Portfolio 1/1/2026 Hochschild Mining (#HOC.L) 30% Mkango Resources (#MKA.L) 19% Bed Bath and Beyond ($BBBY) 14% Avacta Group (#AVCT.L) 12% AJ Lucas ($AJL.AX) 4% Huddled Group (#HUD.L) 4% Cash 17%

Leaving aside $NXH blockchain assets @tZERO and @GrainChainIO for a moment, let’s look at the Neighborhood Intelligence retail businesses ahead of the Q3 results: Overstock is growing double-digits @marcuslemonis confirmed a few weeks ago. Bed Bath & Beyond online is growing more slowly. Combined they did $ 248m in Q1 and about $ 290m in Q2 ex Kirkland’s. Q3 online maybe we see $ 300m. Kirkland’s is renaming and culling to about 200 stores. Despite that its seasonal peak argues for about $ 100m in Q3. The Container Store (TCS) closed early July. About 100 stores should deliver $ 160m. Co-branding and restocking is the plan to lift future sales per sq ft. Without TCS Q2 was $ 361m and 6.4m active customers. With TCS the Q3 guide is $ 505–525m. But $ 550m looks do-able. Gross margin in Q2 was 26.8%, up from 23.7% and way up from 17% seen after the Overstock/BB&B brand mess. With TCS in Q3 we could see 30%. This means we might get GP $ 160m. Overheads are likely to be $ 180m (incl $ 50m marketing) mean a negative $ 20m bottom-line, depending on treatment of one-time costs. Anyway that’s my take on what we might see in three weeks…

This is so good. Frank Dick on reframing success.

I’m interested to know if @marcuslemonis talked to @AmplifyETFs before he announced the $FTHM proposal. They hold 6.2m $NXH shares (6.5%) via their Blockchain ETF $BLOK, specifically for exposure to the blockchain assets and they are very strong advocates for tokenisation - see their latest report. I hope they are supportive of the proposal…. blog.amplifyetfs.com/blok/bl…

I struggle with all the $NXH pessimism. @tZERO got funded and @Alan_Konevsky is working towards an event to provide clearer transparency on value, giving all shareholders (whether direct or indirect) a slice in what looks a rosy future. Despite the Clarity Act vote, the tokenisation sector is on fire and shows tremendous potential. There’s a belief @GrainChainIO is a future superstar. Difficult to judge without details. Let’s see. The core $NXH retail business seems to be making progress, albeit slower and perhaps in a direction that many folk here might not like. @marcuslemonis admits everything is not perfect. The retail business is needing working capital, whilst many here wanted him to prioritise putting more $$ into @tZERO. This has riled @AlderLaneEggs, @StephaneDeBaets et al. I have a feeling one day we will marvel at the sight of the value of the blockchain investments AND also see clearer evidence of merit in the retail roll-up. But given the mood here right now… I won’t be surprised if even with that folk will still find reasons to be glum.

Today’s news is positive on two fronts: Firstly, whilst the terms are opaque it seems @tZERO has raised enough funding to get it thru to the next hurdle. Likely short-term debt finance rather than equity. Credit to @AlderLaneEggs and friends for getting out their wallets. Secondly, much more importantly, we see two very clear signals a bigger event is coming. To quote @Alan_Konevsky this financing is a “bridge towards an independent footprint for the company.” Combine that with the $NXH portion being contingent on a deal… and the pathway is now clear.

Recent in-fighting amongst $NXH shareholders is a symptom of the low SP, which in turn is due to two key factors: Firstly, lack of transparency with the blockchain assets, especially @tZERO and @GrainChainIO. Privately held, there’s no easy valuation metric and news flow is sporadic. This is frustrating for those largely invested in $NXH for blockchain exposure. Spare a thought for @AmplifyETFs $blok with 9%. Secondly, some doubt @marcuslemonis plan for the retail businesses. Bringing together a variety of home brands, reversing BB&B back into b&m, consolidating customer data, removing cost bloat, all works on paper... but it’s still WIP and yet to bear fruit. And this fosters skepticism about any move into adjacent home services at this point in the cycle. Stick around in @NXH if you believe its holdings in various blockchain assets will one day reveal their much promised value. Stick around if you think the home offering roll-up might work. Strange bedfellows but @NXH gives you optionality on both… and h/t to the weird genius of @PatrickByrne for that.

Look I understand why @AlderLaneEggs and other @tZERO shareholders are pissed, especially token holders who put in $100m in 2018 and ended up this year swapping for circa 25% equity stake. Not what they had dreamed about for the last eight years. But that’s a reflection of the tortoise-like progress of the @tZERO team. But hey maybe the tortoise wins in the end…? The current beef with @marcuslemonis appears to be about his hardened approach on the $10m LOI from April. The details aren’t public, but @AlderLaneEggs calling @marcuslemonis a “liar and welcher” is certainly an escalation and reversal of his past willingness to “ride and die with Marcus”. There’s a lot at stake for him (and family) so perhaps not surprising to see his emotions run high. The funny thing is.. everyone wants the same thing… that @tZERO is finally worth something like the >$1.5bn mooted way back in 2018. But that’s for @Alan_Konevsky to make happen. The recent cash injection by ICE is a positive sign, but we all want to see more progress. Oh, and then there’s @GrainChainIO… where $NXH has invested a total $20m for a 23%+ stake. Another black box…

#mka $cth.ne $mka.l mkango hypromag HyProMag referenced in this interesting article about the hardware and rare earth needs of the humanoid robot sector zerohedge.com/markets/diggin…

Three years later. One simple idea changed my life...

🚨𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐭, 𝐁𝐨𝐥𝐝, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐑𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐬 #HUD There’s a moment in every market cycle when the tectonic plates shift so decisively that the old order begins to crumble. That moment arrived in early June 2026, when B&M, the 700‑store discount behemoth, that once sat in the FTSE 100, reported a near 50% collapse in annual profit. Pre‑tax profit plunged to £227 million from £431 million, a 47% wipeout. Like‑for‑like sales across its UK estate fell into negative territory. The company that built an empire on the proposition of unbeatable value, was suddenly on the back foot. At the very same time, Huddled (HUD) released its trading update. The contrast could not be more stark. While B&M's chief executive Tjeerd Jegen spoke of "execution issues" and a "challenging market", Huddled's management declared with quiet confidence: "The hard part is done. What comes next is the exciting part." 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞. 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐚 𝐬𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐟𝐭 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐫𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐥 𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐬𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐇𝐮𝐝𝐝𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐢𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞. 1️⃣ 𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐒𝐓𝐑𝐔𝐂𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐀𝐋 𝐒𝐇𝐈𝐅𝐓: 𝐅𝐑𝐎𝐌 𝐁𝐑𝐈𝐂𝐊𝐒 𝐓𝐎 𝐂𝐋𝐈𝐂𝐊𝐒 The media coverage of the two updates was unequivocal. Multiple reports explicitly framed the battle as one between conventional stores like B&M, and their own digital operations, alongside newer internet‑only players such as Huddled’s Peeko. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 "𝐨𝐧𝐠𝐨𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐥𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞 𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐛𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐤𝐬‑𝐚𝐧𝐝‑𝐦𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐚𝐫 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐬" 𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐟𝐲𝐢𝐧𝐠, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐚 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐬 𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐜𝐡 𝐰𝐚𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐬 𝐛𝐥𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠. B&M's problems are not merely cyclical. They are structural. The company reported its UK like‑for‑like sales had declined by 0.1% over the year. It slashed its total annual dividend by 36% to 9.6 pence from 15.0 pence. It’s now fighting a defensive war, forced to "sharpen our pricing, improve on‑shelf availability in best‑selling brands and revamp our in‑store promotions" just to stem the bleeding. What is the root cause? The answer is written in the consumer data. 𝐍𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐥𝐲 𝐚 𝐭𝐡𝐢𝐫𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐔𝐊 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐕𝐚𝐧𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐬 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐖𝐞𝐥𝐥𝐛𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱 𝐧𝐨𝐰 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐲 𝐨𝐧 𝐜𝐫𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲𝐝𝐚𝐲 𝐞𝐱𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐞𝐬. Energy bills have surged 17% over two years. Groceries are now one of the most common triggers for wiping out savings. In this environment, the consumer is not just looking for value; they are looking for the best value, delivered in the most convenient way possible. And that is precisely where Peeko excels. 2️⃣𝐖𝐇𝐘 𝐏𝐄𝐄𝐊𝐎 𝐈𝐒 𝐄𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐆 𝐁&𝐌’𝐒 𝐋𝐔𝐍𝐂𝐇 Let us be precise about the mechanics of this market share transfer. First, the value proposition is superior. Peeko positions itself as "an online Costco", a curated range of major brand surplus stock at genuinely compelling prices. This is not a simple discount retailer; it is a treasure hunt, a "middle aisle" experience that rewards loyal customers and drives repeat visits. B&M, by contrast, is a 700‑store chain carrying the immense overhead of physical real estate, 35,000 employees, and the logistical burden of managing inventory across hundreds of locations. Every square foot of B&M floor space is a cost that Peeko does not bear. Second, the logistics are superior. Peeko is now fully operational with next‑day delivery via THG Fulfil on orders placed up to 11pm. This is a level of service that a physical retailer cannot match without massive investment. B&M's 700 stores may offer immediate gratification, but they cannot offer the convenience of a parcel arriving at your door the next morning. In an era where consumers are cutting discretionary spending, convenience is not a luxury; it is a necessity. Third, the margin structure is superior. Peeko has rebuilt its per‑item margin from the ground up. Product margin per item sold more than doubled in the first four months of 2026, reaching circa £3.00 per item in May. Average items per order fell from over 12 to under 6, dramatically reducing picking costs. 𝐄𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 £𝟓𝟎 𝐧𝐨𝐰 𝐠𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐚 £𝟑.𝟗𝟗 𝐝𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧, 𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐦𝐚𝐤𝐞𝐬 𝐚 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭. B&M, by contrast, is being crushed by cost inflation and margin erosion, with adjusted pre‑tax profit falling 38% to £284 million. The 700‑store chain is fighting a margin war that it is structurally unable to win. 3️⃣ 𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐍𝐔𝐌𝐁𝐄𝐑𝐒 𝐓𝐇𝐀𝐓 𝐌𝐀𝐓𝐓𝐄𝐑 Consider the trajectory; Peeko generated over 86,000 orders in the four months to 30 April 2026 at an average order value exceeding £37 and a product margin per order above £17. Nutricircle contributed another 46,000 orders with similar metrics. Combined, that is 132,000 orders in four months, each generating product margin of approximately £17. That equates to over £2.2 million in product gross profit in just four months, before scaling. Now consider the competitive landscape. B&M's UK like‑for‑like sales are in decline. Its profits are collapsing. Its dividend has been slashed. The 700‑store chain is in turnaround mode, forced to invest in pricing and promotions just to maintain market share. 𝐌𝐞𝐚𝐧𝐰𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐞, 𝐏𝐞𝐞𝐤𝐨 𝐢𝐬 𝐥𝐞𝐚𝐧, 𝐚𝐠𝐢𝐥𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐠𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠. It is testing new channels including eBay Live, Whatnot, Temu, and Amazon. It has a Beauty Box that sold out on TikTok in two days! It has a Trustpilot rating that has climbed from 4.0 to 4.6 stars on over 27,000 reviews! 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐚 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐰𝐨 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐞𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐞𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐚𝐦𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐞. 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐚 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐧𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫'𝐬 𝐥𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐡. 4️⃣𝐌𝐀𝐑𝐊𝐄𝐓 𝐒𝐇𝐀𝐑𝐄 𝐓𝐑𝐀𝐍𝐒𝐅𝐄𝐑 𝐈𝐍 𝐌𝐎𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍 The bear case on Huddled has always been that the discount retail space is crowded and competitive. But the B&M numbers refute that argument. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐬𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐞 𝐢𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐜𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐝𝐞𝐝; 𝐢𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐨𝐥𝐢𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠. The weak are being crushed, and the strong are taking share. Consider the evidence; B&M's chief executive described it as "a difficult year that saw profits fall due to a challenging market and execution issues". He launched a "back to B&M basics" plan in October to restore like‑for‑like sales growth. He is now forced to "sharpen our pricing, improve on‑shelf availability in best‑selling brands and revamp our in‑store promotions". 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐥𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐬𝐢𝐞𝐠𝐞, 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠. Meanwhile, Huddled's management is talking about scaling. "We know what this business is capable of. We've fixed what was stopping us from doing that consistently. We have a great value proposition, next‑day delivery, genuine customer loyalty, and the margins to justify scaling." 𝐓𝐡𝐢𝐬 𝐢𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐝𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐚 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐚𝐜𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠. B&M is spending money to stop the bleeding. Huddled is spending money to grow. The market is pricing Huddled as if it will fail, but the competitive dynamics suggest the opposite. Every pound that B&M loses to margin pressure is a pound that flows to a more efficient competitor. That competitor is increasingly Peeko. 5️⃣𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐕𝐀𝐋𝐔𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍 𝐑𝐄‑𝐑𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐆 𝐂𝐀𝐓𝐀𝐋𝐘𝐒𝐓 For the sophisticated investor, the B&M profit crash is not a warning sign for the discount retail sector. It is a confirmation that the sector is undergoing a transformation, and that the winners will be the ones with the lowest cost structure, the best logistics, and the most compelling customer proposition. Huddled Group has all three. Its cost structure is minimal compared to a 700‑store chain. Its logistics are best‑in‑class via THG Fulfil. Its customer proposition, as evidenced by its Trustpilot ratings, is resonating. The only missing piece is scale, and management has now declared that the business is ready to return to volume growth. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐠𝐢𝐚𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐛𝐥𝐞𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐞𝐧𝐠𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐬 𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐝𝐲. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐟𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐬 𝐮𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐰𝐚𝐲. For investors willing to look past the material mispricing of the company shares, the opportunity is clear. The fair value estimate of 6.4p per share (£27.3 million market cap) is the base case. This is not only achievable in the next 12 months, but it may prove to be the first step in a much larger re‑rating. 𝐓𝐡𝐚𝐭’𝐬 𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐮𝐦𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐭’𝐬 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐚𝐜𝐪𝐮𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲 𝐁&𝐌, 𝐓𝐇𝐆, 𝐨𝐫 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧 𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐜𝐨, 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐡𝐞𝐟𝐭𝐲 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐦𝐢𝐮𝐦, 𝐛𝐞𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫 𝐢𝐬 𝐨𝐮𝐭.

$bbby $tzero @BedBathBeyond @tZERO @marcuslemonis @AlderLaneEggs When this man expresses interest… then the rest of the world should wake up

Interesting to see in their recent report @AmplifyETFs $BLOK have increased their holding to 5.6m in Bed Bath & Beyond (circa 9%) $bbby $byon blog.amplifyetfs.com/blok/bl…

Tick tick, tick tock… $bbby $byon @tZERO @AlderLaneEggs @marcuslemonis @StephaneDeBaets

$bbby @tZERO $byon