“But to ban guns because criminals use them is to tell the innocent and law-abiding that their rights and liberties depend not on their own conduct, but on the conduct of the guilty and the lawless, and that the law will permit them to have only such rights and liberties as the lawless will allow. ... For society does not control crime, ever, by forcing the law-abiding to accommodate themselves to the expected behavior of criminals. Society controls crime by forcing the criminals to accommodate themselves to the expected behavior of the law-abiding.” - Jeffrey R. Snyder

DECODE CONFLICT SPECIAL ASSESSMENT IRAN’S TWO STRAIT STRATEGY Tehran is attempting something more consequential than another round of proxy warfare. It is building the ability to pressure global shipping at both ends of the Middle East. Iran can threaten the Strait of Hormuz directly. Through the Houthis, it can place the Bab el Mandeb and the southern entrance to the Suez route under pressure indirectly. This is the underexamined strategic picture. The Houthis’ advance toward the Bab el Mandeb is not merely another development in Yemen’s civil war. Control of ports, islands and coastal territory expands their ability to monitor shipping, launch missiles and drones, deploy sea mines and threaten vessels entering the Red Sea. The objective does not require physically closing the waterway. Iran and the Houthis only need to make passage sufficiently dangerous that insurers increase premiums, shipping companies divert around Africa and European consumers absorb the additional cost. That is coercion through commercial risk. The Houthis retain their own leadership and political objectives. They should not be described as remotely controlled Iranian soldiers. But their increasingly sophisticated missile, drone and maritime capabilities were not developed in isolation. Iranian technology, training, components and operational assistance have helped transform a Yemeni armed movement into a regional maritime threat. Tehran gains strategic leverage while avoiding complete responsibility. Europe is especially exposed. The Suez route normally connects European markets with Asian manufacturing, Gulf energy supplies and critical commodities. When ships divert around the Cape of Good Hope, delivery times lengthen, freight costs rise and European supply chains become less competitive. Europe therefore cannot treat Red Sea security as an American, Israeli or Saudi problem. It is the defense of Europe’s own economic bloodstream. Operation Aspides has protected vessels, but escorting ships is not enough when the system generating the attacks remains intact. Europe should expand maritime surveillance, intelligence sharing, convoy coordination and enforcement against the financial, procurement and smuggling networks sustaining Houthi capabilities. The European Union should also impose real consequences on companies, intermediaries and state entities supporting attacks on commercial navigation. Governments cannot condemn the disruption while allowing the enabling networks to operate through European markets. The United States must restore deterrence, but a knockout punch should not mean an indiscriminate war against Iran or the Iranian people. It should mean dismantling the strategic system that allows Tehran to threaten international commerce through proxies. That requires coordinated pressure against the military institutions, financing channels, weapons supply networks and maritime capabilities directly enabling attacks, using lawful and proportionate measures backed by allies. Washington should not carry this burden alone. Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and other capable European states have naval forces, intelligence services and enormous economic leverage. They must contribute more than statements and limited defensive deployments. Freedom of navigation is not a favor granted by armed movements or regional powers. It is a foundation of the international economy. If Iran can threaten Hormuz while its Houthi partner constricts Bab el Mandeb, Tehran gains influence over two of the world’s most important maritime arteries without defeating a single Western military. That is the real strategy. The response must be equally strategic. Protect the shipping lanes. Break the enabling networks. Impose direct costs on those responsible. Keep the coalition united. Make Europe carry its share. DECODE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT Iran is testing whether the West will defend global commerce or merely manage its gradual disruption. A divided response will invite further coercion. A coordinated American and European strategy can deny Tehran the leverage it seeks without turning the conflict into a war against Iran’s population. The sea lanes must remain open. The cost of closing them must become unbearable for those attempting it. #DecodeConflict #Iran #RedSea

Aaron Rodgers says his ex-fiancée, actress Shailene Woodley, told him she had to go "f**k this guy" days after they got engaged. "But not a couple of days after that, she tells me, you know, before we get married, I got to go f**k this guy." "Her story is that I ruined her life and gave her a crazy depression because I left her. But the actuality is she told me that and then she took off the ring by March..."

She said yes with the ring still warm, then two days later asked for one last guy before the wedding. That’s not mixed feelings. That’s a plan she already had. Most people wait years to show you who they are. She did it in 48 hours. The later story about him ruining her life only works if you skip the part where she took the ring off first. He proposed in December. By March the ring was gone. In between was one of the most honest sentences anyone has ever said after getting engaged. Saying yes and immediately requesting a hall pass is rare. Rarer still is turning around later and calling the other person the reason your life fell apart.

IRAN’S DEEPEST SECRET MAY BE UNDER A MOUNTAIN At 33.70500° N, 51.71000° E, near the damaged Natanz complex, Iran is expanding a fortified underground site known as Pickaxe Mountain. Satellite imagery reportedly shows reinforced entrances, new construction and continued excavation. What remains unverified is the facility’s interior and ultimate purpose. It could become a protected location for advanced centrifuges, enriched uranium storage or sensitive nuclear research. Its depth beneath hundreds of feet of rock could make conventional destruction extraordinarily difficult. This is not simply another Iranian bunker. It may represent Tehran’s new strategy: rebuild deeper, disperse critical infrastructure and place the most important capabilities beyond routine inspection and attack. DECODE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT The underground illustration is conceptual, but the strategic warning is real. Iran appears to be replacing visible vulnerability with subterranean resilience. Pickaxe Mountain must not become a permanent blind spot for international inspectors. The most dangerous facility is often the one the world cannot see. #DecodeConflict #Iran #PickaxeMountain

This isn’t “gentle giant” as a slogan. It’s a working guardian who already decided the kid is the thing worth protecting, even while they’re wrestling in the grass.

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Al Green Holds Press Conference to Demand Hormones for ‘Trans’ ICE Detainees

George W Bush Claims Islam Is 'Religion of Peace' for 9/11 Anniversary — So Much for 'Never Forget'

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THE WAR BENEATH THE ARCTIC Russia may be preparing a battlefield NATO cannot easily patrol. During spring 2026, British, Norwegian and American forces reportedly confronted Russian vessels operating near critical undersea cables around Svalbard. Western officials assessed that specialized Russian deep sea units were testing technology capable of damaging cables while making the incident difficult to attribute. No cable was reportedly damaged. But the operation exposed a dangerous strategy. The cables connecting Svalbard with mainland Norway carry communications and data from strategically important satellite facilities. Disrupting them could interfere with Arctic surveillance, commercial communications and the movement of information relied upon by NATO governments. This is how a major confrontation could begin without missiles crossing a border. Russia would not need to destroy the entire internet. It could target carefully selected cables, create multiple failures and force NATO to determine whether the disruption was sabotage, an accident or preparation for something larger. That uncertainty is the weapon. Moscow’s specialized deep sea directorate, commonly known as GUGI, operates submarines and underwater systems designed for missions around seabed infrastructure. Its capabilities make the ocean floor an increasingly important part of Russia’s confrontation with the West. NATO has strengthened surveillance through Baltic Sentry and other regional initiatives. But monitoring the surface is not enough. The alliance needs persistent underwater sensors, protected repair vessels, replacement cable capacity and clear consequences for deliberate sabotage. DECODE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT The Arctic is no longer an empty defensive frontier. It is becoming the concealed infrastructure battlefield connecting satellites, military surveillance and civilian communications. An attack beneath the ocean could paralyze critical systems while remaining below the threshold of conventional war. NATO reportedly stopped the test. The larger question is whether it can stop the real operation. #DecodeConflict #NATO #Arctic

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THE COMPANY THAT INSURES THE SHIP CAN CONTROL THE WAR A sea lane can close on paper before it closes on water. A navy may secure a shipping corridor, destroy missile launchers and escort tankers through a chokepoint. But if insurers withdraw war risk coverage, shipowners may still refuse to enter. No insurance means enormous financial exposure. No protection and indemnity coverage can mean no access to ports, financing or commercial contracts. Crews may also refuse dangerous voyages. This gives hostile states and armed groups a powerful strategy. They do not need to sink every ship. They only need enough attacks, mines, drones or credible threats to make the route commercially unacceptable. The resulting fear moves rapidly through London insurance markets, shipping companies, energy traders and global supply chains. The battlefield therefore extends far beyond the sea. When vessels divert, voyages become longer. Fuel consumption rises. Ships complete fewer journeys. Cargo arrives late. Energy and consumer prices increase thousands of miles from the conflict. This is economic warfare through risk manipulation. The danger is that Western governments often focus on destroying the weapon while overlooking the financial mechanism that gives the weapon strategic power. DECODE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT Future maritime security requires more than naval escorts. The United States and its allies need coordinated government backed war risk protection, rapid intelligence sharing with insurers, secure shipping corridors and credible military consequences for attacks on commercial vessels. Insurers should not be forced to ignore genuine danger. Governments must reduce that danger and prevent hostile powers from weaponizing uncertainty. A missile does not have to sink a tanker to disrupt global trade. Sometimes it only has to change an insurance calculation. #DecodeConflict #MaritimeSecurity #GlobalTrade

THE PENTAGON IS BECOMING AN INVESTMENT BANK America’s next decisive weapon may not begin inside a defense factory. It may begin with a government backed loan. The Pentagon is reportedly considering lending approximately $5 billion to Fluidstack, an artificial intelligence cloud computing company. The proposed financing would come through the Office of Strategic Capital and strengthen domestic supply chains for data center components. The negotiations have not been publicly finalized. But the strategic direction is unmistakable. Modern warfare depends on computing power, secure cloud infrastructure, electrical equipment, advanced chips and enormous quantities of reliable energy. If America cannot produce or protect these systems, it cannot maintain artificial intelligence superiority during a prolonged conflict. Traditional defense procurement purchases equipment after requirements have been established. Strategic financing attempts to build industrial capacity before the military urgently needs it. The Pentagon has already used this approach to support rare earth processing, permanent magnets and drone manufacturing. Artificial intelligence infrastructure could become its largest and most consequential expansion. China has spent decades directing capital toward industries it considers strategically essential. America is now responding with its own model, combining private innovation with federal financing. There are risks. Large government loans require strict financial review, measurable national security benefits and protection against political favoritism. A company receiving public support must deliver real industrial capacity, not merely a higher private valuation. DECODE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT The proposed loan represents more than artificial intelligence policy. It signals that the Pentagon increasingly views capital itself as an instrument of national power. Future wars may be decided before the first missile is launched by the country that finances the strongest factories, energy systems, data centers and supply chains. America is no longer funding only weapons. It is financing the industrial ecosystem that will build the next generation of warfare. #DecodeConflict #Pentagon #ArtificialIntelligence

FLASHBACK: Donald Trump interviewed near Ground Zero just days after 9/11. On one of America’s darkest days 25 years ago, Trump had hundreds of men helping with the aftermath. Leading by example.

Days after the towers fell, Trump wasn’t hiding behind a podium. He was down there with his crews, trying to help in the mess when most people were still in shock. That’s the clip they keep hoping you’ll forget. Words are easy. Showing up when the air still smells like smoke is harder.

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AMERICA’S AMMUNITION PROBLEM BEGINS IN A CHEMICAL PLANT A missile may cost millions of dollars, but it cannot be manufactured without specialized chemicals produced by a remarkably small industrial network. Energetic materials are the propellants and explosives that give artillery shells, rockets and missiles their power. They include military grade nitrocellulose and other specialized compounds that cannot be replaced by ordinary commercial chemicals. This is the hidden bottleneck inside America’s arsenal. The United States can build additional shell bodies, missile casings and assembly lines. But production cannot expand faster than the supply of explosives, propellants, chemical precursors and qualified workers needed to manufacture them safely. Several critical materials have historically depended on a limited number of facilities. Radford Army Ammunition Plant in Virginia is central to domestic military propellant production. Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee produces important military explosives. These facilities are strategic assets, but concentration creates risk. A major accident, cyberattack, equipment failure or supply interruption at one plant could affect numerous weapons programs simultaneously. America is investing in modernization and additional capacity. That effort must continue because stockpile strength is not measured only by how many weapons are stored today. It is measured by how rapidly the nation can replace weapons during a prolonged conflict. DECODE CONFLICT ASSESSMENT The defense industrial base is only as strong as its least visible supplier. America needs multiple domestic sources for critical energetic materials, modernized government ammunition plants, larger reserves of essential precursors and long term contracts that allow private companies to invest confidently. Missile production does not begin with the missile. It begins with chemistry. The country that controls the ingredients controls the rate of fire. #DecodeConflict #AmericanDefense #DefenseIndustry

Some moments just don’t allow for a laugh. When families are reading the names of 3,000 people who never came home, the last thing anyone needs to see is their mayor and a congresswoman sharing a grin. Whether it lasted two seconds or twenty, the optics are terrible and the timing is worse.

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Mamdani and AOC LAUGH as Names of Honored Dead Read Aloud at 9/11 Memorial Muslim NYC Mayor Zohran Mamdani and Democrat Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez were seen laughing as the names of the honored dead were read aloud at the 9/11 Memorial on Friday.