When Councilor Mitch Green says he wants to work toward a world in which both police and prisons are abolished, an obvious question follows:
What exactly would such a world look like—and who would enforce society's rules?
Green and other advocates of police and prison abolition argue that conventional law enforcement could ultimately be replaced by other institutions focused on prevention, social services, “restorative justice” and community-based intervention. That is the theory, anyway.
But we can also look at places where conventional state policing has already become absent, ineffective or displaced and ask what has actually filled the vacuum.
One example can be found in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
In many favelas and peripheral neighborhoods, criminal organizations have established systems of parallel authority and have taken two forms:
Milícias are criminal or paramilitary organizations in the city. In territories they dominate, militias have provided or controlled security and basic services while simultaneously extracting protection payments, monopolizing utilities and transportation, controlling real estate and using violence to maintain their authority.
Then there are drug factions, most prominently Rio's Comando Vermelho (CV). In territories controlled by such factions, criminal organizations have sometimes operated informal courts—often referred to as tribunais do crime or tribunais do tráfico. Residents may bring disputes before members of the organization rather than government authorities. These organizations can establish local rules and determine punishments, which have ranged from warnings to beatings, expulsion and murder.
The term for these systems is criminal governance—the exercise of governmental functions by criminal organizations.
An even more dramatic contemporary example is Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
Armed gangs have become de facto governing authorities across much of the Haitian capital as formal state authority has collapsed. Recent estimates have placed roughly 90 percent of Port-au-Prince under gang control.
These organizations control roads and neighborhoods, operate checkpoints, restrict movement, extort businesses and residents, and impose their own rules. Reports have even documented gangs staging informal "trials" and imposing sentences, including death.
The state has not eliminated coercive authority. It has lost control of it.
Versions of this phenomenon have appeared elsewhere.
In parts of Mexico, cartels have exercised territorial authority and imposed rules on local populations. El Salvador historically experienced extensive neighborhood control by MS-13 and Barrio 18 before the government's massive crackdown beginning in 2022. Colombian guerrilla and paramilitary organizations have administered territory, collected taxes, resolved disputes and punished violations.
Italy's Mafia organizations historically offered protection and dispute resolution while using extortion, intimidation and violence to establish parallel systems of authority.
A much smaller and shorter-lived example occurred considerably closer to home:
In June 2020, Seattle experienced its own experiment with a "police-free" community.
Following days of protests after the death of George Floyd, the Seattle Police Department evacuated its East Precinct on June 8. Protesters subsequently established what became known first as the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ) and later as the Capitol Hill Organized Protest (CHOP), encompassing roughly five blocks of Seattle's Capitol Hill neighborhood. Seattle's own Office of Police Accountability described what followed explicitly as a "police-free" autonomous zone. During CHAZ’s approximately three-week existence, two people were shot and killed and several others were wounded in shootings in or around the protest zone. One of the deaths, of a 16-year-old boy, was due armed security at the site, firing into a Jeep that the boy and his 14-year-old friend, who was also shot and injured, were traveling in.
There are also important historical comparisons with communist states, although the mechanism was different.
The Soviet Union maintained comrades' courts(tovarishcheskie sudy), informal tribunals composed of coworkers or neighbors that dealt with lesser offenses and violations of accepted social conduct.
During China's Cultural Revolution, existing legal and administrative institutions were severely disrupted. Revolutionary organizations and committees assumed governmental functions in many places, while political accusations, public denunciations and extrajudicial punishment became widespread.
Eliminating a police department does not eliminate that function from human society. Eliminating prisons does not eliminate decisions about what should happen to people who commit murder, rape, assault or other serious crimes.
Someone—or some institution—still has to decide what conduct is prohibited, determine whether a person violated those rules, and decide what happens next.
The consequential question, therefore, isn't simply whether we call that institution "the police."
It is who receives the power that the police and courts once exercised, what constraints are placed upon that power, and what recourse an ordinary citizen has when the people exercising it abuse it.
Let’s test the abolitionist theory with a relevant case.
Someone commits murder. Without police, who investigates, collects evidence and takes the suspect into custody? If a community tribunal finds him responsible, but prisons have also been abolished, what happens when he refuses restorative justice—or simply remains dangerous?
Abolitionists propose alternatives, but none eliminates the fundamental problem of coercive authority. Someone still has to stop the dangerous person.
And therein lies the paradox: abolish the police and prisons, and eventually someone must be given the power to police and confine. You can change the names of those institutions.
You can’t eliminate their functions.