Russia needs to lose, and lose badly. That's what every dictator on the planet needs to see. Our ability or failure to stop and punish Russia's crimes in #Ukraine will deter or encourage the aggression of dictatorships worldwide, and thereby determine the course of this century.

Twee zwaargewichten uit Poetins kring, Oesmanov en Fridman, zijn verlost van EU-sancties. Twee dagen later sluit Brussel een bijfiguur buiten: Xenia Fedorova, oud-directeur van het sinds 2022 verboden RT France. Sanctiebeleid met de weegschaal op z'n kop. hln.be/buitenland/kremlin-wo…

Het staatspersbureau van het Kremlin heeft vandaag een artikel gepubliceerd met de titel "Rusland staat voor een nieuwe speciale militaire operatie. Die zal van korte duur zijn". Het bespreekt een militair conflict met Litouwen.

Nog 3 nachtjes slapen... komt allen naar De Dam, Amsterdam, aanstaande zondag 27 september om 13 uur! Neem je buren, collega's, vrienden, (groot)ouders mee en: spread the word! Zie onze eisen op: stopdeoorlogskoorts.nl

I'd encourage everyone to read the Danish military intelligence assessment in full, and not rely on excitable social media upsums. Here is the top line: "The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) assesses that Russia will intensify its hybrid war by carrying out more frequent attacks against the West and NATO, with greater consequences for the targeted countries than in the past. This could include destructive cyber attacks that cripple critical societal functions as well as sabotage attacks that carry a high risk of casualties." In other words, Russia will continue doing what it's already doing (terrorist attacks against hard and soft targets, cyberoperations), only more so. This is an uncontroversial assessment across Western intelligence services, so far as I've been able to determine. DDIS continues: "At the same time, there is a low but growing risk that Russia will launch a limited military attack against one or several NATO countries bordering Russia....Such a limited military attack could take the form of isolated strikes with long‑range weapons on infrastructure that is vital to the support to Ukraine. In this situation, Russia might then claim that the weapons only struck NATO territory because they were jammed by Ukraine. It could also be a so-called false flag operation, where Russia uses Ukrainian‑made drones to attack a NATO country." The scenario envisaged here (a low but growing risk) is a plausibly deniable conventional attack by Russia. The objective would be twofold. First, to sow panic and confusion in the targeted country or countries, and encourage skepticism of the official government version of what just happened. "Maybe it was the Ukrainians." "Maybe it was an accident." "Maybe no attack took place and the deep state is trying to foment World War III." Thirty seconds on this hellsite should be enough to convince you that counterfactual narratives would be easy enough to amplify, especially in countries with elections forthcoming. A "limited military attack" psychologically would just be a heightened form of "hybrid" war because it's designed to overwhelm and demoralize the population and make its think that supporting Ukraine just isn't worth it since those not at war are now liable to become collateral damage. The second objective of such an attack would be to gauge NATO's response to it -- and this is key bit, because, as DDIS also states: "Russia will likely carry out military attacks only if it assesses that such attacks will not result in a war by triggering a collective NATO military response. However, Russia is likely uncertain about what could trigger such a war. Consequently, there is a risk that Russia assesses that the NATO countries will not respond collectively, especially if Russia assesses that the United States cannot or will not support the European NATO countries in a potential war against Russia." (Italics added.) You wouldn't be wrong to detect a hint of political messaging here. (All intel services deny they do any such thing but they all do.) This is Denmark, a country that just stared down a possible U.S. invasion and annexation of Greenland, which would have meant the disintegration of NATO. Trump has spent his entire second term (and much of his first term) doubting the Inviolability of Article V. His Pentagon has given NATO allies questionnaires to fill out to prove their worthiness as allies, while it undergoes a force posture review with ominous media leaks about what Bridge Colby and his minion might do (25,000 U.S. troops withdrawn, a scuppered U.S. base in Poland, etc.) Now comes a frenzy of intelligence reporting across Europe about a possible Russian attack on NATO, all kickstarted by a CIA briefing delivered to the Poles, Scandinavians and Balts months ago with a warning that they're probably on their own if and when such an attack happens. Never let a good crisis go to waste... Russia isn't sure what would trigger a war with NATO, so how might NATO make it sure? A "limited military attack" can be deterred if Washington telegraphs its intent to enforce Article V in word and deed by stating clearly and repeatedly what would constitute a casus belli in 2026 and, of course, by keeping U.S. troops in Europe.

Map of the 150 km mesh range. Recent drone routes show some signs that Transnistria may host repeaters as well.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon blames Ukraine for the continued escalation of the war by attacking Moscow.