Have you seen it ?! 🦖 Dinos now have their DEX! $VOXEGLD token is live too, an interest-bearing liquid staking token representing EGLD staked via @TheDinoVox 🚀 Fully tracked on e-Compass! 🧭

Predix is now live for public testing on devnet🟢 Create markets. Trade outcomes. Earn as a creator. → Launch a market with just 1 $EGLD → 2–4 outcome markets → Continuous probability pricing (CPMM) → Buy, sell & hold positions → Creators earn % of all trading volume In this Prediction Market, every trade, position and outcome lives on @MultiversX. Nothing depends on a private entity. The data is fully on-chain. No custody. No backend. No servers. Have a prediction? Create a market. Have conviction? Trade it.

Update: Mainnet will remain paused overnight as we prepare the next recovery window. Today’s restart did not complete because the allotted window was too short for enough Shard 1 validators to synchronize and transition into the new epoch alongside the rest of the network. An epoch change occurred during the attempt, so we are updating and testing the recovery software to account for that transition. We aim to make the updated release available tomorrow afternoon UTC, Thursday, September 24, followed by a longer activation window, tentatively 8–12 hours. This will give validators more time to upgrade and synchronize, with the next restart attempt expected within that window. These timings remain tentative, subject to successful testing and validator readiness. We will communicate confirmed timing and issue a separate all-clear once recovery is complete. Please continue to wait for the all-clear: do not submit or rebroadcast transactions, or use EGLD and ESDT deposit and withdrawal routes through exchanges or bridges. We know the continued wait is difficult for everyone affected. Thank you for your patience and support, and to our validators and partners for their sustained commitment throughout the recovery. We are working together to bring the network back online safely.

I got tired of watching people announce opposite views from the same repo. Reading the code is useful. Running it is better. So I turn up a private local chain and tested the off switch myself. Two doors. The local command is dead on mainnet. 404. The gossip path still works, one signed message stopped a node. Then it stopped three. That is not what halted mainnet on Sep 19. I was in the validator chat. Operators stopped their own machines by hand. The switch existing and the switch being pressed are different claims. @Justin_Bons was right that it exists. @SasuRobert was right about the channel, and wrong that there is no off switch. @vinibarbosabr already put the files on the table. I pressed the button to verify it all... @MultiversX @CodeMultiversX

After carefully reviewing yesterday’s logs, our engineering team confirmed that the recovery hard fork completed successfully. It does not need to be repeated. Validators are now upgrading and synchronizing for the coordinated restart. Please continue to wait for the separate all-clear before submitting transactions. Thank you to our validators, partners and everyone standing with us through these difficult days. We keep building, together.

we need some new code. we need to review, audit, verify and test it. the developers are on. we are working. preparing a new release. but it will remain pending for tonight. We are preparing a new release for the next recovery attempt. An epoch change occurred during today’s attempt, so we need to test recovery across that epoch change before proceeding. we thought there would be quorum on all shards before epoch change, shard 1 missed that window. coding, testing, coding, testing.

📣 MAINNET HARD-FORK Upgrade v2.1.3.0 We are upgrading the MAINNET! Version v2.1.3.0 is out. ℹ️ This release implements the Mainnet recovery hard fork, using the recovery checkpoint at round 33384826, corresponding to September 19, 2026, at 06:37 UTC. It also includes additional security hardening and improvements. 📅 No activation flags. Upgrade instructions 👇

so to not create any confusion, people can accuse whatever they want. all the AI said update folder is dead code. some sync files were moved, as they are used in epoch start process. and everything required, so that this should not be in a discussion anymore. if anyone wants more confirmation that it was not used, it can ask any of the validators for logs. or if he had nodes, observers or anything it is ultimate proof that it was not used. technically the ultimate proof is that at the p2p messaging layer, any kind of message constructed with this old legacy code would be dropped by the validators. this is not done to erase traces or whatever, as some might try to twist in that direction, it is a totally sincere response, to clean up any kind of confusions. p.s. on other chains from configs, they can blacklist / whitelist addresses, transactions, and more crazy configs exist out there. every such config can be written by the validator as he wants. and those chains are decentralised too. it is not like node level hardcoded things which respond to a central command, not even on those other chains. this is for total transparency, this code will not enter in todays restart, as it needs internal testing and the whole release procedure. but it is prepared in a PR and it will get in as soon as possible.

EGLD has been totally exposed for its lies & hidden centralization today! ⚠️ 3 days of downtime is only the tip of the iceberg: 76M EGLD (2.5x supply) was minted & partially sold! EGLD did not halt; the foundation used an off-switch! All consequences of its reckless design! 🧵 Unlike a normal chain halt, where the chain stops due to a "consensus failure/disagreement", this was far, far worse. Instead of the chain stopping because an "inflation bug" caused consensus to fail, it kept going... That is what allowed the hacker to actually send their EGLD into exchanges & cause considerable harm. What comes next is even more unbelievable. As I was wondering how it was even possible to shut down a chain with 3k validators in 66min... That is what made me uncover the next bombshell: There is a literal foundation-controlled off-switch in the code!!! The Off-Switch Every mainnet node runs with a hard-fork trigger enabled that listens for a message signed by one specific public key. That is a remote stop switch held by the Foundation! We cannot know for sure if they pressed that switch, but it is highly unlikely they could have stopped the chain that quickly otherwise & the fact that it even exists is bad enough! This is all a direct consequence of the shortcuts they had to make to bring a sharded chain down to 600ms... Reckless Design Sharding comes with certain trade-offs: EGLD claimed to overcome these trade-offs through its unique design. Turns out, in reality, those trade-offs had some extreme consequences we are feeling now: EGLD sharding splits every transfer into a sender-shard debit & a destination-shard credit that must be reconciled by hand, & on one path the credit had no debit: a money printer. With no global supply invariant, finality before execution, & no protocol-level freeze, the only fix was manually shutting down the chain & a hard fork erasing the "final" history! Lack of Disclosure Given what I just explained, you can judge for yourself whether the team's disclosure is adequate. I argue it absolutely was not. The fourth screenshot shows their communication on the matter so far & exactly what they failed to mention Including the mint, the hackers' success & the off-switch! The fact that it took my own chain & code analysis to reach these conclusions tells us the team cared more about minimizing PR damage than properly disclosing the incident. At least with this piece out, they will not be able to get away with that anymore & will have to also include this information in their report The community deserves to know what is really going on, how centralized EGLD really is & how the tech is not a magical panacea but instead comes with serious trade-offs Chain Analysis The record is clear, all on a public chain for all to see. The attacker exploited this vulnerability in the chain & managed to mint 76M EGLD! Over 2.5x the supply! Along with 430M bridged USDC, about 430M bridged USDT & 5,540 bridged WBTC... The hacker then proceeded to split these into 16 wallet addresses & then send EGLD to multiple exchanges. If we look at the timing of when these exchanges "froze" EGLD, we see that MEXC did not act in time & it perfectly corresponds with very suspicious selling activity on that exchange, which was not even arbitraged out when the full freeze took effect. We cannot tell whether the hacker managed to exit the exchange afterward, but they certainly could have! Which means the hacker was likely able to walk away with around $1M USD, effectively defrauding the exchange in the proccess, by leveraging this EGLD vulnerability Please look at the visuals, as they provide all of the supporting evidence that can also be independently verified with publicly available information Conclusion This is BTC's 2010 inflation bug & ETH's 2016 DAO's hack rolled into one. That this all happened in 2026 is even more embarrassing Unlike those historic failures, there was no full disclosure of the problem as it was happening. People deserve to know; we are blowing the lid off this story now! This is also nothing like SOL's historic downtime, which involved network halts caused by bugs. Something that has happened in over two years. While EGLD managed to beat SOL in total downtime with this single incident! SOL also never ever had an off switch! The irony & I apologize; some degree of schadenfreude cannot be helped in my situation. As the EGLD community was one of the loudest spreading that false narrative. Turns out it was unknowingly a projection! The biggest red flag is still the team itself, after my fallout with EGLD last year. The toxicity & dishonesty became too much to bear This will likely trigger another ad hominem campaign against me, as it did last time & as it did for other influencers/journalists/thinkers. Fortunatly, I am specialized in weathering the storm. While these facts are undeniable & mostly speak for themselves EGLD certainly has some good technology; we can learn something from everyone. However, what we saw here over the last few days is beyond the pale That's where the value lies: In also understanding the character of a chain's leadership, especially at an early stage, as even with decentralized governance, bad leadership can still mess it all up! This is a truly worst-case scenario for a blockchain; there are very few examples of this level of collapse in blockchain history. After such an event, we have to question the competence & the wisdom of the underlying design choices EGLD's design is flawed & reckless, making centralization trade-offs other chains would never even dream of. All while claiming to be holier-than-thou It is never too late to change our minds in the face of new evidence; please study the supporting visuals for yourself. The truth cannot be credibly denied What occurred here is undeniable, while the silence of EGLD's leadership speaks louder than words: 🎓

EGLD has been totally exposed for its lies & hidden centralization today! ⚠️ 3 days of downtime is only the tip of the iceberg: 76M EGLD (2.5x supply) was minted & partially sold! EGLD did not halt; the foundation used an off-switch! All consequences of its reckless design! 🧵 Unlike a normal chain halt, where the chain stops due to a "consensus failure/disagreement", this was far, far worse. Instead of the chain stopping because an "inflation bug" caused consensus to fail, it kept going... That is what allowed the hacker to actually send their EGLD into exchanges & cause considerable harm. What comes next is even more unbelievable. As I was wondering how it was even possible to shut down a chain with 3k validators in 66min... That is what made me uncover the next bombshell: There is a literal foundation-controlled off-switch in the code!!! The Off-Switch Every mainnet node runs with a hard-fork trigger enabled that listens for a message signed by one specific public key. That is a remote stop switch held by the Foundation! We cannot know for sure if they pressed that switch, but it is highly unlikely they could have stopped the chain that quickly otherwise & the fact that it even exists is bad enough! This is all a direct consequence of the shortcuts they had to make to bring a sharded chain down to 600ms... Reckless Design Sharding comes with certain trade-offs: EGLD claimed to overcome these trade-offs through its unique design. Turns out, in reality, those trade-offs had some extreme consequences we are feeling now: EGLD sharding splits every transfer into a sender-shard debit & a destination-shard credit that must be reconciled by hand, & on one path the credit had no debit: a money printer. With no global supply invariant, finality before execution, & no protocol-level freeze, the only fix was manually shutting down the chain & a hard fork erasing the "final" history! Lack of Disclosure Given what I just explained, you can judge for yourself whether the team's disclosure is adequate. I argue it absolutely was not. The fourth screenshot shows their communication on the matter so far & exactly what they failed to mention Including the mint, the hackers' success & the off-switch! The fact that it took my own chain & code analysis to reach these conclusions tells us the team cared more about minimizing PR damage than properly disclosing the incident. At least with this piece out, they will not be able to get away with that anymore & will have to also include this information in their report The community deserves to know what is really going on, how centralized EGLD really is & how the tech is not a magical panacea but instead comes with serious trade-offs Chain Analysis The record is clear, all on a public chain for all to see. The attacker exploited this vulnerability in the chain & managed to mint 76M EGLD! Over 2.5x the supply! Along with 430M bridged USDC, about 430M bridged USDT & 5,540 bridged WBTC... The hacker then proceeded to split these into 16 wallet addresses & then send EGLD to multiple exchanges. If we look at the timing of when these exchanges "froze" EGLD, we see that MEXC did not act in time & it perfectly corresponds with very suspicious selling activity on that exchange, which was not even arbitraged out when the full freeze took effect. We cannot tell whether the hacker managed to exit the exchange afterward, but they certainly could have! Which means the hacker was likely able to walk away with around $1M USD, effectively defrauding the exchange in the proccess, by leveraging this EGLD vulnerability Please look at the visuals, as they provide all of the supporting evidence that can also be independently verified with publicly available information Conclusion This is BTC's 2010 inflation bug & ETH's 2016 DAO's hack rolled into one. That this all happened in 2026 is even more embarrassing Unlike those historic failures, there was no full disclosure of the problem as it was happening. People deserve to know; we are blowing the lid off this story now! This is also nothing like SOL's historic downtime, which involved network halts caused by bugs. Something that has happened in over two years. While EGLD managed to beat SOL in total downtime with this single incident! SOL also never ever had an off switch! The irony & I apologize; some degree of schadenfreude cannot be helped in my situation. As the EGLD community was one of the loudest spreading that false narrative. Turns out it was unknowingly a projection! The biggest red flag is still the team itself, after my fallout with EGLD last year. The toxicity & dishonesty became too much to bear This will likely trigger another ad hominem campaign against me, as it did last time & as it did for other influencers/journalists/thinkers. Fortunatly, I am specialized in weathering the storm. While these facts are undeniable & mostly speak for themselves EGLD certainly has some good technology; we can learn something from everyone. However, what we saw here over the last few days is beyond the pale That's where the value lies: In also understanding the character of a chain's leadership, especially at an early stage, as even with decentralized governance, bad leadership can still mess it all up! This is a truly worst-case scenario for a blockchain; there are very few examples of this level of collapse in blockchain history. After such an event, we have to question the competence & the wisdom of the underlying design choices EGLD's design is flawed & reckless, making centralization trade-offs other chains would never even dream of. All while claiming to be holier-than-thou It is never too late to change our minds in the face of new evidence; please study the supporting visuals for yourself. The truth cannot be credibly denied What occurred here is undeniable, while the silence of EGLD's leadership speaks louder than words: 🎓

Update: The recovery hard fork has passed testing on an internal test network, and Mainnet recovery checkpoints have been prepared. We are testing a simpler recovery procedure for validators, while preparations continue for rehearsals on Testnet and Devnet. In parallel, we are coordinating next steps with validators, exchanges and infrastructure partners. Mainnet remains paused. Please wait for the all-clear: do not submit or rebroadcast transactions, or use EGLD and ESDT deposit and withdrawal routes through exchanges or bridges. We will share further updates as confirmed milestones are reached. Thank you for your patience and continued support.

Solid progress made securing the situation. 1. The incident is contained. Fund are safe. In coordination with major global exchanges, the attacker’s accounts have been identified, seized and frozen. Specialized law enforcement is now engaged, and the attacker will face the consequences of his actions. 2. The fix is prepared. The team has defined the mission-critical path to recovery. It is now being rigorously tested and, once cleared, will be executed over the next 1–2 days. This is a moment to stand together. Supernova speed and experience return to full force soon. Forward.