To conclude, it is important to consider when force is used, what comes next? The biggest danger may not be action itself but triggering something larger than intended, or acting without a clear path forward. /9
Секретар РНБО України: Для перемоги у війні з російською федерацією Україні потрібні не тільки зброя, фінанси, санкції, а й чітке бачення кращого майбутнього
Pleased to join my fellow Commissioners in welcoming @JJSchroden to the Afghanistan War Commission as Research Director. He comes to us from the Center for Naval Analyses with deep experience in research and analysis #afghanistanwarcommissionafghanistanwarcommission.org…
Reauthorization of FISA Section 702 is among the most important national security issues our country faces today and would be disastrous for us to lose. 1/2
ALT Two met sit in chairs on a stage as a screen projects one of them very large above them.
Wonderful to meet #Taiwan President Tsai @iingwen who has been a steady hand. Even more wonderful to advertise my book on Chinese irregular and asymmetric warfare, along with my colleague @EliotACohen. Can’t imagine Beijing was amused. flickr.com/photos/presidenti…
CSIS expert @SethGJones on the goals of Chinese political warfare: "Most important is preservation of the Chinese Communist Party's rule, but also the expansion of Chinese influence and to weaken the U.S."
Dive into the new comprehensive analysis: cs.is/45evM1p
This week's arrest of two US Navy sailors is a good example of how China is conducting an unprecedented campaign below the threshold of armed conflict to expand the influence of the CCP and weaken the United States and its partners. See our report at: csis.org/analysis/chinas-str…
Wagner forces challenged Putin and killed Russian soldiers. Are they now in the clear? @SethGJones calls the deal a “total capitulation to Wagner” and says he’s spoken to Russian military officials who want Prigozhin dead.
I am thrilled to announce that @dbyman is joining @CSIS and @CSIS_Threats to work on a range of issues, from terrorism to Iranian & Russian covert activities. As my colleague @EliotACohen has already noted, it is a real "coup" for us, though clearly not in the Russian sense
Outstanding discussion on lessons from the history of US covert action and special operations with @CIA and @DeptofDefense official Mike Vickers, @EliotACohen and @EHarding_DC. Didn’t realize Mike was also a budding baseball player!
csis.org/events/lessons-us-i…
Russian fortifications in Ukraine are extensive, as we detail in new @CSIS analysis. But military history is helpful. Fortifications are only as good as the defending forces. Clever strategies, technology, & terrain have been able to overcome defenses 1/ csis.org/analysis/ukraines-o…
In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel Defense Forces heavily relied on an effective strategy, including armor and air forces to destroy significant components of the Egyptian and Syrian air forces 12/
As Napoleon wrote, “The strength of an army, like power in mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the velocity.” A Ukrainian maneuver strategy places a premium on the second factor—velocity 13/