Before Striking Iran: Defining Achievable and realistic Objectives Before considering a military strike against Iran, it is essential to be realistic about what such a campaign can actually accomplish. There is little doubt that Iran is not a peer competitor to the United States militarily. The U.S. retains overwhelming conventional superiority and operational dominance across domains. However, Iran should not be underestimated. As demonstrated in previous limited confrontations, particularly in missile warfare, Tehran possesses meaningful asymmetric capabilities — especially in its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxy network. The core question, therefore, is not whether the United States can inflict damage. It is: What strategic objective is realistically achievable? 1. Regime Change Even senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that regime change would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. There is no unified, viable opposition inside Iran capable of stepping in and governing. Moreover, regime change would almost certainly require a prolonged campaign, potentially including ground forces — something the American public and policymakers have shown little appetite for after Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent a willingness to commit to a large-scale, long-term stabilization effort, regime change is not a credible objective. 2. Destabilizing the Regime to Trigger Internal Uprising A military campaign could weaken the regime and create internal pressure. However, Iran’s leadership — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has no exit option. The regime’s survival is existential for its core leadership. History suggests they would respond to internal unrest with overwhelming force. For destabilization to translate into meaningful political change, a sustained and prolonged campaign would likely be required. Even then, the most probable outcome may not be democratic transition, but internal chaos — potentially pushing Iran toward civil conflict. That scenario carries significant regional and global risks. 3. Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Program A military strike could significantly damage nuclear facilities. Precision strikes may delay progress and degrade infrastructure. But strikes cannot eliminate scientific knowledge, human capital, or political will. Nor is it certain that all highly enriched material could be located and destroyed. At best, military action may delay the program. It is unlikely to eliminate it permanently. Iran would almost certainly attempt reconstruction — potentially with greater determination and fewer constraints. 4. Eliminating Iran’s Missile Capabilities A broad campaign could substantially degrade Iran’s missile inventory and production infrastructure. However, Iran’s missile program is domestically based and central to its defense doctrine. It is viewed as a pillar of deterrence against superior conventional forces. Even after heavy losses, Tehran would likely prioritize rebuilding these capabilities. The result may be temporary degradation rather than permanent removal. 5. Forcing Iran Back to Negotiations on Better Terms There is an assumption that military pressure could coerce Tehran into accepting a more favorable agreement. Yet past confrontations suggest that the Iranian leadership may choose endurance over capitulation. The regime may calculate that time increases political pressure on Washington to de-escalate, particularly if the conflict becomes prolonged or regionally destabilizing. Rather than producing immediate concessions, military action could harden Iran’s negotiating position — or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely. 6. Targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Some might argue that removing the Supreme Leader could fundamentally alter Iran’s trajectory. However, decapitation strikes often produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s political system is institutionalized, not purely personalist. Removing Khamenei could trigger retaliation from Iran and its regional proxies and potentially force the United States into a much broader conflict. It is also unclear whether such a move would moderate Iranian policy. It could just as easily radicalize it. The Strategic Bottom Line There is no question about U.S. military superiority in a direct confrontation. The real issue is strategic clarity. For the first time in decades, the possibility of direct U.S.–Iran military confrontation raises the prospect of open interstate war rather than proxy conflict. That demands disciplined thinking about ends, ways, and means. No available objective appears easily attainable. All carry significant second- and third-order effects. Many outcomes could be unpredictable — and not necessarily favorable to U.S. interests. Thus, before initiating military action, policymakers must clearly define what “success” looks like — and whether the likely costs, duration, escalation risks, and regional consequences align with America’s broader strategic priorities. Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage. #IranRevolution2026 #Iran

There is one fundamental reality that should not be overlooked: Tehran is unlikely to simply allow its most important Iraqi proxies, particularly Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba , to disarm. These groups themselves have shown little willingness to give up their weapons, while continuing to portray their armed presence as necessary to protect Iraq from Israel and the United States. There is a strong strategic case for sustained mediation and for deeper efforts to bring Iraq back into the Arab fold. But the challenges are enormous, and expectations need to be realistic. This process cannot begin with an assumption that Iran’s influence in Iraq can be eliminated altogether. Tehran views Iraq as a critical arena for its national security and regional influence. It may be possible to constrain that influence, strengthen the Iraqi state, and gradually reduce the autonomy of Iran-aligned armed groups. But Iran is not going to voluntarily relinquish its foothold in Iraq under any foreseeable scenario. #iran

Exactly!

The two wars with Iran have significantly degraded its ability to produce a nuclear weapon in the near term. But they may also have dramatically increased Tehran’s motivation to acquire one over the longer term. That is why the key question is no longer simply whether Iran resumes enrichment, but what it intends to achieve if it does. If Tehran decides to rebuild its enrichment program, it may conclude that returning to the old threshold posture no longer makes strategic sense, and that the purpose should instead be to cross the Rubicon toward 90 percent enrichment. For all the attention given to Iran’s missile arsenal or its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, its so-called “economic nuclear weapon”, there is ultimately only one capability that could fundamentally change Tehran’s calculation about its vulnerability to future attack: an actual nuclear deterrent. Iranian leaders look at North Korea and understand that lesson very clearly. This does not mean that Iran has decided to build a bomb. There are major unanswered questions about how Tehran assesses the risks, whether it believes it still has the technical and operational capacity to move toward weaponization, and whether it thinks it could do so without being detected and attacked again. But Iran will inevitably have to reassess its nuclear strategy. And if its leadership concludes that nuclear weapons are now necessary for regime security, then despite the damage inflicted by Israel and the United States, Iran may still retain pathways, technically and practically, to pursue that objective. That creates the central paradox of these wars: a campaign intended to push an Iranian nuclear weapon further into the future may also have strengthened the strategic logic in Tehran for eventually trying to acquire one. If that debate has not already taken place inside the Iranian leadership, it almost certainly will. The public debate emerging from Iran itself already gives us reason to watch that question very closely. #iran #IranWar‌

That is certainly true, but it is important to emphasize that Iran’s red lines have not shifted in either direction. They remain essentially where they were. The issue is primarily one of sequencing: Iran wants the U.S. to take its agreed step first, before Tehran implements its own commitments under the memorandum of understanding. From Iran’s perspective, however, the underlying terms and conditions remain unchanged. #iran

This report is particularly important because it highlights something that is often overlooked: there is no real consensus within the GCC over how to deal with Iran. One might have expected a common threat to produce a common Gulf strategy. Instead, the current crisis is once again exposing significant differences among the Gulf states. The Saudi and Emirati approach could prove to be a dangerous gamble. The assumption appears to be that sustained external pressure, combined with growing pressure inside Iran, will eventually force Tehran to compromise. But that outcome is far from certain. Domestic pressure may not produce Iranian restraint or capitulation. It could instead encourage Tehran to take greater risks, escalate against its adversaries, and shift some of the costs of the confrontation onto the Gulf states themselves. The larger problem is that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may still be dealing with Iran as if it were the Iran of before the war. Under Ali Khamenei, there was at least an argument that overwhelming pressure could affect Tehran’s calculations and encourage caution. But what I call “Iran 3.0” is a different system: one in which the IRGC plays a much more dominant role and a new, more radical and less experienced leadership faces enormous internal and external pressure. Under these circumstances, escalation rather than capitulation may increasingly become Tehran’s preferred response. This creates a genuine dilemma for the Gulf states. An Iran-Oman arrangement that effectively gives Tehran a significant role in the security architecture of the Strait of Hormuz would be extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to accept. Yet preventing Iran from gaining such a foothold also carries serious risks. Without some arrangement that gives Tehran a stake in reopening and stabilizing the Strait, the probability of further escalation could rise substantially. The policy lines are therefore understandable, but they are also extremely dangerous. Washington and its Gulf partners should be careful about assuming that additional pressure will automatically produce additional Iranian restraint. Against the Iran that is emerging from this war, pressure without a credible diplomatic off-ramp could produce exactly the opposite result. And if that happens, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may be among the first to discover that a strategy designed to contain Iran can quickly boomerang against the Gulf itself. Iran appears willing to return to a more regulated and stable framework, but only on the basis of full implementation of the existing memorandum of understanding. From Tehran’s perspective, this is not the starting point for a new negotiation; it is the baseline for restoring the previous framework. The key point is that there is little reason to assume that additional pressure, by itself, will force Iran to retreat from these core demands. Tehran seems to believe that it has already made the concessions it was prepared to make and that the next step must be implementation of what was previously agreed. This is the reality we need to confront. More pressure may increase the costs for Iran, but higher costs do not necessarily translate into greater flexibility. If Tehran concludes that Washington is trying to rewrite the understandings through coercion, the more likely Iranian response may be escalation rather than additional concessions. The choice, therefore, is not simply between pressure and diplomacy. The real question is whether there is still a viable path back to the existing framework, and, if not, how both sides intend to manage the growing risk of escalation. #IranWar‌ #iran

תפסיקו להגיד מה לא. תגידו פעם אחת מה כן נתניהו והמועמדים להחליפו מתחרים בשבועות האחרונים בשאלה מי יגיד "לא" חזק יותר למדינה פלסטינית. "איך אפשר לחשוב על רעיון כזה אחרי השבעה באוקטובר?", חוזרים ואומרים מועמדים שונים, תוך שהם מתעלמים מעובדה לא נוחה: עוד לפני השבעה באוקטובר, ישראל חיזקה בפועל את הגורמים הקיצוניים והחלישה את המתונים בזירה הפלסטינית, כחלק מתפיסה שביקשה להימנע מקידום תהליך מדיני משמעותי. אבל במקום להמשיך ולהסביר מה לא, ובמקום לחזור לתפיסת "ניהול הסכסוך" שהובילה אותנו אל השבעה באוקטובר, ראוי לשאול את המועמדים לראשות הממשלה שאלה פשוטה: מה כן? מהו החזון של ממשלת ישראל ביחס לסוגיה הפלסטינית? מה היא מבקשת שיקרה בעוד עשר או עשרים שנה? משום שלמרות השאיפות של גורמים שונים בקואליציה, טרנספר אינו תוכנית מדינית ממשית שאפשר לבסס עליה את עתידה של ישראל. יתרה מכך, אותם גורמים שמבטיחים לנו "מזרח תיכון חדש" אם רק ייבחרו, אינם מסבירים כיצד בדיוק ניתן יהיה לבנות אותו ללא התקדמות כלשהי בסוגיה הפלסטינית. וחשוב מכך: כיצד מתכוונת ישראל לשמר את זהותה כמדינה יהודית ודמוקרטית כאשר במקביל מתקדם בפועל תהליך של סיפוח זוחל בגדה המערבית? המועמדים השונים לראשות הממשלה צריכים להבין עובדה נוספת. חלקים נרחבים בעולם מניחים כיום שהבעיה המדינית של ישראל קשורה במידה רבה למדיניותו של נתניהו. אבל אם הממשלה שתבוא אחריו תמשיך בדיוק את אותה מדיניות ביחס לפלסטינים, המסקנה בעולם עלולה להשתנות: הבעיה, מבחינתם, כבר לא תהיה נתניהו — אלא מדינת ישראל עצמה. לשינוי כזה עלולות להיות השלכות מרחיקות לכת. צעדים מדיניים ובינלאומיים נגד ישראל, שנבלמים כיום בין היתר מתוך התקווה לשינוי פוליטי עתידי, עלולים לקבל לגיטימציה ותמיכה רחבות הרבה יותר. גם מי שסבור שאפשר להוביל תהליך אמיתי של תיקון פנימי בישראל בלי להתמודד עם הסוגיה הפלסטינית מחמיץ את הנקודה. הסכסוך אינו מתקיים במנותק מהחברה הישראלית. הוא משפיע עליה, על מוסדותיה, על צה"ל, על יחסיה עם העולם ועל הבסיס הערכי שעליו מבקשת המדינה לעמוד. עם כל הכבוד לאיום האיראני, זו שאלה אסטרטגית לא פחות משמעותית לעתידה של ישראל. התמיכה שלה זוכים פורעים יהודים בגדה המערבית מצד גורמים פוליטיים רק ממחישה את עומק הבעיה: ישראל אינה רק נעשית חשופה יותר לצעדים בינלאומיים נגדה; המציאות המתפתחת בגדה שוחקת גם את הבסיס המוסרי שעליו נשענת מדינת ישראל. לכן הציפייה מהמועמדים לראשות הממשלה אינה שיתחבאו מאחורי מדיניות נתניהו ויפגינו "אומץ" באמצעות הצהרות על כל מה שהם מתנגדים לו. הציפייה היא שיגידו לציבור כיצד הם רואים פתרון מדיני ואזרחי לסוגיה הפלסטינית. לא עוד סיסמאות כמו "ניהול הסכסוך" או "שלום כלכלי". אלה אינן תוכניות לעתיד אלא דרכים לדחות הכרעות. ואם המועמדים אינם רוצים להכריע — גם זו עמדה לגיטימית, אבל שיאמרו זאת ביושר. שיסבירו לציבור מה משמעותה של אי־ההכרעה ומה יהיו המחירים שישראל עלולה לשלם בגללה: מבחינה ביטחונית, מדינית, כלכלית, דמוגרפית ומוסרית. עם כל הכבוד לרצון "לנצח", מה הטעם בניצחון שמשאיר אחריו בדיוק את אותה מדיניות שהביאה את ישראל למבוי הסתום הנוכחי? אי אפשר להבטיח לציבור עתיד טוב יותר ובאותה נשימה להימנע מהשאלה שתעצב חלק גדול מאותו עתיד. ישראל אינה זקוקה לעוד מנהיגים שיצטיינו בלומר מה לא. היא זקוקה למנהיגים שיהיה להם האומץ לומר מה כן — ולהסביר לציבור בכנות מה המחיר של הבחירה שלהם.

My interview @cnni with @BenInLDN A. Netanyahu’s speech — the bigger problem happened before he spoke The most important moment surrounding Netanyahu’s speech actually happened before he began speaking: a significant number of delegations walked out. That illustrates a broader strategic problem for Israel. Iran is an immediate security challenge, but Israel is also facing a serious erosion of its international standing. Whatever government comes next will have to invest significant political capital in rebuilding Israel’s relationships with the international community. B. Israel’s wars with Iran have not achieved their broader strategic objectives If we measure these conflicts against the objectives Israel itself sought to achieve, the record is deeply problematic. Israel has not brought down the Iranian regime. It has not permanently eliminated Iran’s nuclear capabilities. It has not eliminated Iran’s conventional military capabilities, nor has it ended Tehran’s support for its partners and proxies across the Middle East. What we are seeing today with the Houthis in Yemen is one reminder that Iran’s regional network remains a significant challenge. Tactical and operational achievements should not be confused with achieving the broader strategic objectives of the war. C. The nuclear problem has changed — it has not disappeared There is an important achievement here: Iran is not currently enriching uranium. But the nuclear challenge has not disappeared. The more difficult long-term question is Iran’s motivation. If the confrontation has increased Tehran’s determination to eventually acquire a nuclear weapon, then Israel and the United States may have delayed one dimension of the problem while making another dimension more difficult. Capabilities can be destroyed and rebuilt. Motivation is much harder to eliminate. D. Israel and the Gulf states do not necessarily want the same thing from negotiations Israel is fundamentally skeptical of any agreement that strengthens and stabilizes the same Iranian regime that it would ultimately like to see weakened or replaced. The Strait of Hormuz obviously matters less to Israel, but it matters more to the Gulf states. Their priority is regional stability and avoiding another major confrontation. Reopening and stabilizing Hormuz could also serve the Trump administration if its objective is to reduce pressure on global oil prices. So there is a potential divergence of interests: Washington and the Gulf states may see value in an agreement that produces economic and regional stability, while Israel may worry that the same agreement gives the Iranian regime economic breathing room and ultimately strengthens it. E. Iran’s new proposal does not represent a fundamental change in Tehran’s position The latest Iranian proposal should not be interpreted as Tehran abandoning its core red lines. Iran appears to recognize that President Trump is under increasing political pressure as the midterm elections approach, particularly when it comes to energy prices. Tehran is therefore offering Trump something he has a political incentive to want. But substantively, Iran is still trying to return to a framework resembling the previous memorandum of understanding, an arrangement Tehran believes serves its interests. F. No agreement does not mean continuation of the status quo This may be the most important point for Washington. The current situation is inherently unstable. The United States is applying enormous economic pressure, but Iran has not capitulated. If negotiations fail, we should not automatically assume that the existing situation simply continues. The opposite may be true: the probability of another escalation could increase. That means Washington needs to answer two questions simultaneously: What are the costs of accepting an agreement with Iran and what is the strategy if it rejects one? Because if Tehran concludes that economic pressure will continue indefinitely and diplomacy offers no viable exit, the next Iranian move may not be another negotiating proposal. It may be an attempt to change the equation through escalation. #IranWar‌ #iran

אחרי התרגיל בשישי שעבר, בטהרן מתקיים היום תרגיל נוסף, הפעם של רוכבי אופנועים תומכי המשטר. נטען בתקשורת האיראנית כי משתתפים בו 40,000 רוכבי אופנועים שהתגייסו לקמפיין "הקרבת החיים" להגנה על איראן.

#Tehran appears to believe that a political window is opening in Washington. With the U.S. midterm elections approaching and President Trump facing strong incentives to bring down oil prices, Iran sees an opportunity to test whether economic and political pressure can translate into American flexibility. But Tehran’s position should not be mistaken for a fundamental strategic retreat. At its core, Iran is still insisting on its key red lines and, in important respects, seeking a return to the framework established in the earlier memorandum of understanding — a framework the Trump administration has since moved away from. That makes the central question for Washington not simply whether it should accept or reject Iran’s latest proposal. The more consequential question is: What happens the day after Washington says no? Iranian leaders are also reading the American political calendar. They understand that a major escalation before the midterms could impose significant political and economic costs on the administration, particularly through higher oil and gasoline prices. Trump himself has publicly acknowledged the connection between the Iran conflict, energy prices and the midterm timetable. If Tehran concludes that Washington wants to avoid a broader confrontation before November, it may decide that escalation, rather than compromise, offers the better path to leverage. The question then becomes whether Iran would move beyond absorbing the economic pressure of the U.S. blockade and take new steps to impose costs on Washington and the global economy, particularly around maritime traffic and energy flows. The Strait of Hormuz has already become one of Tehran’s principal sources of leverage. Recent negotiations have centered precisely on the tradeoff between reopening the strait and easing the U.S. blockade. So the administration should evaluate the Iranian proposal against two scenarios, not one. The first is the cost and strategic consequence of accepting a deal that largely revives the previous framework. The second is the likely Iranian response if Washington rejects it. The real policy question is therefore not only whether Iran’s offer is acceptable. It is whether Washington has a credible strategy for what comes next if it is not. #IranWar‌ #iran

Must read. Israelis howling about Qatari malfeasance need to turn their ire to Bibi and specific Israeli policies that were closely aligned/linked with Doha. Propping up Hamas via Qatar was Bibi’s clear policy to keep the PA down, and Bibi (and Israel) then got horribly burned by it. FFS Mossad chiefs racked up a million frequent flyer points shuttling back and forth.

חשוב להיצמד לעובדות גם כשעוסקים בתפקידה של קטר. במשך שנים ישראל לא הייתה קורבן פסיבי של המימון הקטרי לעזה; ממשלות ישראל ובכירי מערכת הביטחון ביקשו מדוחא להמשיך להזרים כסף לרצועה, בין היתר לאחר שאבו מאזן קיצץ בתשלומי הרשות בעזה. מבחינת מקבלי ההחלטות בישראל, הסיוע הקטרי היה כלי שנועד לקנות יציבות ושקט ולנהל את המציאות ברצועה. אפשר וצריך לבחון את פעילות ההשפעה הקטרית, את קשריה עם חמאס ואת המימון שלה למוסדות במערב. אבל אין בכך תחליף לבחינת המדיניות הישראלית עצמה. הבעיה האסטרטגית של ישראל בזירה האמריקנית לא נוצרה מבצעי השפעה ומאבק בהשפעה הקטרית בקמפוסים לא יפתור אותה. הבעיה היא במדיניות. במשך שנים בחרה ישראל לעבוד עם קטר משום שהדבר התאים למדיניות שנועדה לנהל את עזה בנפרד מן הרשות הפלסטינית בגדה. לכן הצגת קטר בדיעבד כאחראית הבלעדית להתחזקות חמאס מטשטשת את העובדה שהמדיניות הקטרית והמדיניות הישראלית הצטלבו בנקודות משמעותיות. האחריות למדיניות הישראלית נשארת בראש ובראשונה אצל מקבלי ההחלטות בישראל. הפער בין הרטוריקה הנוכחית כלפי קטר לבין שנים של שיתוף פעולה מעשי עמה מחייב בחינה ביקורתית של הטענה שקטר לבדה כפתה את המציאות הזאת על ישראל. האם מערכת היחסים של ישראל עם קטר צריכה לעמוד במוקד הבדיקה של ועדת חקירה ממלכתית לאירועי 7 באוקטובר? בוודאי. יש מקום לבדוק לעומק את הכסף הקטרי שהועבר לעזה, את מערכת היחסים בין ירושלים לדוחא, את ההערכות המודיעיניות לגבי קטר וחמאס, ואת השאלה האם הסיוע תרם במישרין או בעקיפין להתעצמות חמאס. אלא שהבדיקה חייבת להתבסס על העובדות, גם כאשר הן אינן נוחות פוליטית. בכירים ישראלים ביקשו מקטר להמשיך בסיוע לעזה ואף הודו לה על תרומתו ל"יציבות וביטחון" באזור. לכן חקירת תפקידה של קטר אינה יכולה להחליף את חקירת המדיניות הישראלית כלפי קטר, חמאס ועזה. ועדה רצינית תצטרך לברר מדוע ישראל תמכה לאורך שנים במנגנון הקטרי; מי קיבל את ההחלטות; אילו התרעות הוצגו לממשלה ולמערכת הביטחון; מה ידעו מקבלי ההחלטות על השימוש בכספים; ואיזה מקום תפסה המדיניות הזאת בתפיסה הרחבה יותר של ישראל כלפי חמאס והרשות הפלסטינית. ובעיקר, אסור שהדיון באשר לקטר יהפוך למכשיר שבאמצעותו פוליטיקאים, מן הממשלה, האופוזיציה או מערכת הביטחון, מרחיקים מעצמם אחריות אפשרית. 7 באוקטובר היה הכשל הביטחוני הקטלני ביותר בתולדות מדינת ישראל, והבירור שלו צריך לעסוק במכלול ההחלטות, ההנחות והכשלים שהובילו אליו, ולא לבחור מראש גורם חיצוני שעליו תוטל האחריות. את קטר צריך לחקור. אבל צריך לחקור גם את מי שבחר לעבוד איתה, את השיקולים שהנחו את הבחירה הזאת ואת תפיסת הביטחון שבתוכה היא התקיימה. רק בדיקה של שני צדי המשוואה יכולה לספק תשובה עובדתית לשאלה כיצד הגיעה ישראל ל־7 באוקטובר.

Told @ynetnews: There is real distress in Iran, and it is very evident, including in the statements of President Pezeshkian, who sees himself as a representative of the population The situation is difficult, but at the same time, I would not dismiss these demonstrations. Ultimately, there is a significant core that supports this regime, even in the current economic situation and amid the economic and social complexity Iran is experiencing because of the war The latest gatherings were a direct continuation of the demonstrations held during the war, when tens of thousands of people took to the streets each night in Iran’s major cities, including Tehran The rallies, served two purposes: projecting an image abroad that the government retained the confidence of the Iranian public while sending a message to Iranians opposed to the Islamic Republic. The message to government opponents, was that there is no point in going out to protest, even if they were considering taking to the streets, because public spaces had already been filled by government supporters and the leadership retained enough backing to make an uprising appear futile. We are seeing the same logic in the current demonstrations The government’s promotion of the “Sacrifice of Life” campaign fit the same strategy. The regime’s entire focus right now is on demonstrating both the support it enjoys and the Iranian citizen’s willingness to make sacrifices, in the sense of, ‘You will not break us. People will be willing to fight if necessary. It all serves the same strategic purpose. Even when the numbers are exaggerated, I would not underestimate the base of support the regime has. @Liorbenari1 ynetnews.com/article/hy11qzb…

I would be very cautious about dismissing Iran’s threats, including its ultimatum to the Trump administration. First, Iran’s military doctrine appears to have shifted significantly. Tehran is moving from a concept of “forward defense” toward what might be described as “forward offense”, demonstrating a greater willingness to confront the United States directly and, importantly, to initiate pressure rather than merely respond to attacks against Iran or its partners. Second, Tehran appears to believe that President Trump is increasingly constrained by the approaching midterm elections. Iranian decision-makers may calculate that the administration will be reluctant to trigger another major escalation that could push oil and gasoline prices even higher at a politically sensitive moment. Third, Washington continues to intensify pressure on Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, this is no longer simply a maritime confrontation. The growing restrictions surrounding Iranian activity increasingly resemble a broader economic and strategic blockade, including pressure on aviation and connectivity. It would be dangerous to assume that Iran will simply absorb this indefinitely. Fourth, the absence of a major U.S. military response to the latest Iranian actions in and around the Strait of Hormuz could affect Tehran’s risk calculus. Iranian leaders may interpret American restraint not as deliberate escalation management, but as evidence that Washington itself is deeply concerned about the consequences of a wider conflict. Whether that interpretation is correct is less important than the possibility that Tehran believes it to be correct. Finally, Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia gives Iran additional strategic flexibility. With Riyadh forced to devote greater attention and resources to the Yemen front, Tehran may believe that the regional environment provides it with greater freedom of action around the Strait of Hormuz. For all these reasons, I would be extremely cautious about ruling out an Iranian-initiated escalation. Iran does not appear to want another full-scale war with the United States. But that does not mean Tehran will avoid escalation altogether. The critical danger is that its threshold for risk may be declining as Iranian leaders become increasingly convinced that Washington is politically vulnerable, reluctant to escalate, and unable to sustain mounting economic costs indefinitely. That combination creates precisely the environment in which limited escalation can turn into something much larger. not because either side necessarily wants a major war, but because Tehran may increasingly believe it can push harder without triggering one. #iran #iran

ראיון של @radio103fm אודות מערכת היחסים בין איראן לארצות הברית: א. למעשה העמדה האיראנית נשארת קבועה. גם הפגישה בין שר החוץ האיראני לוויטקוף השליח של הממשל לסוגייה האיראנית, הפגישה הזו הייתה חשובה במובן הזה שהיא מעידה שהצדדים רוצים למצוא פתרון מדיני, אבל כן צריך להגיד - האיראנים מציגים את אותן העמדות שהם הציגו באופן רציף לפני המלחמה וגם אחריה. הם לא משנים את עמדתם מהורמוז, דרך הגרעין, דרך הדרישה להסיר את הסנקציות. ב. צריך להגיד שהמצור הימי באמת עובד, איראן לא מייצאת נפט ויש לזה הישג משמעותי. הלחץ הכלכלי כן עובד אבל הוא לא מוביל לכניעה איראנית, הלחץ הכלכלי מוביל להסלמה איראנית. האיראנים כבר מאיימים שמי שיחבור לדבר הזה, איראן לא תהסס לתקוף את שדות התעופה. באיראן לא מוכנים לקבל מצב שמוטל עליהם מצור. הם תוקפים, הם יתקפו, אבל הם לא מוכנים לקבל בהכנעה את המצב הנוכחי. ג. האיראנים מניחים שטראמפ עד בחירות האמצע מאוד לחוץ, ולכן הם כן יכולים להשיג הישגים משמעותיים. מחירי הנפט שעולים שוב זה משפיע לרעה על מצבה של המפלגה הרפובליקנית בסקרים. הם, מבחינתם, המו"מ או הפעילות הצבאית, הם יכולים לבחור אחד משניהם, המטרה המרכזית שלהם היא לא מו"מ או תקיפה צבאית, המטרה לשנות את המציאות האסטרטגית שתועיל לאיראן, תוציא את ארה"ב מהמזה"ת ושלא יהיו תקיפות עתידיות על איראן. אם זה יגיע דרך מו"מ זה בסדר, אם זה דרך תקיפות זה גם בסדר, הם לא יקבלו את המצב הנוכחי שהם לא מייצאים נפט ובסופו של דבר האמריקנים מטילים עליהם סנקציות משמעותיות והם תוקפים ד. הסיפור הישראלי, האיראנים אין להם שום אינטרס להכניס את ישראל לאירוע וגם לא לאמריקנים, כל עוד הסיפור מרוכז במיצרי הורמוז הסיכוי שנהיה מעורבים הוא סיכוי נמוך. הנשיא טראמפ לא יודע בעצמו מה הוא רוצה לעשות עם האיראנים. ברור שהוא עצמו לא יודע מה לעשות. האיראנים מניחים שאחרי בחירות האמצע הוא יחזור למלחמה עצימה. @AnatDavidov maariv.co.il/news/world/arti…

While Iran’s missile and UAV programs are overwhelmingly indigenous, developed and produced inside Iran by Iranian scientists, engineers, and defense industries, they are not entirely self-sufficient. This makes eliminating Iran’s ability to rebuild these capabilities extraordinarily difficult: the knowledge, experience, production infrastructure, and human capital are already deeply embedded inside the country. Yet there is an important vulnerability in this system. Iran’s defense-industrial base continues to depend on imported dual-use materials and components, particularly from China. These include chemicals, industrial materials, electronics, and other components that have legitimate civilian applications but can also support the production of missiles, drones, and related military systems. Their dual-use nature provides Beijing with plausible deniability: China can argue that it is supplying Iran’s civilian economy rather than directly contributing to its military buildup. This external dependency may therefore represent one of the most significant bottlenecks in Iran’s effort to regenerate and expand its conventional capabilities. Restricting access to these supply chains could make rebuilding slower, more expensive, and more technologically challenging. But as long as China is unwilling to substantially restrict the flow of critical dual-use goods to Iran, preventing Tehran from rebuilding its missile and UAV capabilities will remain extremely difficult. The challenge is therefore not simply destroying Iranian production facilities, it is disrupting the international supply chains that allow Iran to rebuild them, and #china is a crucial element in the Iranian force buildup. #IranWar‌ #iran

הפינה השבועית "יא אללה" עלתה לאתר והשבוע! 200 ימים להתכנסויות הליליות ברחבי איראן לתמיכה במשטר. מה קורה שם כבר 200 לילות? ומי משתתף? מוזמנים לצפות ולקרוא. לינק לכתבה המלאה: @citrinowicz ynet.co.il/news/article/hyb6…

Indeed... It did not take a crystal ball to anticipate this before the war. It required something much simpler: understanding the regime in Tehran. Perhaps one of the main reasons the campaign has struggled to achieve its strategic objectives is precisely this failure. Israel and the United States either did not fully understand, or were unwilling to recognize, the nature of the adversary they were confronting. Iran’s leadership does not necessarily respond to military pressure according to the assumptions made in Washington or Jerusalem. Greater pressure does not automatically produce greater flexibility, and battlefield setbacks do not necessarily translate into political capitulation. This is the fundamental lesson: military superiority is not the same as strategic success. If you misunderstand your adversary’s decision-making, threat perception, red lines, and willingness to absorb pain, even impressive operational achievements can fail to produce the political outcome you intended. No crystal ball was required. What was required was a better understanding of Tehran. #iran

🇺🇲 🇮🇷 @citrinowicz published this nine days before the war started, before a single strike had landed. Seven months later, after a war that began by doing exactly what he warned against most specifically, it reads less like analysis than a checklist Washington proceeded to run through. Start with his sixth scenario: targeting Khamenei directly. Citrinowicz called it the most unpredictable option, one that could trigger uncontrolled retaliation and “just as easily radicalize” the regime as moderate it. The war opened on February 28 with exactly that decapitation strike. It wasn't a later escalatory option debated mid-conflict. It was the opening move. The rest of his framework has tracked the war with similar accuracy. Regime change was never seriously attempted, and there was no viable opposition to install, exactly as he wrote. There has been no internal uprising. Levada polling we covered weeks ago instead showed a population that “withdrew into acceptance” rather than revolt, precisely the alternative to democratic transition that he had flagged. The nuclear program wasn't eliminated; it was obscured. The IAEA's September report cannot verify Iran's uranium stockpile or locate a facility Iran announced more than a year ago. “Delayed, not permanently removed,” Citrinowicz wrote. Seven months later, that describes the IAEA's operational reality. The missile program survived as well. Iran was still launching strikes this month and is separately building a new ramjet-propelled anti-ship missile with Russian help. Citrinowicz predicted that the program would be rebuilt “with greater determination.” He could not have specifically foreseen the outside assistance, but the underlying logic has held. His warning about negotiations may be the most consequential. Military pressure, he wrote, could “harden Iran's negotiating position or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely” rather than produce concessions. Seven months later, the June MOU collapsed within weeks. Ratcliffe's covert Moscow trip produced a trilateral summit proposal Iran has shown no real urgency to accept. And Iran's posture, according to the Kimmage and Lipman essay we covered last week, is built around Putin-style endurance rather than capitulation. Tehran has followed the path Citrinowicz warned was possible. What stands out about the piece is not one prediction landing. Citrinowicz offered a six-point, falsifiable framework before a shot was fired. Seven months of war have yet to produce a scenario in which the results exceeded what he argued military force could realistically achieve. “Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage” was his thesis. Seven months later, it remains a useful lens through which to assess the war.

While Washington and the Gulf states are understandably focused on the immediate crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, we should not lose sight of a potentially even more consequential challenge: Iran’s nuclear program. The concern goes well beyond Iranian threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. An increasingly important debate is taking place inside Iran over whether the country’s nuclear strategy itself should be reconsidered in light of the wars of the past year and the changing regional security environment. This debate becomes far more significant because international inspectors have effectively been unable to verify what is happening at Iran’s key nuclear facilities for more than a year. The IAEA reported that, following the June 2025 attacks, it lost access to Iranian nuclear facilities other than Bushehr. That creates a dangerous combination: limited international visibility, growing political discussion in Tehran about the future of Iran’s nuclear doctrine, and continued Iranian possession of significant nuclear knowledge and infrastructure. We therefore need to remain extremely vigilant about what happens next. The uncomfortable reality is that, despite two wars over the past year and despite significant operational achievements against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, the fundamental strategic problem has not disappeared. Iran may not currently be enriching uranium as it did before, but it has retained the knowledge, experience, and at least some of the capabilities that could allow it to rebuild its program and potentially move toward a nuclear weapon if its leadership makes that decision. The key question, therefore, is no longer simply what was destroyed. It is whether the strategic calculations in Tehran are changing, and whether Iran could ultimately conclude that the lesson of the past year is that nuclear weapons, rather than nuclear restraint, offer the best guarantee against future attacks. This was one of the central points I emphasized during a briefing in Paris with representatives of several leading French media outlets: while the world is watching Hormuz, we cannot afford to take our eyes off Iran’s nuclear trajectory. 👇👇👇

בראיון @ynet הדגשתי כי בנוגע להפגנות התמיכה הליליות באיראן לא ניתן לגזור מהן לגבי מידת האמון שהמשטר זוכה לו וכי למשטר יש המון בעיות, אך עם זאת, הוא גם נהנה ממיליוני תומכים ולא ניתן להתעלם מכך. יש מצוקה אמיתית באיראן, אבל יחד עם זאת, לא נכון לזלזל בהפגנות הללו. בסוף יש גרעין משמעותי שתומך במשטר הזה, גם במצב הכלכלי הנוכחי ובמורכבות הכלכלית והחברתית שאיראן חווה כרגע לאור המלחמה. ההפגנות ברחוב האיראני בימים האחרונים הן המשך ישיר של ההפגנות במהלך המלחמה, בה ראינו עשרות אלפי אנשים יוצאים מדי ערב לרחובות בערים הראשיות בטהרן ובכך למעשה לא רק שידרו לעולם שהמשטר נהנה מאמון של הציבור האיראני, אלא גם שידרו לציבור האיראני עצמו (המתנגד למשטר) שאין לו טעם לצאת, גם אם הוא חושב על כך, כי הרחובות נכבשו על ידי הפגנות התמיכה וכי בסופו של דבר המשטר נהנה ממספיק תמיכה, כך שאין טעם לנסות ולצאת נגד המשטר עצמו. @Liorbenari1 ynet.co.il/yedioth/article/y…