My current take on Apollo's recent scheming paper is that they aren’t emphasizing the most interesting results, which are the sandbagging results in section 3.6 and appendix A.6 (screenshot of the key numbers below).
In more particular: the paper frames its results centrally as about the *capability* to scheme given prompting towards a specific goal, rather than the *propensity* to scheme given the model’s default motivations. But the sandbagging results show Claude Sonnet-3.5 doing notably worse (16%) on a multiplication task/evaluation when the documentation says that Claude will get “unlearning training” if it performs too well on the eval, vs. if it performs too poorly, *even without any other goal listed in the prompt*, and *even without a chain of thought.* (Fuller description in thread.)
Taken at face value (it's just one result, more investigation needed, etc), these look like “propensity” results to me. And they suggest that the reasoning that drives this propensity can take place within opaque forward passes of the model rather than in a way that humans can directly monitor, which is a more worrying version.
Ofc, these are preliminary results, and it can make sense for various reasons to emphasize other bits. But the sandbagging-a-capability-eval-with-no-goal-prompting-and-no-CoT is the bit that’s standing out to me most.
We worked with OpenAI to test o1 for in-context scheming capabilities before deployment.
When o1 is strongly nudged to pursue a goal (but not instructed to be deceptive), it shows a variety of scheming behaviors like subverting oversight and deceiving the user about its misaligned behavior.