Pezeshkian's cabinet meetings right now

I'm going to try something new - Here is a look at the biggest stories in Iran in the past week as viewed from its different competing media ecosystems (Establishment State Line, Reformists, Paydari, Different Opposition Groups). No matter where you personally stand, I think it's interesting to see how each faction interprets the same country in the same week very differently. PART I - BIGGEST STORIES Depending on which ecosystem you subscribe to, the biggest story of the week was: - Diplomacy to end the war - The economy - Hamid Rasaei going to prison - University and retiree protests - Continued executions - Military battles over the Strait of Hormuz - The return of diaspora artists like Bijan Mortazavi - Gholamreza Jalali's smartwatch - Unrest in Baloochestan In almost every case, the topics are directly related to the war, which continues to hang over all life. PART II - REFORMIST MEDIA 1 - The biggest focus in the reformist media continued to be whether diplomacy could be used to end the war. - Can the Islamabad MOU be salvaged? - Can Iran escape this prolonged “neither war nor peace” situation? - Is an imperfect compromise better than another round of fighting? - How much longer can the economy function under sanctions and constant military uncertainty? The underlying argument was that no agreement is perfect but diplomacy is legitimate and honorable. Those undermining diplomacy are, whether intentionally or not, in the camp of the enemy. 2 - Related to the war were the extraordinarily horrid numbers showing the declining state of the economy: - Almost 90% point-to-point inflation - Over 70% 12-month inflation - The toman to dollar exchange rate surpassing 270,000 Foreign policy & the economy are increasingly the same topic. 3 - The reformist media was gleeful about Hamid Rasaei's imprisonment because he had been one of the loudest voices for imprisoning his political opponents for years. The official line was basically: “We should not celebrate anyone going to prison.” But the cheerfulness underneath could not be missed. There were lots of old videos of him talking about Evin, political prisoners, and punishment being recirculated. Additionally, there was clearly a sense of relief at Ghalibaf finally putting a leash on the extremists. PART III - ESTABLISHMENT MEDIA 1 - The biggest emphasis in the establishment/state media was on the war, preserving Iranian leverage in negotiations through the Strait of Hormuz, and national security. There is some discussion of diplomacy too, but it was looked at through the lens of leverage and distrust. The idea was not, “How do we reach an agreement now?” and much more, “What do we give up by making an agreement now?” Again and again one saw the suggestion that opening the Strait prematurely (and in this ecosystem the Strait is strongly viewed as closed) would surrender one of Iran's strongest remaining bargaining tools. 2 - Through significant efforts by Pezeshkian's Ministry of Culture, diaspora LA singer Bijan Mortazavi returned to Iran after lots of contradictory reports and his own initial denial. His return follows other high profile cases involving artists who spent significant time abroad, most notably Mohsen Namjoo. From the administration's perspective, this was a signal that expatriate Iranians can return home & that old disputes could now be put aside in the face of national unity in the context of the war. Curiously, IRIB completely went against this. State television aired a report questioning whether artists like Mortazavi and Namjoo should be allowed to return “without regret” and “without paying a price” for their previous political statements. IRIB called for judicial review of their previous activities, and domestic coverage widely interpreted the message as a demand that returning artists be tried or punished. The report also pretty directly put Fatemeh Motamed Arya and Asghar Farhadi on notice because of their previous political positions. So there is a very interesting contradiction here: One part of the state is encouraging diaspora Iranians to come back in the name of national unity. Another part is basically saying: fine, but why should they be allowed to come back without answering for what they previously said? The latter "interrogator-reporter" group are a minority and loathed across the board, but have a large lobby in IRIB (which is why the reformists & Ghalibaf wing believe the head of the IRIB, who is connected to the Paydaris, needs to be sacked) PART IV - PAYDARI / ULTRA-HARDLINER MEDIA 1 - In Paydari world, the biggest story was Rasaei's imprisonment. However this was shown in a much different light - as a coup by certain factions against the righteous revolutionaries. In one particularly belligerent article in RajaNews, Meysam Nili went as far as invoking the language of a “coup” by the heads of the three branches. There was also a large campaign demanding Rasaei's release, which RajaNews reported had received around 70,000 signatures within 24 hours. The basic argument was that someone who had consistently defended the revolution and exposed corruption was now being punished by the very institutions he defended. 2 - This connected to a much broader anger toward Pezeshkian and the direction of the government. In this media ecosystem, compromise is increasingly being portrayed not simply as bad policy but as weakness in the middle of an existential war. The underlying argument: "Iran paid an enormous cost to obtain leverage during the war. Why should Pezeshkian now give that leverage away through negotiations?" This is also why the fight over Hormuz is particularly intense here. What reformists describe as diplomacy, Paydari figures are much more likely to describe as surrendering gains that were achieved through blood. 3 - The Gholamreza Jalali smartwatch controversy was extensively covered in this ecosystem (as it was in the others). Jalali is a Brigadier General in the IRGC and has been the head of Iran's Passive Defense Organization since 2005. This organization is charged with defending Iranian infrastructure (particularly the armed forces and critical industries) from cyber threats and electronic, nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare. A photo was published of him wearing a foreign smartwatch. This is a mind boggling risk for such a high ranking person - who is one of the top people responsible for protecting Iran from cyber threats - wearing an easily hackable electronic device ... in the midst of a war by technologically superior foes known for taking advantage of these lapses. Not only was the picture real, but when the controversy went viral and State TV asked him about it Jalali doubled down & defended himself, saying some nonsense about most citizens having smart TVs at home. This story spread among all other groups too but was particularly discussed in the Paydari sphere. PART V - OPPOSITION MEDIA 1 - Opposition media out emphasis on different events. One big story covered was renewed student protests (now that university students are back from summer break). The largest was at Allameh Tabatabai University, where students protested a combination of: - Rising tuition - Dormitory conditions - Food - Inflation - Compulsory hijab - Political repression - Imprisoned students The slogans quickly went beyond campus welfare issues. There were chants against inflation, compulsory hijab and repression, demands to free imprisoned students, and the slogan “Neither barracks nor business, long live the university.” More importantly, Allameh was not an isolated event. At Alzahra University, student activists reported that around 150 students had been prevented from entering campus, in many cases allegedly without formal disciplinary rulings. At the Tehran University of Art, 30 students reportedly received suspensions of between two and four semesters. There were also reports of students being prevented from entering Khaje Nasir Toosi University, along with food related protests at other universities. Opposition media focused heavily on the political slogans and repression. Establishment friendly coverage was much more likely to focus on tuition, food and dormitory complaints or accuse opposition outlets of exaggerating what happened (there were also lots of mocking of the students as spoiled for making a big deal about fairly decent food portions). 2 - Executions (particularly of detained protesters from the Jan protests) continued to be one of the largest stories in the opposition media ecosystem. The difference here is not just volume but framing. In state media, executions are generally presented individually through the alleged crimes the person was convicted of. Opposition outlets present them as a continuing campaign of state repression & in each case, dispute the official narrative or that is was a fair trial. 3 - The economy is obviously also enormous in opposition media. The war is generally presented as something the Islamic Republic brought upon the country and which is now making an already disastrous economic situation worse. 4 - The diplomatic story is also viewed almost completely differently. Where reformists ask whether the Islamabad MOU can be saved, opposition media is much more skeptical of the entire premise. Trump rejecting Tehran's proposal received significant attention. So did Reza Pahlavi arguing that Iran should pursue access to frozen Iranian assets rather than another agreement with the Islamic Republic. 5 - There continued to be some opposition coverage on Yashar Soltani's reporting on the oil trustees (this was heavily covered by reformist media earlier). Opposition outlets amplified it as evidence of systemic corruption and the existence of a shadow economic structure benefiting politically connected people. Tasnim, meanwhile, described Soltani's reporting as a “suspicious project.” PART VI - OTHER NOTEWORTHY STORIES There were also several stories that received a lot of attention in one corner of Iranian media but almost none elsewhere. 1 - Baloochestan The IRGC announced an operation near Rask in which it said two militants were killed and a Starlink terminal and weapons were captured. One thing that stood out was how strongly the IRGC emphasized that Abdolraouf Eshaqi, the Guardsman allegedly killed by this group, was himself Balooch and Sunni. That is clearly relevant to the government's effort to reject the idea that the conflict there is simply a Shia/Persian government fighting a Sunni/Balooch population. At the same time, Molavi Abdolhamid gave a sermon saying that the economy had effectively been abandoned and that an ethnic or religious government cannot successfully govern Iran. He called for major changes to national policy and for a system that goes beyond ethnicity and religion. He also again raised the issue of justice for the victims of Bloody Friday. 2 - Retiree protests Retirees continued their protests in Ahvaz. This is not an unusual thing & these are some of the most common, reoccurring protests in the country. As inflation continues to go up, retirees have a massive loss in purchasing power. The one thing that caught my eye was, beyond the standard slogans, one protest chant that said, “Enough warmongering, our table is empty.” The Trump admin is clearly aiming at using economic pressure to get people to push the government to make concessions. Here was one small case where that push was happening. It shouldn't be overstated (again these protests are pretty common) but these issues being stated in those ways & where the blame was being put, was noteworthy. 3 - There were also a number of smaller labor and provincial protests that received very little national attention. This is probably the biggest limitation of only following factional political media. You end up knowing everything about what Rasaei said, what Pezeshkian said, what Ghalibaf did and what happened in negotiations while missing developments over salaries, pensions, food, water and university conditions happening around the country. The lives, perceptions, and decisions of ordinary people will have a bigger consequence on the country than anything Trump, Ghalibaf, or anyone else does.

Meanwhile, the Italian Mafia in Canada:

Israel took one look at these people and was like, “Yeah, we’re going with Ahmadinejad.”

That's a hell of a name.

Also, not to steal ostad @sharghzadeh 's critique but why did they call it iranopasmigirim.com instead of iranrapasmigirim.com?

Did anyone ever play this game on SEGA Genesis? QT unrelated.

It's funny that these people think they're going to be able to launder their reputations with this BS meanwhile in 20 years their kids won't speak to them and their grandkids will pretend not to be related to them.

I can see why the IRGC is feeling bullish.

When the Parthians and the Medes, greatly angered by the treatment they had received, proceeded to raise a large army, he fell into the greatest terror. For, though he was most bold with his threats and most reckless in his undertakings, yet he was the greatest coward 3/4

In early July I made several angry posts about the decision to shoot on several ships while the MoU was in place & the importance of recognizing the limits of Iranian power. The response was a torrent of angry posts saying I have an ideology of weakness & shocked I too wasn't drunk off random Twitter accounts proclaiming Iran to be a new super power about to decolonize all of West Asia. Perhaps some of you have waken up a little at this point. It is clear that the United States, with enough time and devoted resources, can largely keep the Strait open. This should not be particularly surprising to anyone, but a great deal of the angry comments to my work are shocked at the idea that there are limits to Iranian power. If anything that Iran was able to keep the Strait as closed as it did for almost 8 months under war conditions significantly exceeded anyone's expectations before the war. It was an impressive feat. Understanding the limits of one's power is not weakness, but rather the only path to survival. Wake up from your delusions and join reality. Iran is not capable of an indefinite open ended war with the US. That does not mean it is doomed either. Rather in between "immediate capitulation" and "unending war that ends in a tragic last stance and annihilation" there is a middle ground where limited power can be used to achieve specific goals. This requires a theory of victory that takes into account Iran's limitations. The war is not over. This was not a war that was launched by Iran over closing the Strait. And the Strait was not even an issue in the 12 Day War or the unending negotiations before the war. It being opened, whether temporary or permanent does not mean this is finished. I repeat my earlier assertion that the outcome of the war will be determined by the nuclear issue. Everything else is secondary. And once you understand the centrality of that issue everything else makes sense. And if it wasn't abundantly clear - neither side has good military options. Which is why we keep getting escalations but return to these weird quiet periods. There is no good, easy military option that concludes this. Though there are highly risky ones that both sides are hesitant to try. This is why both sides are relying on economic pressure (which was basically what they were doing before the war as well). But it's not something either side can tolerate in the long run, which will push them to the risky military options they want to avoid.

A 26 page document, which I'm sure most Americans have read.

"but I'm still not going to do it."

They probably wrote the joke, who are we kidding.

Wouldn't be out of place at a sermon in the IR آنچه مردم در این روزگار بیش از هر چیز بدان نیازمند و تشنه‌اند، آن است که بتوانیم روایتی اخلاقی و معنوی از چگونگی همزیستی خویش در این برهه زمان ارائه دهیم، روایتی که راه و رسم زندگی مشترک ما را بر پایه فضیلت، مسئولیت و اخلاق تبیین کند

Mr. Netanyahu, you should know that Iranians have been in Rum and Turan since the days of Fereydun. You can read it in the Shahnameh.