Xi Jinping is in Washington and meets Trump today, September 24. The proposed $14 billion Taiwan arms package has been held up for months, and Trump explicitly described it after his May meeting with Xi as a "very good negotiating chip." Reuters reports that Xi is expected today to press Trump to halt U.S. arms sales to Taiwan altogether.
If Trump does China’s bidding, he may be setting us on a course toward direct conflict with China. Beijing may perceive an increasingly favorable opportunity: a persuadable and transactional president; U.S. stocks of critical munitions already inadequate for a prolonged conflict and further depleted by the war with Iran; a U.S. Navy numerically smaller than China’s and burdened by maintenance delays, inadequate shipbuilding and repair capacity, and the enormous logistical difficulties of sustaining a war across the western Pacific; and a country distracted by a war of choice in the Middle East.
But Trump may already be inclined to let Taiwan be taken with minimal American response. When Xi reportedly asked him in May whether the United States would defend Taiwan if China attacked, Trump declined to answer, while saying that the last thing America needed was another distant war.
This would be a problem. China would have broken through the first island chain, greatly improving its ability to project military power into the western Pacific. TSMC would be destroyed, captured, or blockaded, critically threatening global access to advanced semiconductors. China would not simply inherit a functioning semiconductor industry either: it would remain dependent on a global supply chain that includes ASML’s lithography systems, Western chip designs, specialized materials, software, and technical expertise. The disruption would extend far beyond semiconductors: the Taiwan Strait is one of the world’s most important commercial shipping routes, with roughly 44% of the global container fleet transiting it.
Our allies in East Asia would have reason to question the credibility of American security guarantees, potentially strengthening arguments in countries such as Japan and South Korea for developing their own nuclear deterrents. North Korea could also conclude that American attention and military resources had been diverted and that U.S. extended deterrence had become less credible, increasing the danger of opportunistic aggression on the Korean Peninsula.
The damage to deterrence would extend beyond East Asia. If China successfully changed the regional order through military force while the United States stood aside, other revisionist states could reasonably reassess both the credibility of American security commitments and the costs of using force to achieve their objectives.
Trump, hardly the bastion of wisdom on geopolitics, may commit us to an unbearable folly: weakening deterrence against a revanchist power seeking a vastly stronger position in the Pacific, thereby increasing the risk of precisely the war he presumably wants to avoid, but may, in the end, be forced to fight because of the dire consequences of a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. And if deterrence fails, we could find ourselves in an open conflict between the world’s two most powerful states, both armed with nuclear weapons.
His transactionalism may end up killing us all.