7) The real distribution opportunity is much larger than 25M The Investor Day added an important piece to the thesis. Management estimates ~184M lives of open opportunity in the commercial markets $OMDA already serves. More importantly, 150M+ additional lives already sit inside networks of partners Omada has signed. These people aren’t Omada members yet, and many aren’t currently offered the benefit. But the underlying PBM/health-plan relationship is already in place. Several newer relationships remain around ~1% penetration or below, while some mature partnerships exceed 30%. There's a huge amount of white space inside infrastructure Omada has already built.

8) Existing distribution should become more valuable over time Having millions of covered lives only matters if $OMDA can convert them into members, and the enrollment engine is improving materially. Email conversion has more than doubled over the last two years, including another ~30% YoY increase from H1 2025 to H1 2026. Employer-led and onsite outreach has increased enrollments by ~33%, while management says conversion can be roughly 3x higher when Omada has more control over member communications. That matters because the member is already eligible, the payer relationship already exists, and the benefit is already funded. Small conversion improvements across tens of millions of covered lives can translate into meaningful incremental revenue without proportional acquisition costs. At the same time, newer PBM relationships could mature faster than Omada’s legacy channels. Historically, Omada might enter a relationship with one product, prove outcomes, and spend years cross-selling others. Today, newer channels increasingly launch with multiple products from day one, and roughly 40-50% of new deals are now multi-product. Healthcare sales cycles are also still long. Major partner relationships can take ~2 years to establish, followed by another 12-18 months for employers to adopt through the channel. That also means much of the work done with CVS, Optum and others should only begin becoming visible in 2027 and beyond.

Quick pause before I continue: I write a newsletter where I share my full portfolio, deep dives on new investments, earnings reviews, and thesis updates. I’ve been writing about $OMDA since I first bought shares in December, including a detailed review of every earnings report since then. Link in bio. Now, back to the thesis.

9) Cross-selling is another huge lever Only around 33% of $OMDA's current contracts are multi-product. That means roughly two-thirds of customers still have additional programs Omada can sell into, and not every product has the same economics. Management estimates five-year lifetime revenue per member of roughly: MSK: $0.7k Prevention: $1.1k Cholesterol: $1.1k Hypertension: $1.2k Diabetes: $2.0k Prescribing: $3.9k So Omada can grow in two ways at once: More members inside existing distribution + more revenue per relationship through additional programs. Both sit on top of much of the same infrastructure.

10) The platform can expand much further Cross-selling today’s products is only part of the opportunity. $OMDA already covers Prevention & Weight Health, Diabetes, Hypertension, Cholesterol, MSK, GLP-1 Care, and Prescribing. But the Investor Day gave us a glimpse of where the platform could go next. Management highlighted potential expansion into areas including: • CKD • sleep apnea • heart failure • fatty liver • osteoarthritis / chronic joint pain • additional prescribing • specialist consultations • labs and broader device capabilities Importantly, these aren't announced products. But management said the categories shown have already come up in customer conversations, while additional products currently being developed haven’t even been announced yet. That matters because Omada’s expansion has historically been customer-led rather than TAM-led. Cholesterol is a perfect example. Costco identified it as an area where its population was underperforming and asked Omada whether it could build a solution. Omada did, and Costco said the early results have been encouraging. The company doesn’t need to become everything in healthcare. It can keep moving deeper into adjacent conditions where it already has the clinical infrastructure, data, customer relationships, and most importantly, the distribution.

11) The unit economics are already improving TTM revenue per member has stayed relatively stable: $286 → $286 → $279 → $284. But gross profit per member increased: $157 → $175 → $183 → $199. $OMDA doesn’t need ARPU to explode for the business to become materially more profitable. Higher-value product mix, longer engagement, lower delivery costs, automation, and care team productivity can do most of the work. Retention has improved too. Roughly 43% of members were retained 2.5 years ago. Today, 58%, and management says new members generally reach contribution breakeven by month three. Longer engagement therefore becomes extremely valuable because most onboarding costs are already behind the company.

12) AI as an efficiency tool I don’t think the $OMDA's AI thesis is about replacing healthcare professionals with chatbots. Management’s strategy remains human-led and AI-enabled. AI is being used to summarize interactions, surface context, triage escalations, recommend next actions, and help care teams manage more members. 100% of Omada’s engineers are also using AI coding tools, with management estimating engineering output per employee is up ~15% versus 2024. None of those improvements is revolutionary individually, but if AI simultaneously improves enrollment, increases retention, raises care team capacity, accelerates product development, and slows headcount growth, the cumulative impact could be substantial.

13) The thesis is much broader than GLP-1s This is one area where my view has changed. When I first invested, I expected GLP-1 demand to be one of the primary reasons $OMDA would outperform consensus in 2026. Instead, the broader business has simply performed better than expected. Diabetes and Hypertension are growing over 50% YoY. Enrollment keeps improving. Margins are expanding. And GLP-1 members have remained relatively stable as a percentage of the member base. I actually prefer this outcome. GLP-1 billings are still growing rapidly, up 52% YoY, and those members show ~14% higher engagement. But Omada’s future isn't dependent on a single drug category. This is a broader cardiometabolic platform thesis.

14) Now look at the financial execution... 2025 revenue grew 53% to $260.2M. $OMDA generated positive EBITDA, positive FCF, and reached GAAP profitability in Q4. At the IPO, consensus expected ~$222M of 2025 revenue and a ~$19M adjusted EBITDA loss. The company delivered $260M of revenue and +$6.5M of EBITDA instead. That’s almost $40M of revenue outperformance and more than $25M of EBITDA outperformance within roughly six months of going public. This is what originally attracted me to the story: Analysts weren’t just underestimating growth. They were (and still are) also underestimating the earnings power that growth could create. This is the kind of company where you can reasonably expect a beat-and-raise every quarter. And 2026 has only strengthened that argument Q1 revenue grew 42% YoY. Q2 grew another 43% to $87.8M. In Q2: • 73% GAAP gross margin • 74% non-GAAP GM • $10.8M adj. EBITDA • 12.3% adj. EBITDA margin • 1.091M members, +45% Revenue increased $26.4M YoY while adj. EBITDA improved by ~$11M. That’s roughly a 41% incremental EBITDA margin, and it happened while $OMDA continued investing in growth. Operating leverage is no longer theoretical.

15) Expectations keep moving higher driven by strong execution Original 2026 revenue guidance: $312M-$322M After Q1: $322M-$330M After Q2: $334M-$340M Adj. EBITDA guidance went: $7M-$15M → $14M-$20M → $21M-$27M Then the Investor Day went one step further. Management raised its long-term non-GAAP gross-margin target from 70% to 80% and its long-term adj. EBITDA target from 20% to 30%, while reiterating expectations for at least 20% annual revenue growth over the foreseeable future. When I first invested, consensus was modeling something closer to a low-margin healthcare business. And honestly, it still is. The company itself is now describing a very different mature model, exactly what I said would inevitably happen.

16) The growth is more visible than it looks Another recent disclosure I think matters a lot: Historically, ~75% of annual revenue is already visible or highly visible when $OMDA enters the year. That comes primarily from existing members and predictable enrollment inside existing customers. Only ~25% depends on new business and upsells. That changes how I think about the risk profile. A company growing this fast might look like it needs to constantly win huge new contracts just to maintain momentum. Omada doesn’t. A large portion of the next year is already supported by relationships and members currently in place. Combined with $221.7M of cash, no debt, and improving FCF generation, I think the setup is unusually strong for a company growing at this pace.

17) So what could $OMDA eventually be worth? Omada gives us unusually good visibility into the main drivers: covered lives, penetration, partner white space, product attach rates, retention, program economics, and long-term margin targets. Management currently guides to $334-$340M of 2026 revenue. I think ~$350M is achievable. From there, a ~30% CAGR through 2030 would take Omada to ~$1B of revenue. That may sound aggressive at first, but it looks more reasonable when you consider that the company is currently growing at more than 40%, with several meaningful catalysts that could support continued strong growth going forward. At a 30% EBITDA margin, that gets you to ~$300M of EBITDA. At 20x EBITDA, the math gets to ~$100/share. To be clear, this isn't a price target. It’s simply a scenario showing what the business could look like if execution remains strong. That said, I view this as entirely plausible, with the potential for further upside. For those criticizing the use of EBITDA rather than GAAP Net Income or FCF, it’s worth noting that this is a business model with very high FCF conversion.

18) Risks The biggest one remains channel concentration. At the contracting level, Cigna and Express Scripts represent roughly 34% and 28% of billings, and both ultimately sit under the same parent company. However, the underlying customer exposure is more diversified: Largest end customer: ~15% Second: ~10% Third: ~5% Fourth and below: <2% each CVS, Optum, HCSC, and newer relationships should gradually reduce concentration, but losing a major channel would still matter. That said, there’s no indication that any partner has ever left $OMDA, nor does there appear to be much incentive to do so. Cigna is also a shareholder in the company, and given that partnering with Omada can help reduce total healthcare costs, the interests of both parties appear to be closely aligned. Other risks include long healthcare sales cycles, competition, limited pricing power, reimbursement/regulatory changes, and the simple fact that maintaining 40%+ growth gets harder as the revenue base increases. The question is whether today’s valuation adequately reflects those risks relative to the upside.