New pinned tweet, as the links broke for the old one: "Petroleum and Progress in #Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War." cambridge.org/us/academic/su… "The Struggle for #Iran: Oil, Autocracy, and the Cold War, 1951-1954." uncpress.org/book/9781469671…

Over the past decade—particularly following the successive waves of protests that have erupted in Iran since late 2017—there has been fairly intensive discussion of the need to provide Iranian protesters with better tools to overcome internet shutdowns. I am not aware of a single policy paper on destabilizing the Islamic Republic (including my own) that does not address this issue in its recommendations. While the importance of providing Iranian citizens with advanced communications capabilities during protests should certainly not be underestimated, especially in light of the lessons learned from the authorities’ internet shutdowns, we should also be careful not to overstate their potential impact. Ultimately, the experience of recent protest waves has largely demonstrated that the failure to alter the balance of power between the Iranian state and its security and repressive apparatuses, on the one hand, and the protest movement, on the other, is linked to a wide range of factors. These include the cohesion and determination of the state’s institutions, the difficulty of organizing and providing leadership for the various and diverse sectors of Iranian society, and the challenge of mobilizing millions of citizens willing to risk their lives and take to the streets in pursuit of a goal that is exceedingly difficult to achieve. This is particularly true at present, when much of the Iranian public appears to be experiencing despair and frustration following a difficult year marked by two wars and the brutal suppression of protests. The fact that a technological communications solution is repeatedly proposed as the main answer to the Iranian protest movement’s fundamental problems is further evidence of the difficulty in devising an effective strategy for bringing about political change in Iran.

“The plan all week was to throw whatever spaghetti they had at the wall by today,” said one of the people familiar with the discussion who was granted anonymity to describe private discussions with the administration. Result: no decision, but still pressure to do something. politico.com/news/2026/09/25…

Reading Eurasia Groups summary of Xi's state visit. Imagine telling someone in 2017 or 2018 that Trump would be the most China-dovish President we'd see for the rest of our lives.

Iran’s nuclear debate, once quiet or behind the scenes, has burst in the open. Iran officials say nuclear doctrine hasn’t changed but warn it may. Our latest. wsj.com/world/middle-east/in…

Notable

It was very popular, had very high production values, was generally well acted and well written for the first four seasons of its run, but by no reasonable measurement could Game of Thrones be regarded as "among the best TV shows of the last quarter century."

Ali Khamenei became Supreme Leader lacking an independent base of power within the system--as a result, he had to share power with influential opponents like Rafsanjani. His solution was to steer more money, influence, and patronage toward the guards, building them into a bulwark for his position and that of his ideological allies. Will Mojtaba attempt something similar, through Taeb and the Basij? Necessarily early days, but the dynamic is an interesting one to consider.

Tbh if we're looking for a precedent, might be the late 17th century and the relative retreat of Ottoman power over the Gulf in the face of Safavid and Portuguese influence.

I think @HamidRezaAz nails it (once again). The leadership is prepared to negotiate; they perceive an opportunity to reach a deal before mid-terms; they see little reason to alter their negotiating position; and their read is that the US will likely not go for this proposal. This is about establishment a credible basis to negotiate *at some point.* If they can get a deal now, great. If it only becomes possible after more time/pressure/calculated escalation, fine.

Details of Iran's offer--fleshed out today during Aragchi/Pezeshkian meeting with press and analysts--align with its negotiating position over the last several weeks. US must return to MOU, end blockade, release frozen funds, end Israel war in S Lebanon. In exchange, Iran will open Hormuz (on terms established with Oman). It will also enter nuclear negotiations (again, something stipulated in the MOU). Iran is offering to make this happen quickly, in a 7 day period, provided US reciprocates.

Iran is fairly certain Trump will escalate after the mid-terms, which is why the most they will consider is a "phased" approach where the US drops the blockade and releases some frozen funds, in exchange Iran "opens" the strait and holds off on tolls.reuters.com/world/asia-pacif…

Brent spiking to $108 per barrel, as the sell-off earlier this week fades amid contradictory reports on East-West pipeline, popping physical prices, and gloomy prospects for US-Iran de escalation.

Both sides have competing incentives when it comes to the mid-terms, muddied by inchoate understandings of the other sides motivations. This might ultimately encourage both to do what they are currently doing--namely, try to ride out the current standoff until the elections are in the rear view.

Why is it filled with children

Military and security leadership continue to heap praise publicly on the president, as ultra-hardliners criticize recent efforts to re-engage with the US.