle est compliquée. Parce que dans cet effort se trouve la liberté. Ceux qui expliquent à longueur de temps qu’il faut simplifier l’orthographe, purger la langue de ses «défauts», abolir les genres, les temps, les nuances, tout ce qui crée de la complexité sont les fossoyeurs de l’esprit humain. Il n’est pas de liberté sans exigences. Il n’est pas de beauté sans la pensée de la beauté." Christophe Clavé

*BRITISH WRITER PENS THE BEST DESCRIPTION OF TRUMP* Someone asked "Why do some British people not like Donald Trump?" Nate White, an articulate and witty writer from England wrote the following response: A few things spring to mind. Trump lacks certain qualities which the British traditionally esteem. For instance, he has no class, no charm, no coolness, no credibility, no compassion, no wit, no warmth, no wisdom, no subtlety, no sensitivity, no self-awareness, no humility, no honour and no grace – all qualities, funnily enough, with which his predecessor Mr. Obama was generously blessed. So for us, the stark contrast does rather throw Trump's limitations into embarrassingly sharp relief. Plus, we like a laugh. And while Trump may be laughable, he has never once said anything wry, witty or even faintly amusing – not once, ever. I don't say that rhetorically, I mean it quite literally: not once, not ever. And that fact is particularly disturbing to the British sensibility – for us, to lack humour is almost inhuman. But with Trump, it's a fact. He doesn't even seem to understand what a joke is – his idea of a joke is a crass comment, an illiterate insult, a casual act of cruelty. Trump is a troll. And like all trolls, he is never funny and he never laughs; he only crows or jeers. And scarily, he doesn't just talk in crude, witless insults – he actually thinks in them. His mind is a simple bot-like algorithm of petty prejudices and knee-jerk nastiness. There is never any under-layer of irony, complexity, nuance or depth. It's all surface. Some Americans might see this as refreshingly upfront. Well, we don't. We see it as having no inner world, no soul. And in Britain we traditionally side with David, not Goliath. All our heroes are plucky underdogs: Robin Hood, Dick Whittington, Oliver Twist. Trump is neither plucky, nor an underdog. He is the exact opposite of that. He's not even a spoiled rich-boy, or a greedy fat-cat. He's more a fat white slug. A Jabba the Hutt of privilege. And worse, he is that most unforgivable of all things to the British: a bully. That is, except when he is among bullies; then he suddenly transforms into a snivelling sidekick instead. There are unspoken rules to this stuff – the Queensberry rules of basic decency – and he breaks them all. He punches downwards – which a gentleman should, would, could never do – and every blow he aims is below the belt. He particularly likes to kick the vulnerable or voiceless or female – and he kicks them when they are down. So the fact that a significant minority – perhaps a third – of Americans look at what he does, listen to what he says, and then think 'Yeah, he seems like my kind of guy' is a matter of some confusion and no little distress to British people, given that: • Americans are supposed to be nicer than us, and most are. • You don't need a particularly keen eye for detail to spot a few flaws in the man. This last point is what especially confuses and dismays British people, and many other people too; his faults seem pretty bloody hard to miss. After all, it's impossible to read a single tweet, or hear him speak a sentence or two, without staring deep into the abyss. He turns being artless into an art form; he is a Picasso of pettiness; a Shakespeare of shit. His faults are fractal: even his flaws have flaws, and so on ad infinitum. God knows there have always been stupid people in the world, and plenty of nasty people too. But rarely has stupidity been so nasty, or nastiness so stupid. He makes Nixon look trustworthy and George W look smart. In fact, if Frankenstein decided to make a monster assembled entirely from human flaws – he would make a Trump.

“In my youth I made it a rule not to drink a drop of alcohol before lunch. Now that I am no longer young, I keep to the rule of not drinking a drop before breakfast.” Winston Churchill was the only British Prime Minister ever awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. Reading him, you realize that to be a brilliant writer you don’t need to write long books — and to be a true philosopher, you don’t either. Here are some of his quotes: One. If you’re going through hell — keep going. Two. You have enemies? Good. That means you’ve stood up for something in your life. Three. Every crisis is a new opportunity. Four. A smart person doesn’t make all the mistakes himself — he gives others a chance too. Five. The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. Six. Success is the ability to go from one failure to another without losing enthusiasm. Seven. A kite rises highest against the wind, not with it. Eight. A man who never changes his mind is a fool. Nine. When eagles are silent, parrots begin to chatter. Ten. Power is a drug. Anyone who has tried it even once is poisoned by it forever. Eleven. Do not wish for health and wealth — wish for luck. On the Titanic, everyone was rich and healthy, but only a few were lucky. Twelve. A lie travels halfway around the world before the truth has a chance to get its pants on. Thirteen. Politics is almost as exciting as war, and quite as dangerous. In war, you can only be killed once — in politics, many times. Fourteen. My tastes are simple. I am easily satisfied with the best. Fifteen. If you want to have the last word in an argument, tell your opponent: “You may be right.” Sixteen. The greatest advantage comes to those who make their mistakes early enough to learn from them. Seventeen. People are very good at keeping secrets they do not know. Eighteen. War is when innocent people die for the interests of others. Nineteen. The greatest lesson in life is that even fools are sometimes right. Twenty. It is far better to bribe a person than to kill him — and far better to be bribed than killed. Twenty-one. It is easier to rule a nation than to raise four children. Twenty-two. We live in an age of great events and small men. Twenty-three. Nothing earns authority like calmness. Twenty-four. The best way to ruin a relationship is to start trying to “sort it out.” Twenty-five. When two people fight, the third one wins. Twenty-six. If you kill a murderer, the number of murderers does not change. Twenty-seven. A pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees opportunity in every difficulty. Twenty-eight. You will never reach your destination if you stop to throw stones at every barking dog. Twenty-nine. A nation that forgets its past loses its future. Once, during a speech, Churchill was asked: — Isn’t it pleasing to know that every time you give a speech, the hall is packed? He replied: — It is, very much so. But every time I see a full hall, I cannot help thinking that if I were not giving a speech but being led to the gallows, the crowd would be twice as large.

America spent $285 billion to LOSE the AI war. Stanford dropped a 423 page report yesterday and revealed the most damning stat on page 200: The number of AI researchers moving to the United States has collapsed 89% since 2017. 80% of that collapse happened in the LAST 12 MONTHS. Let that sink in. The country that invented the transformer. The country that built OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, and xAI. The country pouring $285.9 billion of private capital into AI in a single year (23x more than China). Can no longer attract the people who actually build the technology. And here's the part that should concern every founder, operator, and investor reading this: The Trump administration just made it official. The H-1B visa now costs employers $100,000 PER HIRE. So OpenAI wants to hire a Chinese postdoc from Tsinghua? $100K before they write a line of code. Anthropic wants a French ML engineer? $100K. Google wants the Indian PhD who literally co-authored the paper their entire model is based on? $100K. And these are the LUCKY ones who even get a visa. The result was instant. 89% drop over 8 years. 80% of it in the last year alone. The talent pipeline got destroyed. Now look at the other side of the chart: China's top model is now 2.7 percentage points behind Anthropic's best. Down from a 20+ point gap two years ago. China leads the world in AI publications. China leads in AI patents. China leads in industrial robot installations. US and Chinese models have traded the #1 spot multiple times since early 2025. Switzerland and Singapore now have more AI researchers per capita than the US. The US ranks 24TH globally in actual AI adoption. Behind the UAE. Behind Singapore. Behind countries most Americans couldn't find on a map. And here's the truly insane part: 50% of the world's top AI researchers are Chinese. Jensen Huang said this on a podcast 3 weeks ago. For 20 years, the US strategy was simple: Let them study at Stanford and MIT, then keep them. Pay them $800K. Give them green cards. Build the future on imported brains. That deal is dead. We just told the smartest people in the world: "Pay $100,000 for the privilege of working here, or go home." And guess what they're doing. They're going to Zurich, where Anthropic and OpenAI are quietly opening offices because they can't get the talent into San Francisco anymore. The strategy is the same as building a Ferrari factory and then banning mechanics from entering the building. You can pour hundreds of billions into data centers. You can buy 4 million Nvidia chips. You can sign $300 billion cloud contracts with Oracle. You can build nuclear reactors to power your GPUs. None of it matters if the people who write the algorithms aren't allowed in the country. Wall Street thinks AI is a capex race. But in reality, it's a TALENT race. Every dollar Microsoft and Meta and Google are spending assumes the same army of researchers will keep showing up to use it. That assumption just broke. And the smart money already knows: Why is Anthropic opening a Zurich office? Why is DeepMind expanding in London instead of Mountain View? Why is OpenAI hiring in Dublin and Singapore? Because the math no longer works in America. The government turned the world's biggest brain magnet into the world's most expensive border wall. 3 years from now, when China launches a frontier model that outperforms anything in the US and the headlines scream "How did we lose the lead?" - remember this post. The lead wasn't lost in a lab. It wasn't lost on a benchmark. It wasn't lost to a smarter algorithm. It was lost at customs.

Drop whatever you're doing and read this @newlinesmag article by the political scientist Hussein Banai, which is the single most incisive — and chilling — piece of analysis I believe has been published, anywhere, on this subject of ultimate urgency. newlinesmag.com/argument/the…

L'Express @lexpressmaurice lexpress.mu/node/556080

Notifications en temps réel des retards sur les lignes de bus à Maurice: un fruit à portée de main open.substack.com/pub/jimdem… Low hanging fruit that successive governments have not carried out !

Donald Trump is right that they are smart, but he is missing the point. He views them through the lens of a businessman, calculating deals and leverage. That is why he cannot understand or defeat them. They are not playing the same game. He sees a deal; they see a test of faith. He sees a transaction; they see a battle between truth and falsehood. They are Shia. Their entire identity is built on the sacrifice at Karbala. They are raised with the motto "Hayhat min al-dhilla"—Death is better than humiliation. The USA cannot threaten a nation taught from birth that dying as a martyr is the greatest victory. The USA cannot intimidate a woman whose identity is tied to the daughter of the Prophet. And here is what Trump really doesn't understand: They respect Jesus. They await the Messiah. They believe they are preparing the world for his return by defending truth and the rights of the people of Palestine against falsehood and oppression carried out by Israel. So when the USA fights them with bombs, they thank God for the chance to become martyrs. Trump cannot defeat Iranians who are in love with death for righteousness when he is in love with life.

Which Small countries (mostly SIDS) Punch over/below their weight?Answers from AI open.substack.com/pub/jimdem…

There is method to the (Trump) madness.  Inequality is an inducement to populism — and a key indicator of popular discontentment with the U.S. political process. theglobalist.com/united-stat…

Trudeau cites how “Canadians fought and died” beside you. Cites Iranian hostage crisis. Hurricane Katrina. La fires. 911. “We were always there”. He is not wrong to cite these key moments. The sense of betrayal is palpable.

Very interesting interview

Venice was built on water. This is how it was done.

Eleven years ago, I quit an abusive academic relationship with my former co-author Ricardo Hausmann, presently a Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School. This abuse has now returned in a new act of plagiarism. Today, I am pushing back. A few months ago, I learned about two new working papers that Hausmann and his team posted at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) [1,2]. The first one claims to introduce a “multidimensional approach” to economic complexity by combining data on trade, patents, and publications, and concludes that these metrics are complementary when explaining economic growth. Yet, this is exactly what my co-authors and I did in a 2023 peer-reviewed journal paper [3] that Hausmann and his co-authors were perfectly aware of (as I document below). Instead of giving proper acknowledgement to our work, however, Hausmann and his team hide it in a footnote on page 18 clouded in a factually incorrect statement. The footnote says that “other studies have developed similar complexity metrics under different names.” That is not true. Our 2023 paper uses the same name as Hausmann et al.’s 2024 “new” working paper, namely, the “Economic Complexity Index (ECI).” Now, it is reasonable to wonder if this is a misunderstanding or oversight. People sometimes forget to cite others for innocent reasons. But there is clear evidence to the contrary in two other working papers published almost simultaneously with the first one. One of them, is another WIPO working paper by his coauthors but without Hausmann [4]. This paper does properly acknowledge the existence of our work in multidimensional economic complexity in the main text: “Following […] Stojkoski et al. (2023).” So, the team clearly knew about the work. The third working paper [2], also at WIPO, includes Hausmann as a first author making a call for the use of multidimensional economic complexity methods in innovation policy. Here, the only example of multidimensional work cited by Hausmann et al. is his own 2024 working paper [1], this time completely ignoring the 2023 peer-reviewed paper he knew about (“In Hausmann et al. (2024), we measure this for each country in different dimensions (e.g., trade and patents).”). Unsurprisingly, I had made a similar call for multidimensional expansion of the field in a paper that was also published after peer-review in 2023 (Hidalgo CA, Research Policy, 2023 [5]) and that had been available as a pre-print for two years. In that paper, I cite our original multidimensional economic complexity contribution and also two other papers that had introduced multidimensional approaches to relatedness, another key concept in the field, which Hausmann does not cite either. In my view, these three documents provide clear evidence of an attempt by Hausmann to misappropriate an idea published by a former co-author while knowing of that work. This, violates Harvard’s honor code [6] which requires the “accurate attribution of sources” and considers “plagiarizing or misrepresenting the ideas or language of someone else as one’s own” as a violation of its community standards. In the first working paper [1], he copies the idea while hiding the attribution in a factually incorrect footnote. Simultaneously, he releases a second working paper citing this unpublished work as the only example of prior art [2]. The third paper [4], the one by his co-authors but not him, shows that the team knows about the work and behaves differently when the senior member of the team (Hausmann) is not an author. My co-authors and I were dismayed by Hausmann’s attempt to misappropriate our ideas. Why bother doing original work and getting it past peer-review (which for both of our papers was a lengthy process), if authors with a platform such as Harvard University take your ideas and pass them as their own? But this is not the first time. In 2019, Hausmann and his team announced a “first-of-its-kind” and “unique” feature in their trade data visualization website (“Atlas Online”): the “country profiles.” Yet, my group had supported country profiles in the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) since 2012, several months before Hausmann and I parted ways in 2013 (see full story document for details [7]). The reason that the profiles disappeared in Hausmann’s copy of the Observatory in 2013 was that they were deleted by his team, probably because they did not understand that we had conceived these pages for search engine optimization. In short, the original OEC that I designed with my group and placed in the public domain had country profiles in 2012 and was redesigned in 2015 to make the country and product profiles the main part of the site. Today, OEC.world [8] serves over 100,000 profiles, a design concept we use prominently when constructing other data distribution platforms (e.g. Data USA, Data Mexico, etc). In fact, in 2016 I published a “how to” guide in Scientific American for this kind of work in 2016 [9]. But when Hausmann and his team at Harvard finally built country profiles in 2019, seven years after we did, they claimed a “revolutionary first-of-its-kind” and “unique” feature, in their lab’s own website [10] and in the Harvard Gazette [11] So why share this now? I have three reasons. First, I broke off my relationship with Hausmann in 2013 after several unpleasant experiences, which included having to fight for the authorship rights of junior authors (which Hausmann wanted to exclude from our joint book: The Atlas of Economic Complexity) and being exploited when we were equal partners in a company that I had registered for us to do joint consulting work (see full story document [7]). From there on, I just wanted to forget about him. The tacit deal was that, if he stopped the abuse, I could put this in the past. But Hausmann has repeatedly broken this tacit deal. His 2024 working paper research agenda seems to involve putting forward, without proper acknowledgement, ideas my team and I published after peer-review in 2023 and made available online in 2022. It has been more than a decade. This has to stop. The second reason is that because Hausmann has done this before, I am concerned that if I don’t push back, he will do it again. Right now, my research group and I have a great thing going on. Should we worry that in 2026 Hausmann will try to pass off our 2024 and 2025 papers as his own? The third reason is that this egregious behavior is supported by a power asymmetry that is highly profitable for Hausmann thanks to the Harvard platform. Soon after we split ways in 2013, Hausmann sold this [12] embarrassingly bad economic data visualization website to the Mexican Government as part of a project rumored to be about USD 5,000,000 (paid using an undisclosed and untraceable escrow account (“fideicomiso”)). The online platform was so sloppy that some government officials started to call it “El Mamarracho” (a derogatory term in Spanish for extremely shoddy work). I learned about this in 2019, after a new team entered Mexico’s economic ministry and invited us to build Data Mexico [13], a properly built open data portal integrating dozens of datasets in thousands of profiles for a fraction of the cost of the “Mamarracho.” Hausmann has engaged in commercial endeavors with many governments (e.g. Albania, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Mexico, etc.). So, in my opinion, the target audience for these misappropriated working papers are not other scholars, but the officials who purchase economic development contracts from him and take the word of the Harvard Professor of Practice at face value. This is what makes misappropriating the multidimensional economic complexity idea important. A strong motivation for any consulting work in this space is the fact that trade-based measures of economic complexity explain future economic growth. This was established in a paper Hausmann and I published together in 2009 [14], based on work we did together while I was a PhD student at the University of Notre Dame. But the 2023 multidimensional economic complexity paper made that idea obsolete. On the one hand, it simultaneously considers multiple expressions of complexity (trade, patents, and research), and on the other hand, it looks at multiple outcomes (growth, inequality, and emissions). Giving advice based on the latest developments in the field requires using a multidimensional framework. Finally, I want to say that I have nothing against Hausmann’s co-authors, some of whom I know personally and some of whom I don’t. I understand that they are in a situation in which they may depend financially and professionally on Hausmann. His first attempt to spin my publicizing these facts may be to argue that someone of his caliber does not have the time to look at petty things like footnotes and references (pinning the responsibility on them). I don’t think that’s fair. I also want to say that I do not consider Ricardo’s behavior necessarily representative of Harvard University or of the World Intellectual Property Organization. I have met many people at those organizations and continue to collaborate with some of them. They are outstanding scholars I have decided to go public with this statement after consulting with several senior colleagues and lawyers specialized in disputes in higher education. I am absolutely distraught by having to deal with this situation eleven-years after I quit that abusive relationship. But he needs to cut it out.

The man who drew a triangle that revolutionized economics in many ways is now 100 and still hasnt received his Nobel