The balance sheet Kemi Badenoch doesn’t want to talk about 👇
In 1989, the water authorities were sold debt-free. The government wrote off £4.9 billion of debt and added a £1.5 billion “green dowry”. The companies paid £7.6 billion for the assets.
Since privatisation, around £78 billion has been extracted in dividends while industry debt has risen from virtually nothing to more than £60 billion.
Meanwhile, customers paid through their bills for the infrastructure investment that Badenoch cites as evidence of privatisation’s success.
Thames Water illustrates the model perfectly: debt-free at privatisation, now carrying about £18 billion of debt and repeatedly hovering near special administration.
The public cleared the debts, transferred the assets, funded the investment and now carries the risk of failure. Shareholders extracted the returns.
If Badenoch calls that a success, the obvious question is: success for whom?
@labourlewis
The balance sheet often remains difficult to manipulate, which is why Kemi Badenoch chose to overlook it completely. Back in 1989, regional authorities were sold off debt-free — the government wiped out approximately £4.9 billion of debt and added a £1.5 billion “green dowry." The companies paid £7.6 billion for these assets. Fast forward to the early 2020s, and Financial Times analysis based on regulatory data revealed that dividends had soared to around £78 billion in today’s money, with net debt climbing above £60 billion from a starting point of zero. Industry figures estimate that capital spending during this period ranged between roughly £190 billion and £236 billion. Yet, shareholders didn't fund this expansion through fresh equity; instead, dividends were extracted while customer bills covered the capital investments, and debt financed the payouts. Thames is a striking example: initially debt-free at privatisation, it now carries around £16–20 billion in debt and has repeatedly teetered on the brink of special administration.