I've been thinking a lot recently about what narratives could modify the euphoric investing landscape to a more moderate or even bearish one. Simply put I think it goes like this: Narrative 1: "We cant spend this much anymore" collides with Narrative 2: "They wont let us spend this much anymore" 1 is a markets narrative, 2 is a political narrative

so event funds are really blown out of all their global equity positions because of rates... feel like they could have done a better job managing/hedging their int. rate risk and leverage around tight spreads.. jeez

I just finished reading the full court decision in this poison pill injunction case (3D Investment Partners v Toho HD). It makes for very interesting reading and is major victory for shareholders. That said, there are some limits to its broader application due to the facts of the case. The court is also a first-instance court, so we need to see what happens when the company appeals. The biggest question the case raises to my mind, is whether all non-emergency takeover defence measures can be enjoined if there is no intention on the part of the acquiror to take control of the company? (provided of course that the shareholder is engaging appropriately with the company). Or, will a court take the view that the shareholder began acquiring knowing the measures were in place, therefore cannot seek to have them set aside after the fact? Key quotes from the decision (machine translated): "at least in this case, it is not appropriate to conclude that the common interests of shareholders have been harmed by the acquisition of debtor shares by creditors, etc., based solely on a resolution of the shareholders' meeting." [based on the reasoning that because the acquiror had promised not to acquire more than 27% control was not involved. The company needed to show shareholder interests risked actual harm, it was not enough that shareholders approved the defence measures. For similar reasons, the acquisition was not "coercive" in nature] The company claimed 3D's requests and suggestions regarding its management harm the common interests of shareholders: The court said that 3D's proposals were quite: "ordinary proposals from institutional investors seeking to improve capital efficiency, and cannot be considered to be aimed at pursuing their own interests at the expense of the common interests of shareholders, nor can the other proposals themselves be said to be unreasonable." The court also looked at 3D's behaviour in the Fuji Soft deal, determining that it did not act in a way where its interests were different to other shareholders, so there was no evidence of past behaviour showing detriment to the common interests of shareholders. This could distinguish 3D's record from that of other activists, where the activists have previously participated as LP's in take-private transactions where they have a significant public shareholding. This could be viewed as the activists having different interests in the transaction vs those of the other shareholders.

The Internet Needs Crypto to Survive AI: youtube.com/watch?v=TKVY4hVA… One of the most exciting, and underrated, developments in crypto atm revolves around this @Bankless conversation with @eastdakota of @Cloudflare. ~20% of all websites are routed through Cloudflare, and in this conversation Matthew tells us that the business model of the Web is under attack. To put it simply, agentic traffic is exploding, and agents don't click on ads, but ads underpin much of the "free" stuff we get online. The infrastructure is creaking under agent load. Matthew's assertion is that microtransactions, at a scale not previously seen, will be needed to pay for access to content, as the advertising model of the Web falls apart with agents. Crypto people have talked about microtransactions forever, but it was for people, which never worked, whereas we're now contemplating it for agents. He says Cloudflare handles ~500M requests per second, and that 1-10% of those requests may be suitable for this microtransaction model. A blockchain environment is the only payment network that could theoretically handle this scale, and it would need to hit 5-50M TPS. 5-50M TPS in prod dwarfs anything yet attempted in crypto, and is far beyond anything TradFi can handle. There are very few blockchain environments that could conceivably provide this throughput. Just as important as the scale, is the model and trust assumptions. While Cloudflare may roll this out as a solution for its customers first, what's implicit here is the potential for an entirely new business model for the Web. If Cloudflare walks this path, I hope that what they build has permissionless validation, allowing for anyone to audit the network. Cloudflare has been a torch bearer for the open Internet, and so it only follows that if they're to pioneer a new business model for the Web, that the architecture be an open network. Doing so will engender the most trust, goodwill, and adoption in the long run. Web 3.0 is dead, long live Web 3.0.

2000年代初めに横行したポイズンピル。2025年以降、PBR1倍以下の上場企業経営に対して営業熱心な製薬会社のすすめでポイズンピルは再び流行気味だった。2026年5月より「30%ルール」(原則30%以上保有して買いましたらTOB)が金商法で改正されたが、実態としてポイズンピルは経営者が好きなレベルで、嫌いだったりうるさい株主に対して買い増しを抑制するツール。これが今後抑制される。使いづらくなる。実は製薬会社は、「支配権」という言葉を使いたい。なぜかというと、「支配権」という言葉が出た瞬間、会社の「有事」となり、支配権が焦点となる中、アセマネ勢も（多分）自社の制定した議決権行使基準の範囲外となり、グラスルイスやISSなど議決権助言会社のアドバイスに頼りがち。助言会社も「支配権」（実際20%だからあんま関係ない）というロジックの中、株主を超厳しく判断する。そんな支配権言いがかりアービトラージが横行していた中、東京裁判所は、「いやいやTOBルールあるやん。支配権問題は30%からやろ」と金商法のアップデートにより製薬会社・上場企業経営に一石が投じられた形

There is very little investment case for minority investing in Japan equities at the moment. Outside of shareholder activism and M&A related delisting, its really hard to see any upside anymore

Leopold wanted to buy galaxies...

This could be a HUGE boost to Japan's governance reforms, with potentially big implications for M&A Japan eyes tax breaks for non-core business sales in governance reform push, sources say reuters.com/world/japan-eyes…

this dog might have a crystal ball home.treasury.gov/news/press…

Situational Awareness LP reports 5.99% stake in Taiyo Yuden, ..obligated to report stake within six business days of June 29, 2026 Absolutely incredible to have chased Japan MLCC to unsustainable fundamental levels and likely get stopped out weeks later. What a joke.

Hi-Lex Corporation (7279, ~US$600m market cap) is an interesting activist case study. Three activist / engagement firms have been engaged with the company in recent times - Lim Advisors, Japan Catalyst (Monex), and most recently Zennor. The company historically had a strong position in auto control cables with high global market shares (mechanical cables for auto transmissions, popping your trunk, pulling on the park brake). This business is rapidly dying as everything goes electric. The company has pivoted into the equivalent electrics, but it does not have the same market positions, it is up against stronger competitors such as Aisin, and as a result this business has not generated much in the way of profitability. The market cap is basically covered by the net cash and listed equity holdings on the balance sheet, in companies such as Honda Motor and Asahi Intecc. Theoretically, the company does not have to listen to the activists. The shareholder register is 43-45% controlled by the founding family and other aligned shareholders. This is an unassailable voting bloc. That said, perhaps in response to public activist pressure - or perhaps due to business realities, the company has in recent times sold half its Asahi Intecc stake, and has announced it will focus more on profitability - including restructuring its factory footprint. This is a messy situation. Obviously cheap, uncertain business prospects, an entrenched management that can only be influenced - not pushed. From the management's perspective, they need to pivot to continue as a going concern, and this requires investment. From shareholders' perspective, why waste another dollar of investment on a business that does not, and may not ever realise an economic return, when your own stock trades at 0.4x book? Such a valuation implies that any $1 invested, immediately loses 60% of its value. For me, this situation is too hard. We like plenty of liquid assets, which Hi-Lex has in droves - as well as a cheap valuation relative to book equity and on adjusted EV / EBITDA. But, we also want positive and stable cash flows, low risk of business disruption, and a shareholder register composition that means management cannot ignore outside shareholders. What do you think - would you buy this stock? After all, it is trading for only around the value of the cash and investment securities on its balance sheet!

this whole podcast was really good, worth a listen for anyone interested in investing in Japan

I can be be somewhat bearish on Japan value at times (and I have my reasons)….but this is the main thesis for staying in this space…. and the momentum here is now irreversible. I am looking forward to a future of many many public delistings (at higher prices)

what it feels like scrolling through this AI slop wasteland that hits hard post US close and after the Japan open youtube.com/watch?v=N4eVHjTk…

Non Japan special situation that I came across recently (due to a minor Japanese connection where there some Japanese funded sale-leaseback transactions on ship assets..) CTRM US $19m market cap with $200m of cash and a 74% (fully owned) stake in a listed German asset manager worth €135m. Dilutive Series D prefs owned by another listed co (TORO) convert at $7 and/or the trailing 5 day VWAP. Very large potential dilution so this seems like a no go... (diluted count of 56.5m shrs against current 9.6m shrs) but even fully diluted... would still be around 0.19x book. Main holding MPC is listed (MPCK GY; FY2026 guidance €45-50m revenue and €25-30m EBT), so its a real company and CTRM owns 74% through (wholly owned) Thalvora. MPC is consolidated and dividends do not reach CTRM shareholders for a variety of reasons. These dry bulk shippers (with connections to Cypurs) are notoriously un-investible and have insane dilutive and overly complex structures that have likely led to severe losses for unsuspecting retail investors. Probably still the case here but if there is any chance they use the excess cash for Series D redemption, or merge with TORO, the re rating would be severe. TLDR; The structure is awful, and mgmt fully owns all of the super voting shares, so there is literally nothing an activist could do here.... but huge upside potential with certain catalysts. Maybe one to keep on the radar (AI generated EVENT calendar attached)

a little early on this one, but wow that worked out well. cheap asymmetric vol trades with zero engagement is the zone

lots of naughty risk managers out there hiding behind the mask of "fundamental l/s". This is absolutely staggering "Asia-focused fundamental long-short funds are down 18.6% on average this month through July 28, Goldman Sachs said in a prime brokerage note sent to clients last week."