Otávio Fakhoury, empresário, investidor e ex-executivo de mercado financeiro.

This is a very bad warning sign for stocks
Junk bonds continue to sound the alarm. CCC-rated junk bond spreads are widening while the S&P 500 remains near its August peak. Historically, when these markets diverge, stocks have eventually caught up with the trend in junk spreads. And the bigger the divergence, the bigger the potential catch-up. This is a chart we'll be watching closely. See 18 charts sounding an alarm in the markets: ow.ly/zE1g50ZRtLf
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Faka 🇧🇷🇧🇷🇮🇱🇺🇸🇱🇧 retweeted
Junk bonds continue to sound the alarm. CCC-rated junk bond spreads are widening while the S&P 500 remains near its August peak. Historically, when these markets diverge, stocks have eventually caught up with the trend in junk spreads. And the bigger the divergence, the bigger the potential catch-up. This is a chart we'll be watching closely. See 18 charts sounding an alarm in the markets: ow.ly/zE1g50ZRtLf
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Em recente participação no @irontalksbr, relembramos a famosa "parábola da nota média", que explica com clareza e simplicidade porque o socialismo está fadado ao fracasso. A saber, pq destrói o incentivo individual para o trabalho duro e a excelência, tão necessários para a geração de valor que move o crescimento econômico e o aumento da riqueza de uma nação. Com @luizferoxo e @FelipeSestaro.
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30 anos de prova do fracasso do socialismo. Não é a toa que a China comunista teve que permitir uma certa dose de liberalismo econômico. Mas nunca abandonaram o controle social e a falsa idéia de que planejar dentro de gabinetes a economia e a alocação de capital era necessária para o maximo desenvolvimento do país. Até as taxas de natalidade eram até há pouco tempo atrás controladas pelo governo. As consequências disso estamos vendo hje, com a crise/crash imobiliário e o salvamento recorde de bancos e governos regionais. E seguiremos vendo as consequências desses malinvestments por anos adiante.
Prices carry information that no central planner can replicate. Mao Zedong spent three decades proving this at the cost of roughly 45 million dead in the Great Leap Forward famine alone. Deng Xiaoping's 1978 Household Responsibility System did one essential thing: it let farmers in Anhui province keep surplus grain after meeting state quotas and sell it at market prices. That single change, price signals attached to individual ownership, triggered an immediate production explosion. Chinese grain output jumped from 305 million tons in 1978 to 407 million tons by 1984. Collectivization severs the connection between effort and reward. State procurement prices had disconnected individual incentive from output. Peasants farming communal land had no reason to produce beyond the minimum, and hundreds of millions starved because of that severed connection. When Deng restored prices, he restored the coordination mechanism Mao had destroyed. Capital, labor, and land started flowing toward productive uses because individuals now captured the gains from productive decisions. Maoism's failure was not execution or insufficient resources. The ideology itself was the catastrophe. Command allocation cannot substitute for price signals because prices aggregate dispersed local knowledge that no Beijing committee possesses or ever will. Every year China kept markets contained to agriculture while maintaining state industry, growth stalled in those sectors. Every liberalization produced the same result: output rose. Prosperity follows from prices and property rights. Deleting those two things leads to poverty, famine, and death.
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Como eu venho alertando vcs por aqui, a despeito de eventuais manchetes contrárias na mídia, a alta nos juros não é fruto de um aumento nas expectativas inflacionárias e sim de uma reprecificação do custo do dinheiro no tempo (juros reais). Como eu disse a vcs no ano passado, a era do dinheiro abundante e barato ficou pra trás.
The Real Warning From the 30 Year TIPS Yield The 30 year TIPS yield has surged to roughly 3.2%, one of the highest real yields of the modern era. The important signal is not simply that Treasury yields are rising. It is that investors can now earn roughly 3.2% above inflation from long dated U.S. government debt. TIPS are Treasury Inflation Protected Securities. Their principal adjusts with inflation, so the yield represents the real return investors demand after inflation compensation. A 3.2% TIPS yield therefore does not mean the market expects 3.2% inflation. It means the real cost of long term capital has risen dramatically. The real cost of money has reset At the end of 2021 the 30 year real Treasury yield was around negative 0.4%. By the end of 2022 it had risen to roughly 1.7%. It reached about 2.6% during 2023 and is now near 3.2%. That is an increase of roughly 365 basis points from the end of 2021. This matters because every investment now competes against a government security offering a substantial inflation protected return. Commercial real estate, stocks, corporate debt, private equity, infrastructure and new business investment all have to generate sufficiently higher returns to compensate investors for taking additional risk. The hurdle rate for the entire economy has moved higher. Why This Is Different From An Inflation Scare The nominal 30 year Treasury yield is around 5.4% while the real 30 year TIPS yield is around 3.2%. The difference implies long term inflation compensation around 2.2% to 2.3%. More importantly, much of the latest increase in nominal yields has come from rising real yields rather than a dramatic increase in inflation compensation. That means the market is not merely demanding protection from inflation. It is demanding a much larger real return for committing capital for decades. That is a considerably more restrictive financial condition. Where The Damage Appears Higher real yields immediately reduce the present value of future cash flows, but the economic damage often arrives with a lag. A company carrying debt at 3% may continue operating normally even while market rates rise dramatically. The problem begins when that debt matures and must be refinanced at 6%, 7% or more. That is why commercial real estate, leveraged businesses, private credit and weaker corporations deserve particular attention. The stress does not arrive everywhere simultaneously. Debt matures in waves. Higher real rates can therefore quietly accumulate pressure for years before a visible credit event appears. History Shows The Lag Real yields surged during the 2013 taper tantrum without producing an immediate recession. The economy was strong enough to absorb the adjustment. The 2022 rate shock was different. Rising rates created enormous unrealized losses on long duration assets and eventually exposed balance sheet weaknesses in parts of the banking system during 2023. The critical lesson is that the yield increase and the eventual break do not have to happen at the same time. Valuations adjust first. Refinancing pressure follows. Credit problems can appear later. And by the time the damage becomes obvious, Treasury yields may already be falling as markets begin pricing weaker growth. What Matters Now The most dangerous combination is not simply a 3.2% real yield. It is high real yields persisting while the cash flows available to service debt begin deteriorating. Add weaker hiring, restrictive monetary policy and an energy shock that raises operating costs, and businesses can face falling margins at precisely the moment refinancing costs rise. That is where a high real yield stops being a market curiosity and becomes an economic transmission mechanism. The 30 year TIPS chart is telling us something very important. That inflation adjusted cost of capital has reset..
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Faka 🇧🇷🇧🇷🇮🇱🇺🇸🇱🇧 retweeted
Interest rates have come a long way since 2020. Today, the 30-year Treasury yield is back at levels last seen in 2004, while the 10-year yield has reached levels last seen in 2007. Back in 2020, with rates near zero, Bob Prechter's Theorist wrote: “The probability is high that interest rates have begun a process of rising….” How high could rates go from here?
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Faka 🇧🇷🇧🇷🇮🇱🇺🇸🇱🇧 retweeted
The Fed and banks create new money and hand it to borrowers first. By the time that money reaches your paycheck or savings account, prices have already adjusted upward. You paid the inflation tax. The banks booked the gains. Richard Cantillon identified this mechanism in the 1730s. New money does not spread evenly across an economy like water filling a bathtub. It flows through specific channels, enriching whoever receives it first before prices rise, then destroying purchasing power for everyone downstream. Look at post-2008 numbers. The Federal Reserve expanded its balance sheet from roughly $900 billion in 2008 to $4.5 trillion by 2015. The S&P 500 tripled. Real wages for median workers barely moved. Wall Street firms and Treasury-connected primary dealers received the new money at near-zero rates, bought assets, and watched those assets inflate in price. Your grocery bill followed later. The Federal Reserve acts as a wealth-transfer mechanism, supposedly creating stability and employment. This is a political outcome, not a market outcome. Governments grant the Fed its monopoly on money creation. Political connections determine who borrows first, cheapest, and largest. The system produces inequality by design, then politicians blame the market for the results.
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A situação imobiliária na China segue em deterioração. Qdo 70% do patrimônio das famílias chinesas é representada por imóveis, a situação se complica ainda mais.
The picture is getting worse for China’s property market. With homes representing more than 70% of household wealth in China, a deeper property downturn could have significant implications. And what happens if global stocks start falling, too? Get free market insights - ow.ly/vNNt50ZQI5N
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Faka 🇧🇷🇧🇷🇮🇱🇺🇸🇱🇧 retweeted
The picture is getting worse for China’s property market. With homes representing more than 70% of household wealth in China, a deeper property downturn could have significant implications. And what happens if global stocks start falling, too? Get free market insights - ow.ly/vNNt50ZQI5N
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US 10yr Tsy bateu hje 5,12%. Quem me acompanha aqui não tem porque estar surpreso.
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A todos vcs que esperam pelo colapso do USD, entendam que o USD é um crédito, uma promissória assinada pelo Federal Reserve, cuja garantia é outra promissória, assinada pelo Tesouro dos EUA. Sendo assim, a dívida dos EUA é a principal garantia hje para e emissão de mais créditos em dólar, principalmente através das operações de repo (taxa SOFR). Além disso, outros créditos em dólar existem, lastreados em outros ativos. Enquanto houverem credores e tomadores que aceitem abrir contratos de dívida/crédito em USD, mediante boas garantias, na quantidade suficiente para pelo menos pagar os juros dos créditos já existentes, não haverá colapso do dólar. O tão falado debasement trade precisa de mais e mais contratos de crédito em dólar (mais funding em dolar/mais short dólares) para ser sustentável. Quem aposta no debasement está apostando nisso, apostando que o dólar seguirá tendo oferta via emissão de créditos cada vez maior, sem limite. Logo, apostar no debasement não é apostar no fim do dólar, e sim na sua continuidade como moeda global de funding e transações. Ironicamente, eh a diminuição ou cessação da oferta de novos créditos, ou a não capacidade de seguir devendo, tendo como consequência uma redução dos créditos em aberto, via liquidação, pré-pagamento, moratória, que poderia trazer à tona o real debate sobre o fim do dólar. Nesse cenário, há uma subida generalizada nos juros (principalmente no componente spread de crédito). Pois esse cenário representa uma busca maior por liquidez/caixa, em troca de quaisquer ativos, financeiros ou não, que podem ser trocados por caixa, uma busca muitas vezes maior do que a capacidade de "imprimir" novos créditos em dólar. Um evento desse tipo, uma desalavancagem de enormes proporções, é o que de fato permitiria ao mundo efetivamente reduzir sua dependência do dólar.
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Logo, é o rebasement trade que traria a real possibilidade de se discutir o fim do dólar como moeda global de reserva. Pois sem uma desvalorização dos créditos em dólar, e ou redução do estoque de créditos em dólar, o dólar seguirá acessível e fácil como moeda de preferência para todas as transações mundiais.
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E o convite para debater tudo isso e muito mais, em um podcast, que eu já fiz a ele no passado, será que agora ele vai aceitar?
Agora ele vai acertar?
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Se esse é o critério, já poderíamos ter marcado pq eu acertei algumas boas. A principal delas é a taxa de juros. Quem acompanha o que eu e o professor @luizferoxo falamos no Giro da Semana todos os domingos já sabe disso. Quanto à concordar mais que discordar, isso não reduz a importância nem a graça de uma boa conversa/debate. Pelo contrário, acho que muitos acharão enriquecedor. Logo, refaço o convite para essa conversa/debate ao vivo em qquer canal de finanças/mercados da sua escolha.
Replying to @opropriofaka
Vou aguardar você acertar uma e combinamos mas acho que você iria se decepcionar pois iriamos concordar mais que discordar e não teria tanta graça. Talvez a divergência maior fosse direcional do curto/médio prazo. Abs., JP.
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