You've laid this out in four claims. Let me take them one at a time, because I've read the exact same filings, and the documents are right; it's the causal story wrapped around them that isn't
"Simon Gerovich has structured Metaplanet to transfer value from shareholders to himself during certain market conditions"
The "structure" you're describing is the 10th-series management options. Every element of it was paid for (a ¥18/right premium), costs ¥10/share to exercise, was disclosed on 28 December 2022, APPROVED BY a shareholder special resolution on 7 February 2023, vests only from February 2026, and is self-capped.
Gerovich formally limited his own exercise to 25% of shares outstanding. "Structured to transfer value to himself" implies something covert and unilateral. This was voted in, in the open, by the shareholders
You can argue it's too generous. You can't call a shareholder-approved, premium-paid, capped option pool a hidden structure
"On March 16th, 2026 Simon Gerovich and management granted EVO Fund 100,000,000 Stock Acquisition Rights to be exercised at 1.01 mNAV and above"
The grantee is EVO Fund, an arm's-length financing counterparty, the same one behind the 12th and 20th–22nd series. This is a capital-raising instrument: EVO exercises, the company receives cash, the cash buys Bitcoin
It is not a grant to "Simon and management". And the "1.01 mNAV and above" condition, plus the exercise-suspension clause, are shareholder protections, they stop EVO from exercising unless the stock is above its Bitcoin NAV
"At 1.01 mNAV, because of an anti-dilution clause from December 28, 2022, Simon and management receive a 20% yield while shareholders are diluted by 20%"
This is where the story breaks, so read it carefully. The 10th-series ratchet adjusts to any change in the fully-diluted count, from any source. Every equity raise, every ATM, every one of the 20-plus warrant series triggers it. It is not caused by the EVO grant, aimed at the EVO grant, or dependent on it
If the plan were "feed my 20%", you wouldn't need EVO at all any issuance does it automatically. So "Simon issues to EVO to swell his own stake" mistakes a universal, automatic adjustment for a targeted scheme. Three more corrections:
- It's not a "yield" The clause maintains management at 20% of fully-diluted; it doesn't pay 20%. To capture the top-up, management must write a cheque at ¥10/share. The real transfer is (NAV per share − ¥10) on the incremental shares, not a free 20%
- "Diluted by 20%" measures your ownership percentage, not your economics. Issuing above mNAV is accretive: it raises more cash per share than the BTC-per-share it dilutes, so Bitcoin-per-share rises for existing holders. That's the entire model and management's actual KPI, "BTC Yield"
- Routing through EVO doesn't enrich Simon extra, it dilutes his direct shares too. The ratchet only holds his percentage at 20%; it never grows it beyond that
"This is not FUD and is not a subjective interpretation of intent. It is easily verified in the links I've provided below"
The facts are verifiable, and I'm not disputing a single document, I've read them too. What the links don't contain is the intent. They show a disclosed, shareholder-approved, capped, premium-paid option pool, and an accretion-gated financing to EVO...
"He structured it to transfer value to himself" is the one thing that isn't in any of those PDFs, it's the interpretation laid on top of them
At this point... Let me explain what dilution is, regarding BTC treasuries I think something is misleading
Let's define dilution properly. In a treasury company it isn't your percentage of the share count, it's your Bitcoin per share: the real BTC backing each share
The precise version of that metric is CEBE (Common Equity BTC Equivalent): total BTC held minus the senior claims (bonds + preferreds, converted to BTC)
CEBE is the Bitcoin that actually belongs to the common stock after everyone senior gets paid. CEBE per share = the real BTC you'd receive if the company liquidated the stack and distributed it to common holders
That, not your ownership percentage, is what you own
Two things follow, and together they dismantle the "dilution" claim:
1. It's measured fully diluted. Every warrant and option, including the ¥10 management options, is already in the denominator of CEBE per share. They are not a hidden future dilution waiting to hit you; they've been inside the number the whole time
2. So "diluted 20%" can mean you got richer. When Metaplanet issues shares above mNAV, the cash buys more BTC than it dilutes, your ownership % falls but your CEBE per share rises. Smaller slice of a Bitcoin stack that grew faster than the slice shrank
Example:
800M to 1,000M shares (you're "diluted 20%"), but CEBE goes 8,000 to 10,500 BTC, so CEBE/share rises ~5%
You own less of the company and more actual Bitcoin. That's the entire model
And because the options are already counted, when management exercises at ¥10, that cash is fresh BTC on a share already in the denominator exercise is accretive to CEBE per share, not dilutive. Issuance only happens above mNAV. Nothing in this structure lowers your CEBE per share
The one fair question left isn't dilution at all, it's pay: is a ¥10-strike claim on ~20% of the fully-diluted equity too generous a management package? That's a legitimate compensation debate, but it's approved by shareholders, premium-paid, vested, and capped
"He's diluting your Bitcoin" is simply the wrong frame: measured the only way that matters, CEBE per fully-diluted share, your Bitcoin is going up
CEBE data for common shareholders:
- Strategy: 66%
- Strive: 55%
- Metaplanet: 80%
CEBE Data
cebetracker.io/endgame/ from
@CEBETracker
So, Metaplanet’s common shareholders have more BTC than other BTC treasuries
Which common shareholders are actually more diluted?
And next...
Let’s talk about actual voting power, the dilution you’re referring to (as we can see, there’s no economic dilution) and compare it to the company everyone treats as the gold standard, Strategy
Strategy runs a dual-class structure. Class A gets 1 vote; Class B gets 10 votes. Michael Saylor's ~19.6M super-voting Class B shares carry ~42.6% of all voting power on a small economic stake
That's a management team with structurally amplified, near-controlling voting power baked into the share class itself
Metaplanet has none of that. It's one share, one vote. There is no super-voting class for management. Metaplanet's "Class B" is a preferred income instrument (MERCURY), held by institutions, not a control vehicle
Gerovich's actual voting power is his direct common stock about 2%. Even if he exercised every option he holds, he tops out around 18-20%, never a majority, and only after vesting, a 25% cap, and paying ¥10 a share
Meanwhile the single largest voting block is an external institution, Capital Group, at 10.63%
So ask the question the thread implies:
Who controls the company, the common shareholders or the insiders?
At Strategy, the founder holds ~42.6% of the vote by design. At Metaplanet, the founder holds ~2% today, the biggest voter is Capital Group, and every share votes equally
The Bitcoin-treasury company with less insider control of the ballot box is the one you'reaccusing of insider control
Simon Gerovich (
@gerovich) has structured Metaplanet to transfer value from shareholders to himself during certain market conditions.
On March 16th, 2026 Simon Gerovich and management granted EVO Fund 100,000,000 Stock Acquisition Rights to be exercised at 1.01 mNAV and above.
At 1.01 mNAV, because of an anti-dilution clause from December 28, 2022, Simon and management receive a 20% yield while shareholders are diluted by 20%.
This is not FUD and is not a subjective interpretation of intent. It is easily verified in the links I've provided below.
Stock Acquisition Rights
"Notice Regarding the Issuance of the 27th Series of Stock Acquisition Rights with Exercise Price Adjustment Clause, mNAV Clause, Floor Exercise Price Adjustment Clause, and Exercise Suspension Clause through Third-party Allotment, and the Execution of a Purchase Agreement for Stock Acquisition"
contents.xj-storage.jp/xcont…
Anti-Dilution Clause
1. December 28, 2022 Board Resolution & Issuance Terms (10th Series)
The primary disclosure is the Temporary Report (臨時報告書) filed the same day and the related timely disclosure that sets out the full terms (including the anti-dilution adjustment to ~20% of fully diluted shares).
IRBANK link (easy access to the Temporary Report):
irbank.net/E02978/ext?f=S100…
Direct PDF of the comprehensive Dec 28, 2022 announcement (includes the 10th Series terms):
contents.xj-storage.jp/xcont…
You can also search EDINET (
edinet.fsa.go.jp) using company code E02978 and the filing date 2022-12-28.
2. February 7, 2023 Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting Approval
Results of the EGM (Notice Regarding the Results of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, dated Feb 7, 2023) is listed on Metaplanet’s English disclosures page:
metaplanet.jp/en/shareholder…(Look under January–February 2023 filings.)
The Notice of Convocation (Jan 23, 2023) that contained the proposal for the 10th Series is also available on the same page and via TDnet/EDINET searches for that date.
3. Subsequent Annual Securities Reports (especially the 27th Period)
The stock-option notes (including the 10th Series details) appear in every subsequent Yūka shōken hōkokusho (有価証券報告書).
27th Period Annual Securities Report (FY ended Dec 31, 2025, filed March 26, 2026) — stock-option section:
irbank.net/E02978/so?f=S100X…
Earlier periods (25th, 26th, etc.) are also on IRBANK under the same company code E02978. Search EDINET directly for “有価証券報告書” + E02978 for the official filings.