It has been clear to many of us, and now it’s becoming clear more tangibly, that AI models will commoditize to various degrees. This is of course a difficult business reality if your core business depends on exclusivity on intelligence.
But commodity markets are not communism. They are the largest markets on earth. Oil, grain, steel, electricity, memory: trillions clear through them every year, priced by competition among thousands of suppliers. In economic terms, communism is one provider and no price. A commodity market is the precise inverse. The world that actually resembles central planning is the one Dean argues for: a set of protected incumbents, access gated by the state, agencies instructed to manufacture FUD until every regulated buyer, and transitively every tool maker upstream, backs away from cheaper competitors.
Open weights don't deter capex. They move it. When the model layer commoditizes, spend shifts to inference, data, tooling, and applications, and builds far broader industrial infrastructure rather than concentrating capital in a handful of companies. Most of our digital infrastructure today, hyperscalers included, runs on open source. The businesses built atop it keep excellent margins and compound at extraordinary rates. Open-weights intelligence will likely rank among the most important economic accelerations in history. It won't be kind to every early incumbent, Linux wasn't kind to Sun Microsystems, but it will be very good for almost everyone else. I suspect OpenAI and Anthropic, given their positions, excellent products, resources and talent density, will be just fine. They will simply hold a little less pricing power.
The security theater around Mythos continues to do damage. Of course, there is no evidence for the hysterical claims. The evidence is in fact so thin that proponents of AI's existential risks now openly recommend FUD as the strategy. That should be telling.
Some observations on Kimi:
1. It's a very good model! I don't think its performance can be explained away by distillation or anything like that. In agentic coding sessions, it seems pretty much on par with the best public models of Q1 2026. In my fairly limited use, it also seemed very token hungry. It's not obvious to me that this model is actually that cheap to run.
2. I am personally surprised the Chinese state continues to allow the open sourcing of models this good, given potential risks. To be clear, I *myself* might be fine with models presenting this level of marginal risk being open weight, but I am surprised that China is fine with it. I suspect the reason they are is 75% explained by strategic blindness/lack of AGI-pilledness (the CCP is very Yann Lecun-y in its views of AI). The other 25% or so is their lack of compute for customer inference (making China's open-weight strategy an unintended byproduct of US export controls) and the normal Chinese strategy of aggressive exports. For the companies, as opposed to the government, the decision to open source is partially ideological and partially because they are behind, and they know that very few people would pay for sub-frontier models from China.
3. Open-weight models are inherently decelerationist, and I'm continually surprised to see the so-called "accelerationists" so excited about open-weight models. I suspect the reason they are is that they know open-weight models are effectively ungovernable, and they simply like the overall cloak of ungovernability open-weight models create over the whole of AI. It's not a bad strategy; it reminds me of James Scott's recounting of the hill people in "the art of not being governed." Still, in the end, open-weight models deter further AI capex.
4. One probable outcome of an open-weight-model-dominant world is full AI communism, which is precisely what China proposes: rather than a market product, AI is a "public good" which will ultimately be provided by the state as a kind of "digital public infrastructure." This future strikes me as a dystopian hellscape, but I've never met an open-weight models advocate who doesn't ultimately concede this is where things end. You'd be surprised how many 'accelerationists' lobbied me, while I was in government, to support an eleven or twelve-figure federally funded data center so that startups could train models at a subsidy and then give them away for free. There was no other way for AI to progress, they said. Perhaps this is the logical end state of things. Nonetheless, I find myself surprised to see supposed accelerationists excited about such an outcome. I think many of them just don't know what they're doing. Many accelerationists do not view the creation and serving of frontier models as a legitimate business.
5. I would guess that the Trump Administration will at some point realize that their best strategy here would be to create large amounts of regulatory risk around the use of open-weight Chinese models. You don't need to "ban open source" (one of the dumber motifs of AI policy discussion). You just need to direct every agency to issue soft law that creates FUD. "A Federal Reserve Advisory Bulletin found that there may be backdoors in Chinese AI models." It needn't be that well justified. You just create enough regulatory risk that every regulated enterprise backs off. You probably don't want to create so much regulatory risk that you scare off the hyperscalers from serving Chinese models; this will just drive startups to sketchier providers. There's a happy middle ground here. I'd assume they will do some version of this.
6. It's probably true that open-weight models of this capability make the world a bit more dangerous, but not so much more that you'll really notice. At some point the models will be capable enough that you will notice. "A nonliving, invisible, dangerous, and infinitely self-replicating agent escaped from a Chinese lab," you say? Color me shocked.