PhD | Senior Iran Analyst @CrisisGroup | Views are my own | RTs ≠ endorsements
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And finally… the author copies have arrived!
It’s a great feeling to hold the finished book after such a long process.
The Axis of Resistance: Iran, Israel and the Struggle for the Middle East
UK & EU: May 8 | US & North America: July 14
@politybooks
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Told @WSJ that the debate about the bomb in #Iran is largely now “whether we can do it rather than whether we should do it.”
wsj.com/world/middle-east/in…
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
#Iran Strategy: “This latest stage is more pinpoint, in the sense of them knowing exactly what they want, which is making U.S. forces around the region dysfunctional, in order to push the U.S. presence as far away from Iranian borders as possible.” -- @HamidRezaAz @CrisisGroup
Hoping to push the US away, Iran’s strategy is to go on the offensive. My report, via @csmonitor csmonitor.com/World/Middle-E…
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
The debate about the bomb in Iran, @HamidRezaAz said, is largely now “whether we can do it rather than whether we should do it.” -3-
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Iran’s nuclear debate, once quiet or behind the scenes, has burst in the open. Iran officials say nuclear doctrine hasn’t changed but warn it may. Our latest. wsj.com/world/middle-east/in…
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RT @HamidRezaAz: From what I understand, the #Iran|ian leadership knows that if there is a chance for a deal, it is more likely before the…
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
NEW: Iran in turmoil. A megalomaniac with a poor understanding of Iranian society gambles that sympathetic locals and an Iranian military in disarray will guarantee a quick military victory.
Sound familiar?
In "Old News" this week, @amwajmedia looks at Iraq's invasion of Iran.
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
NEW: Virtually no senior Iraq analyst expected Shia armed groups to meet PM Zaidi's Sept. 30 deadline to lay down their arms.
Zaidi's new phased approach, beginning with a 90-day halt to attacks on US/Coalition interests and intended to end with integration of all fighters into the PMU *on an individual basis* by mid-2027, is also difficult to foresee.
For example, there's no clarity on what happens with the actual residual organizations, not to mention how to deal with leadership networks of integrated fighters being reproduced in new settings.
But like much else in the region, from Baghdad and Washington's perspective, it's better than nothing.
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
our take on what happened and didn't happen #unga81 'Kabuki Diplomacy Between US and #Iran at UNGA' @StimsonMEP @lrozen @gbrew24 @NickKristof @NPRinskeep @glcarlstrom @AliVaez @HamidRezaAz stimson.org/2026/kabuki-dipl…
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
I think @HamidRezaAz nails it (once again).
The leadership is prepared to negotiate; they perceive an opportunity to reach a deal before mid-terms; they see little reason to alter their negotiating position; and their read is that the US will likely not go for this proposal.
This is about establishment a credible basis to negotiate *at some point.* If they can get a deal now, great. If it only becomes possible after more time/pressure/calculated escalation, fine.
From what I understand, the #Iran|ian leadership knows that if there is a chance for a deal, it is more likely before the midterms than after them. Hence the fast-track packaging of the proposal.
However, in terms of content, there is no change, except for the fact that they say there is already an agreement on Hormuz with Oman on the table that the U.S. can/must accept as a baseline for further negotiations. That's actually the key factor that compresses the timeline, reducing the 30-day window of the MOU to seven days. Apart from that, it is exactly the MOU.
It is also in that context that talk about potential Iranian readiness for nuclear negotiations should be understood. Again, that was exactly the provision of the MOU: to start talking about the nuclear issue after the first phase was implemented and verified.
But beyond the news and announcements, my understanding is that the Iranians already know that the chances of this not being accepted by Trump are much higher than the opposite. So, by doing this, and especially by using the venue of the UNGA, they want to show that they were ready for diplomacy and that it was the United States that, for the third time, decided to attack in the middle of a diplomatic track - something that people within Iran' strategic community have been anticipating over the past few days.
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
Exactly right from @HamidRezaAz
From what I understand, the #Iran|ian leadership knows that if there is a chance for a deal, it is more likely before the midterms than after them. Hence the fast-track packaging of the proposal.
However, in terms of content, there is no change, except for the fact that they say there is already an agreement on Hormuz with Oman on the table that the U.S. can/must accept as a baseline for further negotiations. That's actually the key factor that compresses the timeline, reducing the 30-day window of the MOU to seven days. Apart from that, it is exactly the MOU.
It is also in that context that talk about potential Iranian readiness for nuclear negotiations should be understood. Again, that was exactly the provision of the MOU: to start talking about the nuclear issue after the first phase was implemented and verified.
But beyond the news and announcements, my understanding is that the Iranians already know that the chances of this not being accepted by Trump are much higher than the opposite. So, by doing this, and especially by using the venue of the UNGA, they want to show that they were ready for diplomacy and that it was the United States that, for the third time, decided to attack in the middle of a diplomatic track - something that people within Iran' strategic community have been anticipating over the past few days.
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
👇More details and direct quotes from Mohsen Rezaei’s interview yesterday, with video of the full relevant portion of his interview.
Rezaei lays out in unusually explicit terms what he calls Iran’s “new diplomacy” toward the US, and how it differs from the approach that produced the June Islamabad MOU.
His central message: “We are no longer returning to past diplomacy. We are no longer returning to the situation of Islamabad.”
According to Rezaei, Iran has internally agreed on seven conditions, put them in writing, and conveyed them to Pakistan, Qatar and other intermediaries. Pezeshkian and Araghchi went to New York with instructions to transmit those same terms, not negotiate them down:
“There is no discussion whatsoever that these conditions should change, that a new condition should be removed or added.”
The major change is sequencing. Tehran now insists Washington act first:
“Talk is enough; negotiations are enough; now we must act.”
“If America does not fulfill the conditions, we will neither open the Strait of Hormuz nor is there any negotiation on the table.”
Rezaei says the conditions must be implemented “completely and all at once,” and says the US has been given only “four or five days” to do so. After that, he says, Iran will determine its “next step,” without specifying what that would entail.
Most revealingly, he explicitly describes Iran’s leverage over Hormuz as the guarantee behind this new diplomacy.
“In Islamabad, they had imposed a naval blockade; we had not closed the Strait of Hormuz in this manner at the start of the negotiations. But now, in the new diplomacy, we have a leverage called the Strait of Hormuz. This is the guarantee of the negotiations itself.”
“The Strait of Hormuz is our dignity. The Strait of Hormuz is our authority. The Strait of Hormuz is the tool to reclaim the rights of the Iranian nation.”
He also issued a warning to neighboring states against joining US efforts to restrict Iranian aviation: if they cooperate in preventing Iranian flights, “their airports won't be able to have flights either.”
The broader logic is clear: Tehran is not presenting coercive leverage as an alternative to diplomacy, but as its necessary backstop. The lesson Rezaei draws from the June MOU is that Iran should not agree to a deal and de-escalate first and then rely on Washington to fulfill its commitments. This time, he says, Washington must demonstrate compliance while Iran retains its leverage.
Significant comments today amid UNGA U.S.-Iran diplomacy from Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s top national security body, the Supreme National Security Council.
He says Pezeshkian & Araghchi went to New York to convey Iran’s internally agreed terms, not negotiate new ones: “There has been no discussion of changing the conditions.” Araghchi was tasked with transmitting them through mediators.
Rezaei says Iran won’t return to the diplomacy of the Islamabad ceasefire. He says Washington must first accept Iran’s conditions and has “4–5 days” to act.
The short deadline amounts to an implicit threat of further escalation if it doesn’t.
He also warned neighboring states aiding US pressure on Iranian aviation: block Iranian flights and “your airports will have no flights.”
His message overall is that Tehran is open to diplomacy, but its terms are fixed and US action must come first.
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
سرانجامِ ایران و آمریکا جنگ است یا صلح؟
میز گردی با فرشتهٔ پزشک، حمیدرضا عزیزی و میثم بادامچی
دنیای پساسازمان ملل چه جهانی خواهد بود؟
میز گردی با پگاه بنیهاشمی، آرمان محمودیان و حسام دستپیش
piped.video/live/KF_-Z9sWHlQ…
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In my latest piece for @el_pais, I argue that world leaders talking up multilateralism at UNGA this week rings hollow. Too many governments talk a good game on the @UN while letting it starve. Reviving it takes cash, political capital, and action. english.elpais.com/opinion/2…
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From what I understand, the #Iran|ian leadership knows that if there is a chance for a deal, it is more likely before the midterms than after them. Hence the fast-track packaging of the proposal.
However, in terms of content, there is no change, except for the fact that they say there is already an agreement on Hormuz with Oman on the table that the U.S. can/must accept as a baseline for further negotiations. That's actually the key factor that compresses the timeline, reducing the 30-day window of the MOU to seven days. Apart from that, it is exactly the MOU.
It is also in that context that talk about potential Iranian readiness for nuclear negotiations should be understood. Again, that was exactly the provision of the MOU: to start talking about the nuclear issue after the first phase was implemented and verified.
But beyond the news and announcements, my understanding is that the Iranians already know that the chances of this not being accepted by Trump are much higher than the opposite. So, by doing this, and especially by using the venue of the UNGA, they want to show that they were ready for diplomacy and that it was the United States that, for the third time, decided to attack in the middle of a diplomatic track - something that people within Iran' strategic community have been anticipating over the past few days.
#Tehran appears to believe that a political window is opening in Washington. With the U.S. midterm elections approaching and President Trump facing strong incentives to bring down oil prices, Iran sees an opportunity to test whether economic and political pressure can translate into American flexibility.
But Tehran’s position should not be mistaken for a fundamental strategic retreat. At its core, Iran is still insisting on its key red lines and, in important respects, seeking a return to the framework established in the earlier memorandum of understanding — a framework the Trump administration has since moved away from.
That makes the central question for Washington not simply whether it should accept or reject Iran’s latest proposal. The more consequential question is: What happens the day after Washington says no?
Iranian leaders are also reading the American political calendar. They understand that a major escalation before the midterms could impose significant political and economic costs on the administration, particularly through higher oil and gasoline prices. Trump himself has publicly acknowledged the connection between the Iran conflict, energy prices and the midterm timetable.
If Tehran concludes that Washington wants to avoid a broader confrontation before November, it may decide that escalation, rather than compromise, offers the better path to leverage. The question then becomes whether Iran would move beyond absorbing the economic pressure of the U.S. blockade and take new steps to impose costs on Washington and the global economy, particularly around maritime traffic and energy flows.
The Strait of Hormuz has already become one of Tehran’s principal sources of leverage. Recent negotiations have centered precisely on the tradeoff between reopening the strait and easing the U.S. blockade.
So the administration should evaluate the Iranian proposal against two scenarios, not one. The first is the cost and strategic consequence of accepting a deal that largely revives the previous framework. The second is the likely Iranian response if Washington rejects it.
The real policy question is therefore not only whether Iran’s offer is acceptable. It is whether Washington has a credible strategy for what comes next if it is not.
#IranWar
#iran
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
Packaging is new but what's inside is basically the offer that's been on the table for weeks: It's a return to the MOU, just on a compressed timetable
But the message from both Washington and diplomats in the region has been that Trump isn't interested in returning to the MOU
And the politics of it don't seem hugely beneficial for Trump. It will take more than seven days to implement. Brent would fall, but doubtful it would get gas prices much below $4/gallon before the midterms. Diesel would remain squeezed. Meanwhile he'd take a lot of flak for returning to a deal that was favorable to Iran nytimes.com/2026/09/24/world…
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Told @NYT: Iran’s proposal is tempting for @POTUS; it ends an unpopular war/ brings down energy prices in the run-up the midterms. But it also restores a deal that was largely favorable to the Iranians.
nytimes.com/2026/09/24/world…
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Correction to my earlier post: He does mention the "4–5 days" in another part of the interview:
t.me/iribnews/362887
It wasn't in this video, and I hadn't seen it mentioned elsewhere, hence the confusion. Thanks @SinaToossi for bringing it to the attention.
Significant comments today amid UNGA U.S.-Iran diplomacy from Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s top national security body, the Supreme National Security Council.
He says Pezeshkian & Araghchi went to New York to convey Iran’s internally agreed terms, not negotiate new ones: “There has been no discussion of changing the conditions.” Araghchi was tasked with transmitting them through mediators.
Rezaei says Iran won’t return to the diplomacy of the Islamabad ceasefire. He says Washington must first accept Iran’s conditions and has “4–5 days” to act.
The short deadline amounts to an implicit threat of further escalation if it doesn’t.
He also warned neighboring states aiding US pressure on Iranian aviation: block Iranian flights and “your airports will have no flights.”
His message overall is that Tehran is open to diplomacy, but its terms are fixed and US action must come first.
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Correction: He does mention this in another part of the interview, which I had missed earlier
t.me/iribnews/362887
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
My new @clingendaelorg report, “Disarmament without settlement,” examines Turkey’s Kurdish process.
Against the prevailing view, I argue that domestic rather than regional dynamics drove the process, with authoritarian consolidation as its central aim.
clingendael.org/publication/…
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Hamidreza Azizi retweeted
Interesting. This was widely quoted.
But there are few more precise, incisive Iran analysts than @HamidRezaAz.
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