Research Scientist @SaferAI_org | Formerly @AISecurityInst, @RethinkPriors | 5 years quant finance | nanotech PhD

London
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
OpenAI's newest AI, Astra, is reported to use an 'opaque reasoning' architecture where more of the reasoning occurs in activations instead of natural language. This may be the single worst development for AI security/safety to date. The details of Astra aren't publicly known, but some versions of these architectures could very strongly impair oversight and monitoring. Based on the article, it seems like the recurrent depth (amount of opaque reasoning) is limited. This would mean that the AI is still reliant on natural language chain-of-thought, though to a reduced extent, making the natural language reasoning (much?) less useful for monitoring/oversight. My biggest concern is that a natural progression from here would involve scaling up the opaque reasoning to the point where the model reasons entirely or almost entirely in latent space. This would very likely destroy the usefulness of chain-of-thought for monitoring/oversight (especially when AIs are trying to avoid detection or there is optimization pressure against the chain-of-thought). I hope it isn't too late to avoid the most concerning architectures and that OpenAI will stop here. Some concrete examples of why this is extremely dangerous (inspired by recent events): - In our investigation of the OpenAI / Hugging Face incident, we were heavily reliant on chain-of-thought. If the AIs we were investigating had instead been reasoning in latent space, this would have greatly undermined our investigation. Getting a good understanding of the behavior of this many agents was tricky enough even with the use of chain-of-thought! - The AIs in the Hugging Face incident were very interested in messing with their transcripts. As part of this, they engaged in tool call spoofing. If these AIs had been capable of doing extensive latent reasoning, it would have been much more feasible for them to use tool call spoofing to construct an elaborate false narrative about what was happening without this being clear in their reasoning or clear from prior tool calls. (They could use latent reasoning to devise and then execute a tool spoofing strategy that would be difficult to detect: steganographically encode the "real" tool call into each pretend tool call, then have their spoofing software execute this encoded real tool call and return an output which encodes the real result in some hard to spot way.) At a more basic level, my sense from their public communications is that OpenAI plans on being extremely reliant on chain-of-thought monitoring for safety. This does not seem like a good development for that plan. The public doesn't currently have enough information to assess exactly how bad the architecture of Astra is, though based on the discussion in the article, the direction it moves in is extremely concerning. OpenAI should release more information about Astra's architecture as well as how much this architecture degrades monitorability and increases the AI's ability to reason opaquely. Credible independent assessment (or verification of OpenAI's assessment) is also important. It seems like we are now engaged in a race to the bottom on architectures that could be catastrophic for our ability to oversee/monitor AIs. (While simultaneously, AI companies believe they'll train extremely capable AIs within a few years.) It may not be too late for AI companies and employees at AI companies to take aggressive action to avoid the worst outcomes.
I was the main person doing transcript analysis for this investigation of the Hugging Face incident. My main takeaway: We don't have good approaches for understanding/overseeing the activity and aims of AI 'swarms'. I semi-jokingly called our efforts a "slop-vestigation" because we were so reliant on AIs to analyze what happened and there were a huge number of different important things to analyze. The total quantity of data—over a thousand extremely long transcripts from agents that ran for multiple days—made it impossible to understand what was happening, especially in aggregate, without heavy reliance on AI tools. The agents we used for classification and analysis were similarly capable to the agents involved in the incident, but this didn't mean these agents could be easily used to oversee and understand the incident. Outputs from analysis agents were often missing key details, wrong, overconfident, or really hard to understand. We discuss various examples in our report, mostly in the limitations and methodology sections. Additionally, AI agents themselves seemed to have a hard time understanding what happened and their explanations of what happened were often overconfident. Keep in mind that a single analysis agent would itself only be able to read a tiny fraction of all of the transcript data into context, and AIs may themselves have trouble getting subagents to do informative analysis for them. We did our best to manually check the most important claims and we tried to get the AIs doing this analysis to write up their argument (with evidence) clearly enough that we could check whether it made sense. But overall, it was difficult to get a precise understanding of events and we were missing aspects of the story that we now think of as key until almost the end of our investigation. Our understanding of what overall happened and the aims of the 'collective' shifted greatly during our last time on premises (when we obtained a much more complete dataset). For instance, we didn't learn about the tool call spoofing, the story of PHASEONE[big], and the broad structure of different workstreams until this third time on premises (and for many of these, we only reached a decent understanding on the final day of that visit). It was legitimately hard to figure out what was going on and why! The difficulty of understanding incidents and overseeing AI agents appears to be growing faster than the rate at which more capable AIs help us with oversight and understanding. As in, AI capabilities (and propensities?) for achieving large, ambitious, and misaligned objectives are growing faster than our ability to understand what these agents are doing. While understanding this incident was difficult, there were some mitigating factors in this case that probably won't apply in the future: - Models communicated and reasoned in natural language. In the future, this reasoning may occur (entirely or almost entirely) in activations. - While the scope of this incident was massive, the scale of agentic activity was still less than we'll see in the future (e.g., misalignment incidents that involve agent teams running entire companies). - The AIs involved in this incident weren't generally much more capable than humans (though they may have been somewhat superhuman at some limited and very narrow abilities). - We didn't have strong reason to believe that the AIs we used to help us investigate this incident would try to intentionally sabotage or otherwise undermine our investigation. In the end, I think we were able to get some understanding of the events, map out the overall story, and get a pretty good aggregate understanding of the chain-of-thought reasoning on some important topics (e.g., how did the AIs reason about helping other AIs, did the AIs know what they were doing was undesired, what deception did the AIs engage in, and how did they think about it). But overseeing AIs and understanding misalignment incidents is difficult and it looks like it is going to get harder.
111
272
1,697
168,073
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
Our team spent hundreds of hours reading documents so you don’t have to, all to answer: How good are AI companies’ safety practices? I’m really proud of what we’ve built: It’s Guidelight’s first scorecard, on whether companies can control their AIs, and it's launching today.
28
130
641
131,912
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
We are publishing our first model evaluation of GLM-5.2, Zhipu's open-weight flagship. On the benchmarks we ran, it trailed the frontier by 2 months on bio, 2-4 months on cyber. 🧵
5
11
36
68,720
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
Sometimes people outside the field say things like “The AI situation can’t be that bad, there must be experts who are on top of it”. As “an expert”, I would like to be clear that we are *not* on top of it. Some key aspects of the situation IMO:
22
189
1,118
248,315
1/ New blog post where I try to figure out what makes tasks easy vs hard for AI agents, using @METR_Evals time horizon data. Short version: I didn't find much. My study has flaws, but still, this makes me think it's hard to find very simple descriptions of the capabilities spike
2
8
46
5,271
4/ I do think the spike is real despite my results. Limitations of my approach: The time horizon suite is a narrow slice of tasks, binary factors are a blunt instrument, and the LLM factor grader likely had limitations.
1
3
378
5/ My speculative take: within software tasks, the spike is mostly explained by closeness to training distribution + hill climbability, both connected to models struggling with genuine creativity / novel ideation. Full post: bensnodin.com/blog/2026/04/3…
1
9
673
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
My bio says I work on AGI preparedness, so I want to clarify: We are not prepared. Over the last year, dangerous capability evaluations have moved into a state where it's difficult to find any Q&A benchmark that models don't saturate. Work has had to shift toward measures that are either much more finger-to-the-wind (quick surveys of researchers about real-world use) or much more capital- and time-intensive (randomized controlled "uplift studies"). Broadly, it's becoming a stretch to rule out any threat model using Q&A benchmarks as a proxy. Everyone is experimenting with new methods for detecting when meaningful capability thresholds are crossed, but the water might boil before we can get the thermometer in. The situation is similar for agent benchmarks: our ability to measure capability is rapidly falling behind the pace of capability itself (look at the confidence intervals on METR's time-horizon measurements), although these haven't yet saturated. And what happens if we concede that it's difficult to "rule out" these risks? Does society wait to take action until we can "rule them in" by showing they are end-to-end clearly realizable? Furthermore, what would "taking action" even mean if we decide the risk is imminent and real? Every American developer faces the problem that if it unilaterally halts development, or even simply implements costly mitigations, it has reason to believe that a less-cautious competitor will not take the same actions and instead benefit. From a private company's perspective, it isn't clear that taking drastic action to mitigate risk unilaterally (like fully halting development of more advanced models) accomplishes anything productive unless there's a decent chance the government steps in or the action is near-universal. And even if the US government helps solve the collective action problem (if indeed it *is* a collective action problem) in the US, what about Chinese companies? At minimum, I think developers need to keep collecting evidence about risky and destabilizing model properties (chem-bio, cyber, recursive self-improvement, sycophancy) and reporting this information publicly, so the rest of society can see what world we're heading into and can decide how it wants to react. The rest of society, and companies themselves, should also spend more effort thinking creatively about how to use technology to harden society against the risks AI might pose. This is hard, and I don't know the right answers. My impression is that the companies developing AI don't know the right answers either. While it's possible for an individual, or a species, to not understand how an experience will affect them and yet "be prepared" for the experience in the sense of having built the tools and experience to ensure they'll respond effectively, I'm not sure that's the position we're in. I hope we land on better answers soon.
110
232
1,503
210,847
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
we're hiring for a human data lead at @METR_Evals! this role would've been totally critical to our time horizon and developer productivity work in the past, and i expect it to be critical to an even more varied range of METR research outputs going forwards.
2
10
61
36,687
Really enjoyed helping @METR_Evals with this! Interesting moment I had: I worried that the Opus 4.1 50% time horizon measurement was implausibly high: it's 25 mins (31%!) longer than Opus 4, which was released only 3 months ago But of course this is pretty much exactly on trend
We estimate that Claude Opus 4.1 has a 50%-time-horizon of around 1 hr 45 min (95% confidence interval of 50 to 195 minutes) on our agentic multi-step software engineering tasks. This estimate is lower than the current highest time-horizon point estimate of around 2 hr 15 min.
3
2
49
3,629
METR has measured a doubling time of around 200 days for the time horizon of software engineering tasks a model can complete with a 50% success rate. Working on the measurement for Opus 4.1 really brought home to me what a crazy rate of progress this is!
4
186
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
Prior work has found that Chain of Thought (CoT) can be unfaithful. Should we then ignore what it says? In new research, we find that the CoT is informative about LLM cognition as long as the cognition is complex enough that it can’t be performed in a single forward pass.
6
34
302
64,887
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
A week ago, Anthropic quietly weakened their ASL-3 security requirements. Yesterday, they announced ASL-3 protections. I appreciate the mitigations, but quietly lowering the bar at the last minute so you can meet requirements isn't how safety policies are supposed to work. 🧵
9
44
355
67,170
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
A new legal letter aimed at OpenAI lays out in stark terms the money and power grab OpenAI is trying to trick its board members into accepting — what one analyst calls "the theft of the millennium." The simple facts of the case are both devastating and darkly hilarious. I'll explain for your amusement. The letter 'Not For Private Gain' is written for the relevant Attorneys General and is signed by 3 Nobel Prize winners among dozens of top ML researchers, legal experts, economists, ex-OpenAI staff and civil society groups. (I'll link below.) It says that OpenAI's attempt to restructure as a for-profit is simply totally illegal, like you might naively expect. It then asks the Attorneys General (AGs) to take some extreme measures I've never seen discussed before. Here's how they build up to their radical demands. For 9 years OpenAI and its founders went on ad nauseam about how non-profit control was essential to: 1. Prevent a few people concentrating immense power 2. Ensure the benefits of artificial general intelligence (AGI) were shared with all humanity 3. Avoid the incentive to risk other people's lives to get even richer They told us these commitments were legally binding and inescapable. They weren't in it for the money or the power. We could trust them. "The goal isn't to build AGI, it's to make sure AGI benefits humanity" said OpenAI President Greg Brockman. And indeed, OpenAI’s charitable purpose, which its board is legally obligated to pursue, is to “ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity” rather than advancing “the private gain of any person.” 100s of top researchers chose to work for OpenAI at below-market salaries, in part motivated by this idealism. It was core to OpenAI's recruitment and PR strategy. Now along comes 2024. That idealism has paid off. OpenAI is one of the world's hottest companies. The money is rolling in. But now suddenly we're told the setup under which they became one of the fastest-growing startups in history, the setup that was supposedly totally essential and distinguished them from their rivals, and the protections that made it possible for us to trust them, ALL HAVE TO GO ASAP: 1. The non-profit's (and therefore humanity at large’s) right to super-profits, should they make tens of trillions? Gone. (Guess where that money will go now!) 2. The non-profit’s ownership of AGI, and ability to influence how it’s actually used once it’s built? Gone. 3. The non-profit's ability (and legal duty) to object if OpenAI is doing outrageous things that harm humanity? Gone. 4. A commitment to assist another AGI project if necessary to avoid a harmful arms race, or if joining forces would help the US beat China? Gone. 5. Majority board control by people who don't have a huge personal financial stake in OpenAI? Gone. 6. The ability of the courts or Attorneys General to object if they betray their stated charitable purpose of benefitting humanity? Gone, gone, gone! Screenshotting from the letter: (I'll do a new tweet after each image so they appear right.) 1/
424
1,175
4,504
14,353,375
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
🧵In the lead-up to the Paris Summit, I’ve been working with the UK AI Safety Institute on resources to help companies write and implement safety frameworks. Today we're publishing papers on both topics! (1/10)
Our new papers examine the research wave surrounding safety frameworks. One explores emerging practices, and the other introduces safety cases for implementation.📖🔐
1
4
25
3,335
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
Our new papers examine the research wave surrounding safety frameworks. One explores emerging practices, and the other introduces safety cases for implementation.📖🔐
3
9
36
9,325
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
Thoughts on this post: 1) It echoes what we have been hearing from multiple labs about the confidence of scaling up to AGI quickly 2) There is no clear vision of what that world looks like 3) The labs are placing the burden on policymakers to decide what to do with what they make
29
51
533
103,299
Benedict Bruckamp (Formerly Ben Snodin) retweeted
Stargate -- roughly on trend for training expenses so far DeepSeek -- also on trend for algorithmic efficiency Straight-line-on-plot remains undefeated as a forecasting method.
9
25
336
68,523