🚨 New Working Paper Alert 🚨
"Cautious Careers: Job Mobility under Incomplete Markets" is now available as NBER Working Paper 35580:
nber.org/papers/w35580.
Started more than 8 years ago as two separate projects by two teams on each side of the Atlantic that shared the same idea: changing jobs can be *risky*, and some workers might pursue safer but less productive jobs. Yes, we did take our time, but sometimes that's what it takes to get things right!
Our headline policy result is: moderately generous unemployment insurance can mean more jobs, not fewer. Beyond insuring the unemployed, UI subsidizes risky job-taking by employed workers, and their greater willingness to accept outside offers makes it easier for firms to fill vacancies, encouraging job creation. Cutting UI back to bare social assistance would lower aggregate productivity by about 1.3%, almost entirely through employed workers turning down risky but productive offers.
Where does this come from? Together with the fantastic trio of
@alexclymo,
@ayusufmercan and
@Schoefer_B, we are the first to provide direct empirical evidence on how much US workers are willing to pay for extra job security. In a tailor-made module of the nationally representative AmeriSpeak survey (NORC), we elicit workers' indifference curves between pay and unemployment risk. The headline number: the average US worker demands a 1.63% pay raise to accept each additional percentage point of annual layoff risk. And consistent with the role of incomplete markets, this tradeoff is about 75% steeper for borrowing-constrained households.
We then build a general equilibrium search model with a two-dimensional job ladder, where jobs differ in both productivity and unemployment risk, and risk-averse workers can only partially self-insure. Without targeting it, the model reproduces our survey's indifference curve slope almost exactly (1.53 vs. 1.63).
What does this caution cost the economy? A complete-markets counterfactual would boost job-to-job mobility by 12%.
Finally, in recessions we document a "climb to safety": workers redirect their job switches toward safer, lower-paying jobs. Counter-cyclical UI expansions largely undo this, at the cost of higher unemployment.
Bottom line: labor market dynamism isn't only about the unemployed finding jobs. It's also about whether employed workers can afford to take risks. Comments and feedback very welcome!
Ungated version on Benjamin's website:
eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/ (just click on the title of our paper).