GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @HTX_Global
kaspa:native up Friday. nacho-the-kat:native already stretched.
1
12
29
323
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @HTX_Global
Caught the glow. nacho-the-kat:native still holding $KAS.
8
19
266
October 7th, 8 PM CET
13
53
250
15,576
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
nacho-the-kat:native Nation and kaspa:native never stops fighting! 🥊💚
9
18
68
1,969
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @austinoakes
nacho-the-kat:native & Austin - Hotel Lobby
2
10
40
850
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
📢 Status of unexpected iKAS received on September 21. Some of you may have received iKAS you didn't ask for. Some of you have already returned it. Here's what happened and what to do, iterating the message from Igra Labs. What happened: The attacker behind the KRC20 incident sent 5,000 to 10,000 iKAS to around 35 wallets that have nothing to do with the attack. The goal was to make uninvolved users look connected. You are not under suspicion. Anyone can send to any address and you couldn't have refused it. Your own funds are unaffected. What to do: Check if your wallet is on the list below. If you received iKAS from the attacker, please return it to the Igra DAO Governance contract: 0xB3300fcC2F3EF3DeCdF8B1f710c21666f33Cbf18 These are stolen funds. Returning them is voluntary, takes one transaction, and costs you nothing you could otherwise use. Tagged wallets from the attacker: explorer.igralabs.com/accoun… If you already moved or spent it, email team@igralabs.com – they'll help sort it out. Questions? DM directly. This list was provided by Pavel from Igra. Please check, do the right thing, and spread the message. | 1 | `0xc8885faa4a15e7f66a198666df469c9dd33c672d` | 10,000 | 2 | `0xa5568cfae8c693e2efc9869171c64bbbdd290e0d` | 9,000 | 3 | `0x8274d2445025ab33c40be4291b3e3ab86a5e4177` | 8,000 | 4 | `0x2856feb1ad6c6f58eb924029d8280f483934d311` | 8,000 | 5 | `0x16db28eaf22c96e4fbff848eb8fe2cc3d8554604` | 7,000 | 6 | `0x9f690b346579844bfd716cd7b243b43577f433a2` | 7,000 | 7 | `0xa7eccdb9be08178f896c26b7bbd8c3d4e844d9ba` | 7,000 | 8 | `0xed9ba8076ce0c9b0dc8f09256281066aafa56e0c` | 7,000 | 9 | `0x21756267408688a2446f4653360a704cce065127` | 6,000 | 10 | `0x35c76bf5a701a30629d9706f4c8f77a4a0ca5978` | 6,000 | 11 | `0x88bf17fcaa40f709365e0e9fcd6d6fcfb9be600c` | 5,400 | 12 | `0x73b6e464250c495fa55d5b7707274e02a9c5afa9` | 5,000 | 13 | `0x77a6389e99f9cc1da9e193c95914e0f6ec40ad75` | 5,000 | 14 | `0x78acf9653e3920df1f1be372bb271c5d50545aaf` | 5,000 | 15 | `0x8d8f68560c973df8943926999ecfd3e91e1b71bf` | 5,000 | 16 | `0x91b33068a097d57195269bce27f0e73f0b34fbeb` | 5,000 | 17 | `0xe1b1ad50765fcea0e3810aa5ba2586824e3e23cd` | 5,000 | 18 | `0x5c2367dbef846798252597f5c60ab87568494c8d` | 5,000 | 19 | `0x6a419ee1a990af586ebde3de5eaf350fd81e2b84` | 5,000 | 20 | `0x6fe712e2d9ae5248da125aa207196f6d88ab27ca` | 5,000 | 21 | `0xbdf78f7c16c0f45ab139ec9d2dc05f9b0a25d33c` | 5,000 | 22 | `0xc6769a5db6b07d7da036aaa8eee8d1d94348168d` | 5,000 | 23 | `0xc6f6fa57a0a0ca6ae75cedf3d1d766cce8295c6d` | 5,000 | 24 | `0xe0b4513e94e0735d817d44898fe1d82ede080c89` | 5,000 | 25 | `0x44401941c2415b7e3a4ffc64787e3799ab441c73` | 5,000 | 26 | `0x5335981963940a1a967d739789739e7200af60fc` | 5,000 | 27 | `0xa7dab4b0775c48ef5d2e4f62879915f4bba63db2` | 5,000 | 28 | `0xe606e6012a9a5b81d8f57de042173cec81227d05` | 5,000 | 29 | `0xb34af39cb611d2745efd59ac95f232ac35667bc7` | 5,000 | 30 | `0x72c836cc241e70ff2149337eec23691c6e781480` | 4,900 | 31 | `0x612171c17e6c15513a43d94c0981d933de5137f0` | 2,000 | 32 | `0xcd72f0cf43a5eecc3605387ccba402dd8ed65a4f` | 1,000 | 33 | `0xb143f6ca55358fac056eca7ac1a228a1f018b048` | 931 | 34 | `0xdcb00e25a8e44072399c358a59bf90fb92a56e8d` | 700 | 35 | `0x3177f6cdde461631e3a345dee7f15f5bc7d0e747` | 600
⚠️ Status update: what to do if you received unexpected iKAS on 21 September. Short version: if you received iKAS from any address on this list, please send it to the Igra DAO Governance contract: 0xB3300fcC2F3EF3DeCdF8B1f710c21666f33Cbf18 explorer.igralabs.com/accoun… Long version: The attacker behind the KRC-20 incident sent amounts of 5,000 to 10,000 iKAS to around 35 wallets that seemingly have nothing to do with the attack. This was done to make uninvolved users look connected to it. You are not under suspicion. Anyone can send to any address and you could not have refused it. Your own funds are unaffected, and exits covered by your own balance and deposits will settle normally. Funds originating from the attacker cannot be bridged out. The exit settlement operators settle against amounts traceable to your own deposits, so anything traced to the attacker's wallets will not be paid out. These are stolen funds. Returning them is voluntary, takes one transaction, and costs you nothing you could otherwise use. If you already moved or spent it, email team@igralabs.com and we'll help sort it out.
2
17
51
3,979
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
KAS topluluğu, hazır mısınız? 🥁 Gate TR x @turkiye_kaspa iş birliği başladı! Sen de yerini al, kaspa:native ödüllerini kaçırma! Detaylar ve katılım 👇 gate.tr/campaigns/6405
8
48
173
3,561
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
🚨🚨 the tagged hacker wallets have almost nothing left to send. What’s still out is sitting in other addresses. Already back / contained Igra Governance: ~724k iKAS (~700k from Exploiter 11 + ~24k from other wallets) All 12 labeled exploiter wallets: dust only (~0) 1M iKAS exit was burned and blocked. Igra is not paying it out. That’s contained, not sitting in a hacker wallet Still not returned as iKAS Original liquid pile on Igra was ~970k iKAS 970k − 724k in Governance ≈ ~246k iKAS still out That’s mostly the 5k–10k dumps to ~35 random wallets. Those people were asked to send it to Governance. ~142k KAS already exited to Kaspa L1 through Kasplex. That’s the piece that actually left. Recovery there depends on the revert / exchanges, not another Governance transfer. $KAS $NACHO
6
20
773
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
$KAS is milk. $KAS is life. Drink up Nacho Nation! Best be ready for our next move. 🐾
4
20
87
2,263
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @HTX_Global
kaspa:native has the socket. nacho-the-kat:native stays plugged.
6
24
485
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @Chriscrypto_89
it'll be finished when implemented in every major ecosystem edges. this requires validation from the ecosystem, and the community. it also requires a reference implementation which is in progress, and should settle the a foundation for future wide kcc. Kas-Smith already witnessed some voices over KCC20 (and others), and i encourage you to participate. ideally, mid-term, core maintainers drop these temporary hats off (while staying active) and ecosystem players claim them.
1
20
68
1,311
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
1 word.. nearly 900 likes 😂 safe to say, the community turns out for kaspa:native can we get it over 1k?
49
211
1,941
61,537
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Kaspa.
97
259
1,686
121,353
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
KatPool has updated to v2.1.0 Point your kaspa:native miners -> katpool.com
Kaspa v2.1.0 is out [Link in the reply] All node, mining, and infrastructure operators across mainnet and testnets are strongly encouraged to upgrade. This release introduces P2P Protocol Version 11, extracts a standalone ZK SDK, and reflects an ongoing focus on proactive defense-in-depth across the node architecture. Key Highlights: • P2P Protocol Version 11 & Chunked IBD: Large Initial Block Download (IBD) payloads (including Pruning Point Proofs, headers, and trusted data) are now streamed in 20 MiB chunks. This eliminates message- framing bottlenecks and timeouts during node sync, backed by overall safety limits and transfer timeouts, while maintaining full backwards compatibility with Protocol 10 peers. • Standalone ZK SDK: Zero-Knowledge proof and script-generation tooling has been extracted into a dedicated crate (kaspa-txscript-zk-sdk). It adds support for RISC Zero Groth16 and STARK verifier generation with dynamic or static image IDs, bounds control proofs against oversized inputs, and resolves cross-platform build issues. • General Hardening: Comprehensive defense-in-depth upgrades across the node, including stricter P2P message and block limits to guard against DoS vectors, a workspace-wide arithmetic safety audit to eliminate overflow risks, enhanced stratum bridge stability, and tighter consensus validation. These structural safeguards significantly strengthen node resilience and provide higher confidence in overall network security.
1
13
39
1,957
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
This is important, get involved in KCC-12
this KIP-12 is superseded by KCC-12. goal: dApp doesn't need to integrate browser wallet 1 by 1. If you own a dApp (/want to), or you own a browser wallet, please read the proposal and add your thoughts (not LLM thoughts, we can do that on our own)
7
35
1,013
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
🚨 On-chain: Kasplex KRC-20 Exploiter 11 → Governance 350,000 iKAS returned.🚨 Stolen $NACHO value that got swapped to iKAS is starting to come back. Stay patient on KRC-20 until Kasplex finishes the revert. $NACHO doesn’t fold. 🐈‍⬛ $KAS
6
17
75
4,636
RT @Igra_Labs: ⚠️ Status update: what to do if you received unexpected iKAS on 21 September. Short version: if you received iKAS from an…
4
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
Replying to @HTX_Global
$KAS set the line. $NACHO kept the bite.
1
3
15
157
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
🚨 $KASPY MEXC De-Listing Notice 🚨 Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening Crew. We will be parting ways with #MEXC following the assessment that just concluded. Let us be clear here: as a team, we believe we passed the MEXC assessment in line with the ST Rules we're governed by. The internal review team doesn't see it that way on the results and criteria, and we don't agree with their finding. We're not here to point fingers or rehash the requirements, we simply want to state up front that we disagree with MEXC's assessment finding. We filed both an appeal and a request for an extension to pin down which criteria wasn't met. Neither was granted. With that said, we want to stay professional, and we ask the community to do the same. This is not the outcome we wanted to see, and we worked incredibly hard to avoid it. But we cannot continue this partnership with the exchange. Now, to look at it from a different angle: exchanges like Gate or MEXC intend(ed) to charge a migration/integration cost to migrate from KRC20 to KCC20. Depending on the exchange and the team's negotiation, that cost can range up to 50% of the original listing cost. That has been the primary concern for us at @kaspy_io and our friends across the chain @NachotheKat . We understand the last holdouts for the migration are primarily us two, because of our exchanges and our financial obligations. We here at $KASPY had planned to bring up the migration cost after a successful assessment. This clears that up quickly. With #Coinex and #BitMart shutting down, and #MEXC choosing to delist $KASPY, we're left with a clean migration opportunity, one that we as a team are actively pursuing. The vision we're moving forward with is to work with the KCC20 Developers and assist in any way we can with migration preparation and considerations. $KASPY will thrive coming out of this, and this may be a blessing in disguise. We achieved incredible market caps without CEXs before, doing it again would be an incredible full circle kaspa story of resilience. It will be interesting to see if on DEX we face the same manipulation that many other KRC20s and kaspa itself has faced on the CEXs. All current and active market maker funds will be reallocated to support a KASPY DEX Liquidity Pool. MEXC will delist $KASPY on 2026-09-24 at 10:00. We are awaiting a withdrawal timeline from our MEXC reps, but we have requested an extended time-frame. Sometimes the path to greatness is paved by difficult roads, and we are no strangers to trials, difficulties, and opposition. The team will remain intact, engaged, and continuing to move forward as if this delisting is nothing more than a bump in the road. This is #KASPA. We are the $KASPY Crew. We will never stop. $KASPY on $KAS
21
22
123
6,284
GIO-CT5555 𐤊 retweeted
We just want to take a moment to say thank you. The amount of support, patience, and kind messages we’ve received over the last couple of days has honestly meant a lot to us. We’ve read your messages, and we’re extremely grateful to have this community behind us during such unfortunate circumstances. As we’ve already explained in our reports, ZealousSwap itself was not exploited. The issue originated from the KRC 20 indexer, but unfortunately the consequences reached our liquidity pools and affected many of you. We also want to make something clear for anyone who may not know this: the ZealousSwap protocol itself was one of the biggest liquidity providers in both the ZEAL and NACHO pools, so the protocol suffered significant losses alongside everyone else. But when it comes to the recovery plan, recovering the protocol’s own liquidity is not our priority. Our focus is on the community. We are working tirelessly on a recovery plan that is as fair as possible to everyone affected, including those who bought after the incident. There are a lot of moving pieces and we want to make sure we get this right rather than rush into a solution that creates another group of people who are treated unfairly. If recovering users means the protocol never recovers its own lost liquidity, we are prepared for that. Removing the protocol from the recovery equation also makes what we are trying to achieve significantly more realistic. We’re sorry that our community has had to go through this, even though the vulnerability itself was outside of ZealousSwap. Right now, what matters to us is what we do next. Thank you again for sticking with us. ❤️ We’ll share the recovery plan as soon as we’re confident it is the fairest path forward.
9
31
131
6,226