Happy Nat. Foundation Day to #SouthKorea🇰🇷! Dep. Min. Wu joined Rep. Hwang to celebrate. With #SouthKorea now #Taiwan🇹🇼’s third-largest trading partner, trade topping US$90B as of Sep. this year & strong complementarity in chips & AI, our partnership continues to grow stronger.

知らないと思うけど、昔、台湾が世界中から断交されていった時に、韓国は台湾の弱みに付け込んで大量の不良在庫の自動車や機械を押し付けたんだけど台湾が引き取って代金を払ったら即座に断交したので、精神が汚い国として嫌われているんだよ。

The Korean Dystopia Narrative is such a lucrative export for this country. People overseas lap it up, it provides western copium, & it feeds into all sorts of unconscious biases; meanwhile Koreans just drink ice americano and get on with life like normal people in a safe country.

Ukrainian women party while Ukrainian men are FORCED - by law - to sacrifice their lives in battle. This is female privilege. 🇺🇦

The President of South Korea is in no position to threaten anyone, especially the President of Ukraine. Let me remind you that the very term “martial law” scares Koreans more than the real prospect of military action or provocations from North Korea. So, no offense, but the President of South Korea should think carefully about whom he is speaking to and what he is saying. Ukraine may one day prove to be one of South Korea’s few real allies if the country comes under attack. As today’s realities clearly show, what matters most in a crisis is having genuine allies who will actually stand by you, rather than allies who exist only on paper.

до речі, а коли йобані корейці вибачаться перед Китаєм за Нанкінську різню?

'Black Korea' by @icecube a song many don't know of now but it added to the outright resentment of Koreans in South LA/South Central. "so pay respect to the black fist or we'll burn your store, right down to a crisp." 18 year old me listening to this song "Fuck you Cube, alright, let's go then, fake ass "gangster". I know your history. youtu.be/GI8BEITVSAI?si=kn-P…

프래터니티(fraternity)는 미국 명문대에 있는 폐쇄적 사교 집단. 남자 쪽을 프래터니티, 여자 쪽을 소로리티(sorority)라고 한다. 명문대 나온 것만으로도 인맥이 생기지만, 여기 멤버였다면 그 안에서도 핵인싸였다는 뜻. 문제는 비밀주의. 문장·암호·내부 호칭이 있고, 밖에서는 말하지 않으며, 가히 사이버 종교를 방불케 한다. 특히 입단식(hazing)이 그렇다. 밤새 술을 먹이고, 얼음물에 세우고, 폭언과 구타를 통과시켜 “우리 사람”으로 만든다. 애초에 WASP 백인 위주의 문화라 동양인들은 잘 끼워주지도 않지만, 이 문화에 익숙하지 않은 한국인들은 주로 영화를 통해 이 문화를 접한다. 영화 《소셜 네트워크》에서 저커버그가 겪었던 헤이징이 대표적인 사례. 더 큰 문제는 비밀주의와 난잡한 파티 문화 때문에 프랫 하우스 파티에서 성폭력 문제가 지속적으로 일어나고 비밀주의로 인해 덮어지는 일이 반복된다는 점. 《애니멀 하우스》(Animal House)는 난장판 파티의 원형을, 《더 스컬스》(The Skulls)는 한 걸음 더 가서 명문대 비밀결사와 권력 승계 과정을 보여준다.

I ACCUSE PUTIN. @KremlinRussia Yoon Suk Yeol was one of Asia’s clearest supporters of Ukraine. His government backed Kyiv with aid, deepened security cooperation with the US and Japan, and openly confronted the growing Russia–North Korea military partnership. Moscow had every strategic reason to want a weaker Yoon presidency. But the formal reason for Yoon’s downfall was his own disastrous martial-law decision. On 3 December 2024 he declared emergency martial law; parliament rejected it, and on 14 December he was impeached. On 4 April 2025 the Constitutional Court unanimously removed him from office, ruling that his actions violated his constitutional duties and improperly used military force against parliament. My accusation is therefore about the combination of both factors: Yoon’s strongly pro-Ukrainian geopolitical course made him an adversary of Moscow, while the domestic martial-law crisis created the opportunity for his removal. Did Moscow or Pyongyang exploit that crisis? Did Russian or North Korean influence operations amplify the campaign against Yoon? Did covert networks help turn a domestic constitutional crisis into the downfall of a president Putin had every reason to dislike? These questions deserve investigation. I accuse Putin of seeking the downfall of the pro-Ukrainian President Yoon — but evidence of a secret Russian operation has not yet been publicly established. FOLLOW THE MONEY. FOLLOW THE NETWORKS. FOLLOW THE PROPAGANDA. @GunterFehlinger | fehlinger.net | natoenlargement.org

I ACCUSE PUTIN. @KremlinRussia Yoon Suk Yeol was one of Asia’s clearest supporters of Ukraine. His government backed Kyiv with aid, deepened security cooperation with the US and Japan, and openly confronted the growing Russia–North Korea military partnership. Moscow had every strategic reason to want a weaker Yoon presidency. But the formal reason for Yoon’s downfall was his own disastrous martial-law decision. On 3 December 2024 he declared emergency martial law; parliament rejected it, and on 14 December he was impeached. On 4 April 2025 the Constitutional Court unanimously removed him from office, ruling that his actions violated his constitutional duties and improperly used military force against parliament. My accusation is therefore about the combination of both factors: Yoon’s strongly pro-Ukrainian geopolitical course made him an adversary of Moscow, while the domestic martial-law crisis created the opportunity for his removal. Did Moscow or Pyongyang exploit that crisis? Did Russian or North Korean influence operations amplify the campaign against Yoon? Did covert networks help turn a domestic constitutional crisis into the downfall of a president Putin had every reason to dislike? These questions deserve investigation. I accuse Putin of seeking the downfall of the pro-Ukrainian President Yoon — but evidence of a secret Russian operation has not yet been publicly established. FOLLOW THE MONEY. FOLLOW THE NETWORKS. FOLLOW THE PROPAGANDA. @GunterFehlinger | fehlinger.net | natoenlargement.org