The trading API behind the largest trading products Powering @fomo @AxiomExchange @gmgnai and many other for security and market data feeds

Powered by Serialized ⚡ Congrats on the launch, @copytop_ team!
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Welcome @fobodotfun to the Launchpad Program 🤝
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Audits. Real-time onchain data. Serialized is coming to @Enter_Elysium serialized.xyz
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TOKEN2049 Singapore is next week 🇸🇬 Serialized will be there for #TOKEN2049 week, October 5–9. Smart contract audits + real-time on-chain data & APIs. If you're launching a token or building a trading app, wallet or dashboard, let's connect. DMs open, see you there 👇
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We called it 17 days early. CME Markets (@launchonCME) commodity coins: Unsafe on our engine since Sep 8, flagged for liquidity removal risk. Sep 25, the admin wallet pulled $178K out of 62 peg pools in 3.5 minutes. No exploit. The code allowed it. serializedaudit.io/r7c2w/rob…
举报疑似挪用 CME(Commodites.Market)商品池资金并转入 Binance 的异常资金 币安风控团队您好: 我希望举报一笔疑似涉及项目方擅自撤出流动性池资金,并通过跨链方式转入 Binance 的异常资金流。 涉及项目为 Commodites.Market(CME),运行在 Robinhood Chain。近期我们通过链上数据发现,项目相关地址正在批量将商品代币流动性池中的 USDG 主动撤出,并通过 Relay 跨链至 BNB Chain,随后兑换/结算为 USDT,再转入 Binance 充值体系。 目前已经确认的一条完整资金路径如下: CME 商品池 USDG
→ 项目部署/运营相关地址
→ 0x338A3b6B0EAbc0EfdD1AeA33e81E57C102158D8C
→ RelayDepository
0x4cD00E387622C35bDDB9b4c962C136462338BC31
→ BNB Chain
→ 收款地址
0xa2197016fe0fc61cd8a656d38d593cb125b87295
→ Binance 充值体系地址
0x8894E0a0c962CB723c1976a4421c95949bE2D4E3 其中一笔已确认: 源链 Relay 存款交易: 0x7b5eff15ca5841e4cdb0870a16a35aa524f85ab789903154bf35358232f3ff96 该交易在 Robinhood Chain 调用: depositErc20(...) 存入: 59,100 USDG Relay 随后在 BNB Chain 完成 Fill,到账约: 58,905.3 USDT 目标地址: 0xa2197016fe0fc61cd8a656d38d593cb125b87295 之后该资金进一步流入 Binance 相关充值地址: 0x8894E0a0c962CB723c1976a4421c95949bE2D4E3 我们此前还观察到项目相关地址存在多笔相同金额的批量操作,包括多笔 59,100 USDG 被送入 Relay,疑似存在系统性撤出商品池流动性并转入中心化交易所的行为。 值得注意的是,这些资金原本来自项目商品代币相关流动性池。部分池子的 USDG 被大量撤走,只留下极少量流动性。目前尚未看到项目方公开说明这些资金属于正常迁移、资金重组或其他已披露用途。 因此,我们怀疑这些资金可能涉及: 项目流动性资金异常转移、未经社区或用户充分披露的资金撤出,或潜在的资产挪用行为。 恳请 Binance 风控团队协助: 核查上述 Binance 充值地址所对应的账户及资金来源; 对相关账户及后续资金流进行风险审查; 如符合 Binance 风控、反洗钱或涉诈处置标准,请对相关资金采取必要的限制或保全措施; 保存相关账户登录、充值、提现及资金流记录,以便后续如有执法机构调查时提供协助。 我可以继续提供完整链上交易哈希、Relay 跨链记录、商品池撤资记录、相关地址关系图以及截图证据。 robinhood:0xe2324ff2a59f8ecba8c321c6466e59121c00e795 @launchonCME @binance @cz_binance @heyibinance @evilcos
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Arc support across all Serialized APIs. From hour zero. ⚡
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The hooks flagged here are closed-source. Nothing to read on-chain. We decompiled them: • BNB: fees could be set to 100% • Base: implementation could be set to 80% 0x caught them at settlement (12.8% / 18%). But the same red flag was already sitting in the bytecode before the first trade. Read the hook. Then route.
A malicious hook doesn't need a UI to scam you. 👉 It just needs to look like the best quote. After analyzing over 84,000 v4 hooks, we determined only 19% of hooks to be safe. It's time to get real about hooks.
Article

Uniswap v4 hooks were a mistake

It’s time to get real about hooks. This year 0x has routed 81.92 million trades and $42.67 billion in volume, with roughly ~70% of transactions touching Uniswap liquidity. And we field dozens of

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Serialized Audit is now becoming Serialized. Audit is just one of the API sets we provide. Serialized is a full-stack data provider for the apps and terminals that want to scale fast and don’t worry about data infrastructure that’s easy to deploy and customizable to one’s needs. We’re powering the most popular apps and terminals out there across security, market data and routing Built for world’s scale
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A honeypot rarely blocks your sell outright. It lets the deployer out, and quietly fails yours. The trap sits in a transfer hook that checks a list you were never added to. A scan is not an audit. But it can read the transfer path and show you whose sells are conditional.
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Money leaves a contract through a function anyone was allowed to call. No exploit chain. No clever trick. A missing permission check. A scan is not an audit. But before you deploy it will tell you which money-moving functions have no access control.
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Tempo support is live. Paste any contract, get one straight verdict — honeypots, hidden taxes, owner powers, TIP-20 policy roles. Verified and closed-source both. serializedaudit.io
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Serializedaudit is now the audit provider for @AxiomExchange
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The cheapest security question in crypto, and you can answer it before you deploy: For every function that moves money, who can call it? A scan is not an audit. But it will tell you that, in seconds.
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Roughly $8M left a vault last week because a function that moved money was public. Not a clever exploit. A missing permission check. Before deploy, ask the boring question about every money-moving function: who can call this, and what is the worst they can do with it?
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Every H1 report this week says it differently: more incidents than ever, fewer dollars than last year. The counts themselves differ by over a hundred, because no two firms publish the same method. Scanners have the same gap. You get a verdict, never an accuracy number.
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The useful question about a token is not "is the team trustworthy." It is: assume the owner key leaks tomorrow. What can that role still do? Mint unlimited supply? Swap the logic in one transaction? No timelock, no cap? Then the key was never the only problem.
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The contract you read is not always the contract you run. If a token sits behind a proxy, the logic can be swapped after launch. The address never changes. Before you trust it: - Who holds upgrade rights: an EOA, a multisig, or a timelock? - Is there a delay, or does the swap land in one transaction? - Can initialize() be called a second time? - Ownership renounced, but is the admin slot still live? All of it is readable before you buy. That is what a pre-deploy scan is for.
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The contract someone audited may not be the contract you are using. Upgradeable proxies let the logic be swapped after launch. Before you trust one, ask: - Who holds the upgrade key: a single EOA, or a timelock + multisig? - Can upgrades ship instantly, or is there an enforced delay? - Is the initializer locked, or can it be called again? - "Renounced ownership" but still upgradeable? A pre-deploy scan flags these before you integrate. A scan is not an audit, but it tells you where to look first.
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