Belarus is landlocked. Its export route ran through Lithuania. Lithuania’s foreign minister told Reuters that resuming shipments was off the table while EU sanctions remain in force...
On 21st September 2026, President Trump said the US was negotiating a “massive” Belarus potash purchase at a price below Canada’s. That same day, Lukashenko said Belarus’s output was already contracted for 2026.
The missing detail is delivery timing. Belarus Prez Lukashenko’s statement limits the case for a large purchase this year. It does not rule out spare cargoes, redirected sales or contracts for 2027.
There is evidence for a smaller opening. On 11 September, Lukashenko said some volumes had become available and a vessel was loading for the US. He also said next year’s business could be considered. Those are his claims, not confirmation that a cargo reached an American buyer.
The negotiations have a history. On 15 December 2025, the US Treasury authorized transactions with three Belarusian potash companies. A further US-brokered agreement secured 250 prisoner releases on 19 March. Treasury removed the three companies from its sanctions list on 26 March.
Washington had already obtained prisoner releases. Minsk had obtained sanctions relief. Trump is now promoting the commercial opportunity to American farmers and explicitly comparing the prospective price with Canada’s.
There is a legitimate economic reason to explore it. Potash supplies potassium that crops need. Another competitive supplier could give American buyers more choice and put pressure on Canadian offers. That benefit does not require Belarus to replace Canada entirely.
But American permission to buy does not settle the transport problem.
Belarus is landlocked. Its historic export route ran through Lithuania’s port of Klaipeda. In May, Lithuania’s foreign minister told Reuters that resuming shipments was off the table while EU sanctions remained. Those sanctions remain in force.
RFE/RL obtained a US proposal seeking transit through Lithuania, Poland or Ukraine to avoid Russia. That matters because Belarus had shifted exports to Russian routes. A US purchase shipped through Russian ports would still pay for Russian transport services.
The price comparison therefore needs more than a cheaper offer from the seller. An American buyer must add rail, port charges, ocean freight and delivery inland, then compare the total with Canadian supply delivered to the same destination.
A Belarusian offer could still win. Freight does not prove it cannot. But Trump’s post gives no price basis, tonnage, delivery schedule or named buyer.
Nor would every Belarusian tonne sold to America necessarily increase world supply. Existing output could be redirected between customers. US buyers might gain another supplier without the world gaining another tonne of fertilizer.
My expectation is that individual cargoes and negotiations over 2027 supply are more plausible near-term developments than a rapid replacement of Canadian volumes. That changes if buyers disclose large contracts and a workable delivery program.
For farmers, the promised saving becomes real when the fertilizer reaches them at a lower total cost. The diplomatic concessions have already happened. The announcement has not yet established that saving.