Reminder: you can now sync an ethereum node within half a day and with aggressive settings the space it takes up on disk can be under half a terabyte. EIP-4444 and hard work by client teams on optimizing snap sync has improved things *a lot*. Glamsterdam will improve the sync situation further still (eg. Nimbus's new sync protocol uses it)

Why I #StandWithCrypto 🛡️

JUST IN: 358,000,000 in long positions liquidated from the crypto market in the past 24 hours.

If you think your ai security researcher can find the bug and exploit it. Then prove this solving with your ai. @octane_security @zellic_io @ZeroCool_AI @cantinasecurity

In response to the ZCode product security issues reported by the community, we have completed the necessary remediation and sincerely apologize to all our users. We have open-sourced ZCode at github.com/zai-org/ZCode, placing the code under community scrutiny and making ZCode more open and transparent. We sincerely thank the community developers who previously identified issues in ZCode. Going forward, we will establish an ongoing product security vulnerability reporting and response process. We welcome developers to continue reviewing ZCode and reporting potential issues, and we will provide rewards based on the severity of the issues reported. With respect to the code data referenced by the community, we confirm that no such data is retained and that it has never been used for model training. Following the remediation, we invited the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) and NSFOCUS to conduct security assessments. The results are as follows: Through its technical assessment, CAICT confirmed that the zcode-prod Alibaba Cloud OSS bucket is in a zero-data state. Security remediation has been completed in the ZCode v3.14.0 client. The Repo Wiki feature has been removed, and the workflow for generating and uploading local repository snapshots has been disabled. NSFOCUS confirmed that all data objects in the zcode-prod Alibaba Cloud OSS bucket, as well as the bucket itself, have been deleted. Remediation has been completed in the ZCode v3.14.0 client. The Repo Wiki entry point and the associated generation workflow have been removed, and no functional path capable of triggering the generation of local repository snapshots or transmitting local files externally was identified. Once again, we sincerely apologize and welcome continued scrutiny from the community. The full security assessment report will be released soon.

“Jev can chat too”

If you think your ai security researcher can find the bug and exploit it. Then prove this solving with your ai. @octane_security @zellic_io @ZeroCool_AI @cantinasecurity

This security researcher just earned $150k from a single report. That’s 2.5 years of Harvard tuition or a Porsche 911, however you like to spend your money. The payout pushes them to #5 on the 90-day leaderboard and #22 on the 2026 leaderboard. There’s still a lot on the table in 2026 for security researchers hungry enough to go after it. Congrats @SagaKrypto 🎉

It's an increasingly common take that AI hacking means cybersecurity is doomed. I disagree. I think cybersecurity is naturally defense-favoring once people get their shit together. And anyone who continues to hold cryptocurrency (including me, ~90% of my net worth) is implicitly making that bet. Here's why I am making that bet. First, the oversimplified punchy one-line statement: If AI can prove Navier-Stokes and FLT, then AI can prove the statement "this program is secure" as a mathematical theorem. Even if the program is very complicated. Now, the nuance: (See also: vitalik.eth.limo/general/202… ) The word "secure" is hiding all kinds of skeletons in the closet in terms of what it actually means. What does it mean for Signal (the encrypted messenger) to be "secure"? The most basic definition you might think of is: no one who doesn't hold the recipient's secret key can read the contents of the message. But: * Did you remember to include _other_ critical forms of security? Can the adversary forge messages? Can the attacker prevent messages from reaching the recipient? Can they cause your client to crash by sending malformed messages? * Have you made sure that your model of the adversary includes attackers that interfere with the protocol actively and not just passively? And attackers that interfere by replaying messages to you or the recipient that either of you sent over the wire at any point earlier? * What if the adversary hacked (or _is_) the Signal server? * How did you learn which public key belongs to the recipient in the first place? What if that process was tampered with? * What if your device gets hacked at some point in the past or future - is your message still safe then? * What if your key leaks because of a bug in your operating system? Or because you got a bugged version of the Signal client? Or what if the database is corrupted? * Or the libraries, interpreter or compiler of the programming language you wrote it in? * What if your key leaks because tiny perturbations in perceptible signals generated by the hardware leak mathematical relationships that can extract the key a few hundredths of a bit at a time? * Are you hiding the *size* of the payload? Does that matter? * You're definitely not hiding the identity of the sender and the recipient, and the exact time each message was sent (think: not just time-of-day, but also time deltas between one message and the next). Is that not enough to deduce a lot of important facts about what relationships you have, and what *kinds* of conversations you are having? So ... even definitions can be over a thousand lines of code, and need deep careful thought to figure them out. Working on making definitions more human-readable is of extreme importance - it's perhaps the only "high-level language" that matters right now. But even still, even despite all of the above, for security-critical components, the definition is a much smaller attack surface than the implementation. Verifying that the definition is adequate is a much more tractable task than scanning over the code directly - and can become even more tractable with better tooling. Definitions are also _additive_: if two groups have two different definitions A and B, then, well, you can just prove that the program satisfies both A and B. Code is not additive in this way: if a program is A + B, a bug in A _or_ B can sink the whole thing. Definitions are additive. And if you can't satisfy A and B at the same time, you've isolated the most important philosophical issue for your project to spend its next few weeks grappling with. Sometimes, definitions are not much smaller than the implementation - UI components might be one example. But for many of the most critical components - message-passing protocols, sandboxes, cryptography like SNARKs and FHE - the asymmetry is real. Historically, a large class of failures with this approach have come from people only verifying a small portion of their code, that they self-declared to be the security-critical portion, and ignoring the rest - and it turns out that something in the rest of the code is security-critical too. This was reasonable back when verification was difficult and scarce. The solution today: sorry, you have to verify over literally your entire program, including database, networking, any caching layers, everything. Modern AI can do it. So it's not about "the good guys find all the vulnerabilities before the bad guys do" - that could maybe work too, after all a finite program only has a finite number of vulns, but it's riskier - it's specifically an asymmetric strategy of making code that is much more resilient in the first place. This is the kind of direction that Ethereum is going in for the next few years. There is no future for blockchains - especially blockchains with scalability and privacy - without doing this. We need to make software actually secure. And we have already made a lot of progress.