At least could you pls let us know if this exploit was an insider job.. that's what i heard🤔🤔🤔🤔. Let's not forget that some of your colleagues have been arrested and released afterwards in regards toba previous exploit. Pls advise 🙏

The idea L2s are selling us is that they are actually as safe as the underlying L1. That is far from the truth, in mathematical terms it is like the distance from 1 to infinity. So on most of L2s there is no fraud proofs, you simply trust the centralised sequencer. Or the admin key which can simply transfer all the funds. Protocols are hard to upgrade, what happens if there is a bug ? So teams are creating backdoors. But these backdoors are effectively the gun the state can use against all what is built, or you need to hack the sequencer, get into the server room where the sequencer runs, social attack on only one devOps dev who has the password for the sequencer. Even if there is a small multi-sig, it still means that L2 is not as safe as L1, it is as safe as that small group from the multisig. This directly means, L2s in the current form are simply not here to scale L1, if you scale L1 you have no backdoor and you are as secure as L1. There is simply no backdoor in a scalable, decentralised L1 like #MultiversX . Funds are ultra safe, especially with guardians and $ESDT, in-protocol token standard. It is simply unbelievable how much money, effort, time is put into working on bad primitives, just because those teams, investors, VCs sees that they can earn the green dollars fast. The vision of #blockchain is simply much more. Be good, do good, develop something magical.

Oh. Total nonsense, just to start with. "The Off-Switch Every mainnet node runs with a hard-fork trigger enabled that listens for a message signed by one specific public key. That is a remote stop switch held by the Foundation! We cannot know for sure if they pressed that switch, but it is highly unlikely they could have stopped the chain that quickly otherwise & the fact that it even exists is bad enough! This is all a direct consequence of the shortcuts they had to make to bring a sharded chain down to 600ms..." THERE IS NO OFF SWITCH. USE ALL YOUR AGENTS. Check the public code, and there is no off switch. there is actually no hardfork code. there is nothing of sort. How can you make a rapid decision with validators ? There is a common channel where we can put urgent messages and everyone decides, every validator decides. Some other blockchains did this too, L1s as well in the recent years, not going to make names. The bug happened IN THE SAME SHARD. It has nothing to do with SHARDING. Check again with all your agents, and please if you want to put out information, at least make correct ones. There is no centralisation, there is no reckless design, there are NO trade-offs. the code in issue was formally verified and audited and it still got this bug. the bug happened because there was a save function called and after some errors checks and gas usage, and in case of those errors, we did not revert the previous save. this was sadly a reentrancy attack, because a function and the order of the execution was not protected. THE CODE is OPEN SOURCE. The code does not lie. check the code. thanks for your attention.

EGLD has been totally exposed for its lies & hidden centralization today! ⚠️ 3 days of downtime is only the tip of the iceberg: 76M EGLD (2.5x supply) was minted & partially sold! EGLD did not halt; the foundation used an off-switch! All consequences of its reckless design! 🧵 Unlike a normal chain halt, where the chain stops due to a "consensus failure/disagreement", this was far, far worse. Instead of the chain stopping because an "inflation bug" caused consensus to fail, it kept going... That is what allowed the hacker to actually send their EGLD into exchanges & cause considerable harm. What comes next is even more unbelievable. As I was wondering how it was even possible to shut down a chain with 3k validators in 66min... That is what made me uncover the next bombshell: There is a literal foundation-controlled off-switch in the code!!! The Off-Switch Every mainnet node runs with a hard-fork trigger enabled that listens for a message signed by one specific public key. That is a remote stop switch held by the Foundation! We cannot know for sure if they pressed that switch, but it is highly unlikely they could have stopped the chain that quickly otherwise & the fact that it even exists is bad enough! This is all a direct consequence of the shortcuts they had to make to bring a sharded chain down to 600ms... Reckless Design Sharding comes with certain trade-offs: EGLD claimed to overcome these trade-offs through its unique design. Turns out, in reality, those trade-offs had some extreme consequences we are feeling now: EGLD sharding splits every transfer into a sender-shard debit & a destination-shard credit that must be reconciled by hand, & on one path the credit had no debit: a money printer. With no global supply invariant, finality before execution, & no protocol-level freeze, the only fix was manually shutting down the chain & a hard fork erasing the "final" history! Lack of Disclosure Given what I just explained, you can judge for yourself whether the team's disclosure is adequate. I argue it absolutely was not. The fourth screenshot shows their communication on the matter so far & exactly what they failed to mention Including the mint, the hackers' success & the off-switch! The fact that it took my own chain & code analysis to reach these conclusions tells us the team cared more about minimizing PR damage than properly disclosing the incident. At least with this piece out, they will not be able to get away with that anymore & will have to also include this information in their report The community deserves to know what is really going on, how centralized EGLD really is & how the tech is not a magical panacea but instead comes with serious trade-offs Chain Analysis The record is clear, all on a public chain for all to see. The attacker exploited this vulnerability in the chain & managed to mint 76M EGLD! Over 2.5x the supply! Along with 430M bridged USDC, about 430M bridged USDT & 5,540 bridged WBTC... The hacker then proceeded to split these into 16 wallet addresses & then send EGLD to multiple exchanges. If we look at the timing of when these exchanges "froze" EGLD, we see that MEXC did not act in time & it perfectly corresponds with very suspicious selling activity on that exchange, which was not even arbitraged out when the full freeze took effect. We cannot tell whether the hacker managed to exit the exchange afterward, but they certainly could have! Which means the hacker was likely able to walk away with around $1M USD, effectively defrauding the exchange in the proccess, by leveraging this EGLD vulnerability Please look at the visuals, as they provide all of the supporting evidence that can also be independently verified with publicly available information Conclusion This is BTC's 2010 inflation bug & ETH's 2016 DAO's hack rolled into one. That this all happened in 2026 is even more embarrassing Unlike those historic failures, there was no full disclosure of the problem as it was happening. People deserve to know; we are blowing the lid off this story now! This is also nothing like SOL's historic downtime, which involved network halts caused by bugs. Something that has happened in over two years. While EGLD managed to beat SOL in total downtime with this single incident! SOL also never ever had an off switch! The irony & I apologize; some degree of schadenfreude cannot be helped in my situation. As the EGLD community was one of the loudest spreading that false narrative. Turns out it was unknowingly a projection! The biggest red flag is still the team itself, after my fallout with EGLD last year. The toxicity & dishonesty became too much to bear This will likely trigger another ad hominem campaign against me, as it did last time & as it did for other influencers/journalists/thinkers. Fortunatly, I am specialized in weathering the storm. While these facts are undeniable & mostly speak for themselves EGLD certainly has some good technology; we can learn something from everyone. However, what we saw here over the last few days is beyond the pale That's where the value lies: In also understanding the character of a chain's leadership, especially at an early stage, as even with decentralized governance, bad leadership can still mess it all up! This is a truly worst-case scenario for a blockchain; there are very few examples of this level of collapse in blockchain history. After such an event, we have to question the competence & the wisdom of the underlying design choices EGLD's design is flawed & reckless, making centralization trade-offs other chains would never even dream of. All while claiming to be holier-than-thou It is never too late to change our minds in the face of new evidence; please study the supporting visuals for yourself. The truth cannot be credibly denied What occurred here is undeniable, while the silence of EGLD's leadership speaks louder than words: 🎓

Once again we are missing on the biggest trend at present, privacy coins They probably wait another 2-3 months before catching up

How does the NEAR token actually benefit from Intents and NEAR AI? > Intents feeds buy pressure. NEAR Intents has generated nearly $50M in fees and captured $1.84M of net revenue in the last 30 days, $560K of it in the last week alone. That revenue feeds buybacks that buy NEAR on the open market. It is not a promise and not an emission, it is a standing bid that grows as volume grows. > NEAR AI turns holding into demand. Staking is being wired to inference: your staked NEAR pays for AI compute instead of sitting idle, so holding stops being passive and starts buying you intelligence. Its confidential compute already holds $100M in TVL, and every agent that runs on NEAR needs the token as fuel. AI usage becomes token demand. > The bought-back NEAR is not burned. Burning only destroys the asset. Buying it back and locking it pulls near:native out of circulation and keeps it productive, earning and backing the network. Real scarcity comes from somewhere else too: a falling issuance rate and a path to a fixed supply cap. Burning tokens is a headline. Capping supply and capturing revenue is a machine.

Is there a way for MultiversX to integrate NEAR intents into xPortal? Seems like we already should be able to circumvent expensive bridges and native stable integrations with this technology. NEAR users can benefit from amazing MultiversX UI/UX. MvX becomes less siloed. ???