Reporter/Presenter @BBCPersian. Previously @Reuters. contact: t.me/bbcparham

London, England
I spoke with BBC’s legendary @JohnSimpsonNews on whether the Iranian regime can survive this war.
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Former Iranian police chief explains why Iran signed the MoU with the US and what led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz again. Esmail Ahmadimoghaddam says Iran needed a pause between the two rounds of war, time to rebuild, recover and prepare for another round of fighting. In Iran, the MoU was largely seen as an achievement. Some Iranian officials still say they were surprised that Donald Trump agreed to make so many concessions. So when the three vessels were targeted, it came as a surprise to many inside Iran as well. Among the reasons Ahmadimoghaddam gives for Iran needing the pause is oil: 🛢️ Oil exports: he says Iran’s oil exports had been halted for almost 55 days and the country had accumulated about 115 million barrels of oil, both in storage and on tankers in the Persian Gulf. During the pause, he says Iran managed to export around 90 million barrels. He says the sudden increase in supply initially led buyers to demand lower prices. But when Iran closed the Strait again, prices rose, allowing Iran to sell the oil at higher prices. He also mentions Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral processions, including the ceremonies in Iraq. It appears that holding large-scale events in Iraq was particularly important for Iran as a way of projecting its power. However, the three vessels were targeted while the funeral was still taking place and President Pezeshkian was in Iraq. Other reasons Ahmadimoghaddam gives for signing the MoU and needing time: - Rebuilding and upgrading missile and drone capabilities: He says Iran restored its drone capacity to roughly pre-war levels and expanded and improved its missile capabilities. - Strengthening air defences: He claims Iran improved its ability to detect and hit US drones, including MQ-9s. - Updating its target bank and reconnaissance capabilities. - Speeding up target selection: He says software now allows Iran to match weapons to targets much faster. - Repairing damaged infrastructure: He claims 70–90% of capacity in sectors including steel, petrochemicals, electricity and gas had been restored. - Stabilising fuel and energy supplies: He says the government worked to address petrol and diesel shortages to reduce the risk of protests. - Replenishing strategic reserves: He says Iran strengthened its reserves of food, medicine, foreign currency and other essential goods. Despite his claims, Iran is currently facing shortages of medicines, including essential and life-saving drugs, while the cost of food has risen sharply. P.S. Ahmadimoghaddam is now the president of Iran’s Supreme National Defense University.
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چرا ایران بعد از امضای تفاهم‌نامه با آمریکا سه کشتی را زد و تنگه هرمز را بست؟ اینجا احمدی‌مقدم در حال توضیح دادن یکی از دلایل آن است: نود میلیون بشکه نفت‌مان از محاصره خارج شد اما خریداری نشد. چون ناگهان نفت زیادی عرضه شده بود، مشتری‌ها با قیمت‌های پایین می‌خواستند بخرند. با بسته شدن تنگه، همان را با قیمت بالا فروختیم. او رئیس دانشگاه عالی دفاع ملی و رئیس پلیس پیشین ایران است.
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Iran to Its Neighbors: If We Can’t Fly, Neither Can You The tweet below is from an aide and adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader: “Either flights in the region are open to everyone, or to no one. If Iran is unable to operate flights or receive airport services, no other country in the region will be able to do so either.” Is Iran threatening to attack airports across the region? And if so, how far is Tehran prepared to escalate? This is not the only warning Iran has issued to countries in the region in recent days. Two days ago, the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (the country’s top national security decision-making body) issued a similar threat, saying that if Iranian planes were unable to fly, airports in those countries would not be able to function either. And in his UN General Assembly address, President Masoud Pezeshkian gave a similar message to Iran’s neighbours: either we builds security together, or we will all face insecurity together.
همسویی با آمریکا در اجرای سیاست‌های خصمانه در خاطر ملت ایران ماندگار خواهد بود، هر چند راهبرد ما در این مورد مشخص است: پرواز در منطقه یا برای همه آزاد است، یا برای هیچ‌کس. اگر ایران امکان پرواز و دریافت خدمات فرودگاهی نداشته باشد، هیچ کشوری در منطقه هم این امکان را نخواهد داشت.
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US–Iran Diplomacy at UNGA: Threats in Public, Talks in Private Despite the threatening rhetoric from both sides, the US and Iran have continued negotiations on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Donald Trump has threatened to “annihilate” the Islamic Republic if no agreement is reached, while also saying he expects a deal after the November midterm elections. Repeated threats, even an existential one, can lose credibility over time if they fail to change the adversary’s behavior. Iran is playing a similar game: talking tough while keeping the door open to negotiations. A former Revolutionary Guards commander has warned that any US forces attempting to land in Iran would be “destroyed.” This shows that Tehran still sees the possibility of further US military escalation -including some form of ground incursion - as a real risk. At the same time, Ghalibaf, Iran's chief negotiator, has argued that Iran should turn its military successes into political gains through diplomacy. Rejecting a choice between war and negotiations, he said Iran must “both fight and negotiate”, using diplomacy to consolidate gains made on the battlefield and ultimately restore deterrence. Both sides have a great deal to lose if those talks fail. For Washington, simply reaching an agreement may not be enough. It wants the Strait of Hormuz reopened and to ensure that Iran cannot resume its nuclear activities. For Tehran, accepting those demands without substantial concessions in return could look like capitulation. Iran is already under intense pressure from a US maritime blockade, economic strain and restrictions on international air travel. Tehran also wants to preserve the leverage it has gained over the Strait of Hormuz and, crucially, restore deterrence after repeated US and Israeli attacks, making another attack more costly. The rift is wide. Washington wants to show that military pressure has produced strategic results, while Tehran needs any settlement to demonstrate that it has not surrendered under that pressure. The talks may be under way, but bridging those gaps will require significant concessions from both sides.
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Parham Ghobadi retweeted
Mahsa Piraei the daugther of Mino Majidi, who was killed in 2022 calling on international community to hold the leadership of Islamic Republic accountable.
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Parham Ghobadi retweeted
چنین روزی بود؛ فردای خاکسپاری ژینا. با خاله‌اش، همان که پذیرای او در تهران بود و مدام می‌گفت که شرمنده است، به خاک «آیچی» رسیدیم. زنی بر گور زنی دیگر «روله روله» سر داده بود. و آنچه که هنوز ماندگار است، میراث اوست: زن، زندگی آزادی
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Parham Ghobadi retweeted
WSJ SCOOP: Iran has resumed its production of ballistic missiles using stockpiled components and working in underground facilities, officials from the U.S. and Middle East familiar with the matter said, eroding what the U.S. and Israel have touted as a major achievement of the war. wsj.com/world/middle-east/ir…
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Iran is escalating as it feels its grip on the Strait of Hormuz is being challenged
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Parham Ghobadi retweeted
روزنامه فایننشال تایمز گزارشی درباره عملیات مین‌روبی آمریکا در تنگه هرمز منتشر کرده بنابر این گزارش از غواصان نیروی دریایی آمریکا و شناورهای زیرآبی برای این مأموریت استفاده شده پرهام قبادی توضیح می‌دهد
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Iran says that "proportional retaliation" is over Iran’s chief negotiator, Ghalibaf, has said that the era of “proportionate responses” is over. On Thursday, Iranian VP Aref said recent US attacks had changed Iran’s calculations and military doctrine. From now on, he said, Iran’s response would be “disproportionate” and “multilayered.” Iranian commanders say Tehran’s military doctrine has shifted from defensive to offensive — with faster, broader and potentially pre-emptive strikes. Now they appear to be adding another principle: retaliation will no longer necessarily be proportionate. The timing is important. Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz is being eroded. TankerTrackers has reported that current oil volumes moving through and around the region have recovered to more than 40 percent of pre-conflict levels. The strait is still not fully open, but Iran’s claim that it can effectively close the waterway is increasingly being challenged. At the same time, Iran itself is suffering far more severely from the disruption, with its oil exports reported to have fallen to virtually zero. That leaves Tehran facing a strategic dilemma. It can return to negotiations while its economic position and bargaining leverage are deteriorating, or it can escalate in an attempt to regain leverage before its position weakens further. The latest military exchange suggests Tehran has chosen the latter. And that may explain why Iran targeted US warships, according to CENTCOM.
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مهدی یراحی: من نمی‌خواهم میان «شیاطین داخلی و خارجی» یکی را انتخاب کنم.
Replying to @PanahFB
ممنون جناب فرهادبهمن عزیز. فقط یک نکته را لازم می‌دانم روشن کنم: سکوت من درباره‌ جنگ اخیر، به معنای بی‌تفاوتی به آن یا گرفتارشدن در دوگانه‌ی «شر داخلی/شر خارجی» نبود. اتفاقاً مسئله برای من دقیقاً پرهیز از همین دوگانه بود. ضمن آنکه در اواخر جنگ دوازده‌روزه هم یک‌بار موضعم را درباره جنگ اعلام کردم که ضمیمه همین توییت من و شماست. به شخصه جمهوری اسلامی را مسئول اصلی و بخش بزرگی از این ویرانی می‌دانم؛ اما همین مخالفت، مرا از دیدن رنج و مرگ انسان‌های بی‌گناه در جنگ، یا از گفتنِ «نه به جنگ»، معاف نمی‌کند. همان‌طور که «نه به جمهوری اسلامی» هم نباید مشروط به چشم‌پوشی از جنایت دیگری باشد. بگذارید صریح بگویم: در جنایتکار بودن نتانیاهو و ترامپ تردیدی ندارم و بدیهی است که هیچ گربه‌ای محض رضای خدا موش نمی‌گیرد. این البته به معنای هیچ ارادتی به حماس، حزب‌الله و گروه‌های تندرویی از این دست هم نیست؛ گروه‌هایی که همچون حاکمان ما، مردمشان را در چنبره‌ی ایدئولوژی کور گرفتار کرده‌اند و نگذاشته‌اند گره کار ملتشان بسیار پیش‌تر از اینها با دست باز شود. باری، «نه به جنگ» برای من یک موضع تاکتیکی یا واکنشی نیست که دیر یا زود به آن رسیده باشم؛ امتداد همان چیزی است که سال‌ها پیش در «پاره‌سنگ» خواندم: اینکه انسان را نمی‌شود میان پرچم‌ها و قدرت‌ها گم کرد. و شاید مهم‌تر از همه، من نمی‌خواهم میان «شیاطین داخلی و خارجی» یکی را انتخاب کنم. مسئله برای من این است که در برابر هر دو، جانب انسان بایستم؛ حتی اگر این موضع، از هر دو سو به سوءتفاهم یا مصادره منجر شود. این شاید تمام چیزی باشد که از «نه به جنگ» می‌خواهم بگویم.
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This war is taking an enormous economic toll on Iran. The sporadic exchange of fire has not forced Tehran to capitulate. Broadly, there are two camps in Iran over what to do next. Hardliners: Escalate → hurt US allies and global energy markets → increase pressure on Trump → survive until the midterms → negotiate later from a stronger position. Pragmatists’ fear: The economy breaks first → protests erupt → Iran’s bargaining position weakens → today’s leverage disappears.
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Danny Citrinowicz: Hoping that economic pressure will eventually drive Iranians into the streets is not a strategy. What happens if they don't? And what happens if they do, only to be brutally suppressed by the same regime once again?
The current status quo is inherently unstable. What happened last night will happen again, perhaps at different levels of intensity, but the underlying dynamics have not changed. The problem is that the administration appears to be operating on assumptions that simply do not match conditions on the ground. Iran still has sufficient military capabilities to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. And despite its severe economic difficulties, Iran is not a failed state. Economic pain alone will not compel Tehran to make the concessions Washington is demanding. More importantly, Trump is not offering Iran a credible diplomatic off-ramp. Without one, military confrontation will continue whether the administration wants it or not. Hoping that economic pressure will eventually drive Iranians into the streets is not a strategy. What happens if they don't? And what happens if they do, only to be brutally suppressed by the same regime once again? Washington's assumptions need to confront a basic reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to the crisis in Hormuz unless the United States is prepared to commit enormous military resources for an extended period of time. There is little indication that it is. Trying to preserve the current status quo, maximum economic pressure, limited military action, and no meaningful diplomatic off-ramp, is therefore not a sustainable strategy. It is a formula for recurring escalation. #iran
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Parham Ghobadi retweeted
In my conversation with @BBCParham of BBC Persian, I argued that, despite the risks of further military escalation with the United States, Iran may conclude that time is no longer on its side and choose to escalate before its position deteriorates further. A prolonged naval blockade, combined with limited U.S. strikes aimed at degrading Iran’s ability to sustain pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, could weaken Iran’s economy while gradually eroding one of Tehran’s most important sources of leverage. As I told Pahram, this creates a dangerous incentive: Iran may try to “escalate its way out” of the current confrontation—raising the costs before its leverage declines, in the hope that greater escalation will ultimately force a negotiated settlement.*
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I explained Iran’s recent pattern of behaviour suggests it is likely to respond to recent US strikes by targeting American bases in the region, particularly in Jordan. I also discussed why mounting economic pressure may push Tehran toward escalation rather than capitulation, and what Iran is seeking from China and Russia. @LVaughanJones
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