📡 You’ve probably seen this story making the rounds online: russian soldiers are trying to activate their Starlink terminals by finding Ukrainian citizens willing, for 30 shekels, to register them in their own name. No surprise there: the enemy’s abrupt switch from reliable “capitalist” connectivity to domestic low-tech workarounds has seriously degraded their communications – disrupting coordination and putting a dent in assaults and drone activity across the frontlines. 💡Knowing how desperately russians will hunt for any way to bring Elon’s terminal back online –and the risks resumed comms creates for the Ukrainian defenders – we, together with InformNapalm and MILITANT, decided to help. We did so by creating a network of channels and bots that appeared to offer activation services for a fee. In one week, we received: 📌 2,420 submissions with enemy Starlink details and precise geolocations; 📌 31 messages from would-be collaborators eager to act as registered holder for activation; 📌 $6,000 in “donations” from russian troops who were frantically looking for a fix to their comms problem. Bottom line: 📌 Information on enemy terminals was passed to Serhiy Sternenko so they can be permanently neutralized; 📌 Data on would-be collaborators is already being processed by the competent Ukrainian authorities; 📌 The shekels we “farmed” off the enemy will cover several urgent fundraisers for Ukraine’s Defense Forces.

🚁 How does a key US treaty ally maintain direct operational links with sanctioned Russian defence conglomerates? The answer lies in South Korea’s dependence on its legacy Russian Ka-32 helicopter fleet and a critical enforcement gap in East Asia. 🕵️ Internal procurement documents obtained by Dallas Analytics reveal that South Korean operator HeliKorea initiated direct outreach to sanctioned Russian state entities – including JSC 322 Aircraft Repair Plant and Rostec subsidiary JSC NASC – to secure Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pathways for these dual-use rotorcraft. Key findings from our latest supply-chain investigation: 📌 Sanctions Exposure: Private MRO outreach directly targets sanctioned Rostec subsidiaries, bypassing Republic of Korea, US, and EU export control mechanisms. 📌 Institutional Disconnect: By treating dual-use aviation maintenance as a localised operational matter for line agencies, South Korean trade authorities disclaim oversight of secondary sanctions risks, leaving private firms legally exposed. 📌 Moscow’s Strategic Dividend: Circumventing sanctions fails to enhance South Korea’s long-term security. Instead, it perpetuates reliance on Russian aviation sector while allowing Moscow to monetise these operational lifelines. Neutralising these grey-zone procurement channels requires stringent end-use verification and aligned state oversight across East Asian aerospace hubs. dallas-analytics.com/helikor…

🔍 How do foreign machine tools reach the builder of Russia’s military satellite launchers? Following our investigation into Russia's Khrunichev Centre, Dallas Analytics confronted the Asian manufacturers identified in internal procurement documents. What we uncovered goes far beyond procurement lists: 🎭 Rebranding & Concealment: Russian "manufacturers" mask foreign origins – relabelling Taiwanese and Chinese tools as domestic. 🛑 End-Use Blindspots: Manufacturers in Taiwan, Japan, and China either lack basic end-use verification mechanisms or turn a blind eye to secondary market routes. 📜 Sanctions Gaps: Key intermediary entities and rebranded product lines remain unsanctioned by Western jurisdictions. Private-sector voluntary compliance and regional efforts are falling short. Closing these loopholes requires coordinated state intervention and full deployment of EU market access leverage. 📑 Read our latest report on supply-chain exposure: dallas-analytics.com/machine…

🚀 Internal documents from the Khrunichev Centre – Russia's leading maker of space rockets – reveal plans to sharply expand production of the Angara launch vehicle – the rocket Russia uses solely to put military satellites into orbit. 🏭 The programme loses money and survives only on state subsidy. Russia's own factories are worn out, so Moscow is pouring billions into a new plant in Omsk – with hundreds of advanced machine tools lined up to equip it. ❗Much of that machinery – nearly a third of the plant's high-tech core – is Chinese, including whole categories barred from export to Russia under EU sanctions. Chinese firms are lined up to supply them anyway, while selling the same equipment into the very Western markets those sanctions were meant to protect. dallas-analytics.com/russia-…

🚨Russia declared the RS-28 Sarmat – its newest nuclear-armed ICBM – "on combat duty" in 2023. Internal defence-industry files obtained by Dallas Analytics tell a different story. A strategic weapon called operational faster than its own factories could document, price or deliver it – by a Russian state that has shut off every external means of verifying the claim. Sarmat's fielding is the story of a strategic programme defeated not by sanctions or engineering, but by its own bureaucracy. 🔍 Full investigation: dallas-analytics.com/rs-28-s…

🚀 Confidential Documents Expose Why Putin’s 'Oreshnik' Flies Blind Dallas Analytics reveals a critical vulnerability within the Soviet-designed GU-503 gyro unit inside the 'Oreshnik' guidance mechanism, causing the platform to deviate by tens of kilometres from its intended targets. Consumed by political optics after the November 2024 Dnipro strike, Vladimir Putin ordered four additional missiles for 2025. To meet this rigid timeline, Russian manufacturing facilities completely bypassed standard quality-assurance protocols to avoid delaying the Kremlin's schedule. ✉️ Internal correspondence from the Michurinsk Plant 'Progress' reveals that it has completely lost the specialised calibration technology and cannot verify the gyroscope's precision metrics prior to final assembly. This manufacturing failure directly explains why subsequent Oreshnik missiles are erratically striking civilian garage cooperatives instead of assigned military targets. 🔍 Full investigation: dallas-analytics.com/oreshni… We have also expanded the list of our channels – you can now follow Dallas Analytics on Substack, Threads, LinkedIn and Instagram for further investigations and updates.

🚨 Russia is preparing to significantly expand Mi-8 helicopter production. According to documents obtained by Dallas Analytics, the Kazan Helicopter Plant is scheduled to manufacture 72 Mi-8MTV-1 helicopters in 2026–2027 under Russia’s state defence order. ❗This figure is nearly twice as high as previous estimates of Russia’s production capacity and could allow Moscow to offset wartime losses sustained during its invasion of Ukraine. If achieved, these production targets could help restore Russia’s airborne assault and transport aviation capabilities to levels approaching those seen before the full-scale invasion. 📁 At the same time, the leaked documents reveal persistent weaknesses within Russia’s defence-industrial base, including dependence on engine and avionics suppliers, financing challenges, production bottlenecks, and growing reliance on state reserve funds to sustain military output. What threat could these helicopters pose to Ukraine and NATO? How realistic are Russia’s ambitious production targets? And what do the documents reveal about the vulnerabilities of the Russian defence industry? 🔍 Read our full investigation: dallas-analytics.com/russia-… We have also expanded the list of our channels – you can now follow Dallas Analytics on Substack, Threads, LinkedIn and Instagram for further investigations and updates.

✈️ With planes breaking down and repair hubs facing insolvency, the Russian military is navigating a full-blown airlift crisis. It needs to move materiel, but its own aircraft increasingly cannot. The solution? Civilian aviation. 🕵️ A new Dallas investigation reveals how the Russian MoD co-opts commercial operators and joint-use aerodromes to bridge its logistical collapse. Primary evidence exposes these "civilian" fleets: 🇨🇳 Moving military cargo to China for sanctioned defence contractors 🇺🇬 Routing electronics from Uganda to supply Almaz-Antey 🇮🇳 Evading oversight to transport missile systems & warheads to India Furthermore, the MoD is hiding military aircraft on the civilian registry to fly sensitive missions abroad disguised as ordinary commercial charters. 🔍 Read the full analysis here: dallas-analytics.com/russias…

🚨 ExpoElectronica 2026: how a Russian trade show enables sanctions evasion Dallas analyzed 719 participants of a major electronics exhibition in Moscow and uncovered a network supplying Western components to Russia – despite sanctions. Key findings: 📌 Russian importers continue sourcing electronics for the military-industrial complex; 📌 Chinese companies act as key intermediaries; 📌 Western components (such as Siemens) are routed via third-country intermediaries. Even small firms play a critical role in sustaining Russia’s access to dual-use electronics. ❗️Bottom line: sanctions on Russia alone are not enough without targeting foreign intermediaries. ExpoElectronica effectively serves as a ready-made database of potential sanctions violators. 🔎 Read the full investigation for details dallas-analytics.com/expoele…

🚨 On 31 March 2026, a Russian An-26 military transport crashed during a routine flight over occupied Crimea, killing all 29 people on board, including Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Otroshchenko, commander of the Northern Fleet’s Mixed Aviation Corps. 🕵️ Dallas obtained confidential internal documents suggesting this was not just an isolated accident, but part of a broader decline in Russia’s military aircraft maintenance infrastructure. According to Russia’s own officials, the system has been hollowed out by the war against Ukraine, strained by Western sanctions, and undermined by mismanagement at the highest levels. ✈️ Russia still relies on roughly 368 Antonov aircraft across its military and security services, including the An-12, An-26, and An-72. Of these, 143❗currently require repairs. Unless urgent measures are taken, within 18 to 24 months their operation will cease entirely. 📰 Our investigation examines Aviaremont JSC, part of Rostec, a key repair provider for Russia’s military aviation fleet. In December 2025, Aviaremont acknowledged that its subsidiary, 308 ARZ, could not properly service An-series aircraft due to missing design documentation, failed import substitution, and the lack of domestic production for critical spare parts. 🔍 Journalists, analysts, and researchers seeking further detail or access can reach out via our website form dallas-analytics.com/maintai…

🛢️ Dallas has obtained a secret drone defence plan from Rosneft – the source of about a third of Russia’s crude, led by Igor Sechin, a close ally of Vladimir Putin. 📄 The document is both a confession and a roadmap: a confession that Russia’s largest oil company cannot fully protect its refineries, and a roadmap revealing just how fragile those systems really are. 🔍 It maps the security layers Ukrainian forces may face – and serves as a cautionary study for Gulf states on what fails against evolving drone threats. dallas-analytics.com/inside-…

🕵️It has been two weeks since we’ve published an investigation showing United Russia – Putin's ruling party – knowingly approved and elected compromised candidates. Party bosses with documented criminal histories and a propensity for systemic graft have put maximum effort into containing the damage. 🔥Therefore,we sincerely thank our community and everyone who helped spread the word about vetted criminals running Russia. 🔍 Our investigation highlights only a fraction of the verified database – we invite investigative journalists and researchers to take a closer look 👇 drive.proton.me/urls/1SFHNP3… #GnedovLeaks

🚨 Dirty secrets of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party revealed in a major joint investigation by Dallas, @256CyberAssault, and Ukrainian Militant. 🕵️ We obtained raw operational intelligence containing the private dossiers of United Russia's political candidates. This data comes directly from Evgeniy Gnedov – retired penitentiary system Lt. General, a key advisor within the party, and Medvedev protégé. #GnedovLeaks

📡 Remember when the Russian MoD was frothing at the mouth, swearing there were no Starlinks on the frontline and calling them “useless NATO garbage”? Apparently, the enemy’s “unmatched” internet is so powerful that even after their “money mule” schemes were exposed, they’re still desperately trying to activate these terminals with the help of would-be collaborators:) Top-tier work by the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) once again! As for us – stay tuned! We’re dropping somethin major tomorrow.

Today, the 256 Cyber Assault Division turns 3! Three years ago we launched with one goal – to hit back at the enemy hard. We know they feel it 😏 A huge thank you to our supporters, partners, and the entire #OSINT community – none of this happens without you! 🎁 And for our anniversary gift we're announcing a major investigation together with the private intelligence and analytics company @dallasparkua – diving deep into Putin's elite. It's going to be hot. As always. 🔥

🇰🇵🚛🇧🇾 A new Dallas investigation uncovers sustained commercial ties between MAZ – Belarus’s state-owned producer of heavy-duty trucks and military vehicles – and North Korea’s Chosun Kyonghun 1 Trading Company. The most recent contracts, covering large shipments of critical automotive components, date to 2025 – an unambiguous violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 2375 and 2397, which comprehensively prohibit all trade with DPRK state entities. 🕵️‍♂️ At the heart of the story is Belarusian citizen Aliaksei Adamovich. Trained as an engineer, he coordinates illicit supply chains moving North Korean and Chinese components – drive shafts, steering systems, and electronic control modules – to support Russia’s war effort. Acting as a technical intermediary, he enables sanctioned Russian firms such as UralAZ to sustain production of military chassis powering the Kremlin’s offensive. ❗The Adamovich case highlights systemic weaknesses in Western sanctions enforcement. Despite functioning as a key facilitator for sanctioned state-owned manufacturers, he reportedly enjoys “gold-tier” travel privileges while pursuing permanent residency in Poland. Read the full Dallas investigation below and support our work by subscribing to the channel ⬇️ (Link in thread)

We’ve exposed cooperation between Russian army officers and representatives of Kadyrov’s Vostok-Akhmat battalion in an illegal arms trade. Discover how weapons from the front lines are being smuggled into temporarily occupied Crimea in our latest investigation with @InformNapalm:informnapalm.org/en/we-can-s… 👉 Media representatives interested in this story are encouraged to contact us at: CyberResUa@proton.me

1/ Українська хакерська група @256CyberAssault у співпраці з міжнародною розвідувальною спільнотою @InformNapalm провела чергову #CYBINT-операцію, в ході якої були здобуті важливі для Сил оборони України розвідувальні дані. Деталі в статті: “Можемо хоч ядерку провезти”: як офіцери 291-го полку ЗС РФ і «Восток-#Ахмат» налагодили контрабанду зброї через Крим informnapalm.org/ua/vostok-a…